# CHAPTER 58 — The Multitude Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince

Nothing is more unreliable or inconstant than a crowd of people: so affirms our Livy, like all the other historians. It often occurs that in recounting the deeds of men we see the crowd has condemned someone to death and has later lamented this fact and deeply regretted it, as we see the Roman people did with Manlius Capitolinus, whom they first condemned to death and then deeply regretted it. And these are the words of the author: ‘Before long the people remembered only his good qualities, now that there was no danger from him, and regretted their loss.’ * Elsewhere, when Livy is recounting the events that arose in Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero, he declares: ‘indeed, that is the nature of crowds: the mob is either a humble slave or a cruel master.’ * I do not know if, wishing to defend an argument which, as I have said, all writers attack, I may not be assuming a task that is difficult and full of so many problems that it will be necessary for me either to abandon it, earning shame, or to pursue it, earning blame. But however that may be, I do not think, nor shall I ever think, that it is a mistake to defend any opinion through arguments without using either authority or force.

I must say, therefore, that the defect for which writers blame the crowd can be attributed to all men individually and most of all to princes, for each person who is not regulated by the laws will commit the very same errors as an uncontrolled crowd of people. And this can be easily understood, for there exist and have existed many princes, and the good and wise ones have been few in number: I am speaking of princes who have been able to break the constraints that can correct them, among whom may not be numbered those kings who arose in Egypt when, in the most distant antiquity, that province was governed by laws, nor those kings who arose in Sparta, nor those who in our own days arise in France, a kingdom which is regulated more by laws than any other kingdom in our times about which we have information. These kings that arise under such constitutions are not to be placed among that number whose individual natures we must consider in order to see if they resemble the multitude. Such a comparison must be made with a multitude likewise regulated by laws, just as they are, and that same goodness we find in these kings will be seen in that crowd, and we shall see that it neither rules arrogantly nor humbly obeys, just like the Roman people, who never humbly served nor arrogantly ruled, while the republic endured uncorrupted; indeed, with their institutions and magistrates, they held to their ranks honourably. When it became necessary to rise up against a powerful individual, they did so, as can be seen in the cases of Manlius, the decemvirs, and others whom they sought to suppress; and when it was necessary to obey the dictators and the consuls for the public welfare, they did so. If the Roman people regretted the death of Manlius Capitolanus, it is not surprising, for they regretted the loss of his exceptional abilities, which were such that their memory alone aroused everyone’s compassion, and they would have had the power to produce the same effect in a prince, because all writers believe the rule that exceptional ability is to be praised and to be admired even in one’s enemies. Moreover, if Manlius had been resurrected amidst so much regret, the people of Rome would have pronounced upon him the same judgement as they had before, after they dragged him out of prison and a short time later condemned him to death; notwithstanding this fact, we can see princes reputed to be wise who have put to death some person and then deeply regretted it, as Alexander did in the case of Cleitus and his other friends, and as Herod did with Mariamne. * But what our historian says about the nature of the crowd, he does not apply to a multitude regulated by laws, as was the Roman people, but to an uncontrolled multitude, like the one in Syracuse, which made the same errors that angry and undisciplined men such as Alexander the Great and Herod committed in the cases mentioned. Still, the nature of the multitude is no more to be blamed than that of princes, for all err in equal measure when they err without fear of punishment. Besides those I have mentioned, there are many examples of this both among Roman emperors and among other tyrants and princes, where we can see as much inconstancy and as many changes in character as were ever found in any crowd.

