# CHAPTER 55 — How Easily Affairs Are Conducted in a City Where the Populace Is Not Corrupted; and That Where Equality Exists, a Principality Cannot Be Created, and Where No Equality Exists, a Republic Cannot Be Created

Although what is to be feared and hoped for from corrupted cities has been amply discussed above, nevertheless it does not seem beyond my purpose to consider a decision of the senate concerning the vow made by Camillus to give Apollo the tenth part of the spoils taken from the Veientes. These spoils had already passed into the hands of the Roman plebeians and since there was no means of accounting for them, the senate issued an edict ordering everyone to return to the public treasury the tenth part of what he had seized. Although this decision was not carried out, since, to the plebeians’ satisfaction, the senate later adopted another means and other ways to please Apollo, it is, nevertheless, evident from such a decision how much that senate relied upon the goodness of the plebeians and how it judged that no one would fail to return exactly what the edict commanded them to return. On the other hand, it is evident that the plebeians did not think of cheating on the edict in any way by returning less than they should, but thought, instead, of freeing themselves from the edict by openly demonstrating their indignation over it. This example, along with many others that have been cited above, shows how much goodness and religion were in that people and how much good was to be expected from it.

And truly, where this goodness does not exist, nothing good can be hoped for, just as nothing can be hoped for in those provinces which in our own times are seen to be corrupt, as is the case in Italy above all others. Even France and Spain share to some degree in this corruption, and if in these provinces as many disorders cannot be seen as arise every day in Italy, this derives not so much from the goodness of their peoples, which in large measure has disappeared, as from their having a king who keeps them united, not only through his own exceptional skill but also through the institutions of those kingdoms, which are not damaged beyond hope. It is quite evident that in the province of Germany this goodness and religion are still strong among the people; this causes many republics there to flourish in liberty and to obey their laws in such a fashion that no one outside or within these republics dares to occupy them. And to show it is true that a good portion of that ancient goodness still prevails in these republics, I wish to give an example similar to the one cited above about the senate and the Roman plebeians. When these republics need to spend some amount of money for the public welfare, the magistracies or councils that have the authority to do so assess all the inhabitants of the city at 1 or 2 per cent of their income. Once they have made this decision, according to the regulations of the city, each citizen comes before the tax-collectors, and after he has taken an oath to pay the proper sum, he throws into a strong-box designated for this purpose what, according to the dictates of his conscience, he thinks he must pay; of this payment there is no other witness except the person who pays. Hence, it is possible to surmise how much goodness and religion still exist in these men. It must be assumed that each citizen pays the right sum, because if this sum were not paid, the tax would not produce the amount they estimated on the basis of what they usually collected in the past; if someone did not pay the fraud would be recognized, and with this recognition, some means other than this would be employed. Such goodness is all the more to be admired in these times since it is so rare; indeed, it is clear that this practice has survived only in that province. This arises from two causes: the first is that they have no extensive contacts with their neighbours, for their neighbours have not gone to visit them, nor have they themselves visited anyone else, because they are content with these goods—to live on the foods, and to dress themselves with the wools the country produces; in this way, the reason for any contact and the beginnings of any kind of corruption have been eliminated, since they have not been able to take up the habits of either the French, the Spanish, or the Italians, nations which taken together constitute the corruption of the world. The other reason is that these republics, where an uncorrupted body politic has been maintained, do not tolerate any of their citizens acting or living like noblemen: on the contrary, they maintain among themselves a clear equality; they are the mortal enemies of those lords and noblemen who live in that province, and if by chance some of them fall into their hands, they are killed as the source of corruption and the cause of every conflict.

To explain more clearly what this title of nobleman means, I will say that men are called noble who, in a state of idleness, live luxuriously off the revenue from their properties without paying any attention whatsoever either to the cultivation of the land or to any other exertion necessary to make a living. Such men as these are pernicious in every republic and in every province, but the most pernicious are those who, besides the aforementioned fortunes, also have castles at their command and subjects who obey them. Of these two kinds of men the kingdom of Naples, the papal states, Romagna, and Lombardy are full. Hence, it happens that in these provinces no republic or any body politic has ever arisen, for men of this kind are completely hostile to any form of civil life. And to try to introduce a republic into provinces organized in a similar way would not be possible, but to try to reorganize them, if there were anyone capable of serving as arbiter in such matters, would mean finding no other solution than to establish a kingdom there. The reason is this: that where there exists so much corrupt material that the laws are insufficient to restrain it, it is necessary to institute there, together with these laws, an even greater force, that is, a royal hand that with absolute and excessive power may impose a restraint on the excessive ambition and corruption of the mighty. This explanation can be verified through the example of Tuscany, where it may be observed how three republics, Florence, Siena, and Lucca, have existed over a long period of time within a small expanse of territory, and although the other cities of that province are in a way subservient to them, it is evident that with their courage or with their institutions, they maintain or would like to maintain their liberty. This is brought about by the fact that there are no lords with castles and very few or no noblemen in this province, but there exists such a state of equality that a prudent man with a knowledge of ancient civilizations could easily introduce a free form of government there