I conclude, therefore, contrary to common opinion that says that peoples (when they hold power) are variable, changeable, and ungrateful, affirming that in them there exist no other sins than exist in particular princes. If anyone were to blame peoples and princes alike, he might be telling the truth; but he would be deceiving himself by excluding princes, for a people that exercises power and is well organized will be stable, prudent, and grateful no differently from a prince, or better than a prince, and will even be considered wise; and, on the other hand, a prince freed from the restraint of the laws will be even more ungrateful, variable, and imprudent than a people. The variation in their conduct arises not from a different nature (for this in all men is the same, and if there is a surplus of good, it resides in the people), but from having more or less respect for the laws under which one or the other lives. Anyone who considers the Roman people will see that for 400 years they were enemies of the very title of king and lovers of the glory and the welfare of their native city, and he will see many examples displayed by them in Rome that bear witness to both of these qualities. If anyone were to remind me of the ingratitude that the multitude displayed against Scipio, I would respond with the same argument I made above when this subject was discussed at length, where it was demonstrated that peoples are less ungrateful than princes. * But with respect to prudence and stability, I would say that a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgement than a prince. It is not without reason that the voice of a people is compared with that of God, for it is obvious that popular opinion is wondrously effective in its predictions, to the extent that it seems to be able to foresee its own good and evil fortune through some occult power. As for making judgements, when the people hear two opposing speakers of equal skill taking different sides, it is only on the rarest occasions that it does not select the best opinion and that it is not capable of understanding the truth it hears. If in matters of courage or of seeming utility, as was mentioned above, the people errs, a prince will also often err because of his own passions, which are more numerous than those of a people. It is also evident that in the selection of magistrates the people make far better choices than a prince, for one can never persuade the people that it is good to elect to public office an infamous man with corrupted habits, something that a prince can be persuaded to do easily and in a thousand ways. It can be seen how a people may begin to loathe something and will remain of this opinion for many centuries, something that is not true of a prince. In both of these two matters I think the Roman people bears sufficient witness, for in so many hundreds of years and in so many elections of consuls and tribunes, they did not make four choices which they were forced to regret. And, as I have mentioned, the Roman people so hated the very title of king that no merit on the part of any citizen who aspired to that title could enable him to avoid the just penalties. Besides this, it is evident that cities where the people hold power quickly make enormous conquests and much greater ones than cities which have always been under the rule of a prince, as Rome did after she drove out the kings, and Athens after she freed herself of Pisistratus. This can arise from nothing other than the fact that governments by peoples are better than governments by princes. Nor would I wish that all of what our historian says on this matter in the previously cited passage or in any other be used to counter this view of mine, because if we are to discuss all the disorders under peoples and all those under princes, all the glories under peoples and all those under princes, we shall see that in goodness and in glory, the people are by far superior. And if princes are superior to the people in enacting laws, forming civil societies, establishing statues and new institutions, the people are so much superior in maintaining the things established that, without any doubt, they add to the glory of those who established them.

Finally, to conclude this argument, let me say that just as the states of princes have long endured, the states of republics have long endured, and both have needed to be regulated by laws, because a prince who is able to do what he wishes is mad, and a people that can do what it wishes is not wise. If, therefore, we are discussing a prince legally bound by the laws and a people enchained by them, more ability can be observed in the people than in the prince; if we are discussing both of them in an unregulated state, fewer errors will be observed in the people than in the prince, and these will be less serious and will have greater remedies. But a good man can speak to an intractable and unruly people and can easily lead them back down the right path; nobody can speak to an evil prince, nor is there any other remedy for him than the sword. From this, one can speculate about the importance of their respective maladies: that is, if words are enough to cure the malady of the people, and that of the prince requires a sword, there will never be anyone who will not judge that where there is greater need for a cure, there exist greater flaws. When a people is thoroughly unrestrained, neither its foolish actions nor the evil at hand need be feared, but rather the evil that may arise from them, since a tyrant may arise amid so much confusion. But with evil princes the opposite happens: the present evil is to be feared and the future holds hope, since men persuade themselves that the prince’s wicked life can cause a state of liberty to arise. Thus, you see the difference between the two, which is the difference between things that are and things that are to be. The cruelties of the multitude are directed against those whom they fear will take possession of the public property; those of a prince are directed against anyone he fears will take possession of his own property. But this sentiment against the people arises because everyone speaks badly about the people without fear and in complete freedom even while the people rule; everyone always speaks badly about princes with a thousand fears and a thousand reservations. Nor does it seem beside the point to me, since this subject leads me to it, to discuss in the following chapter the kinds of confederations that are most reliable, those created with a republic or those created with a prince.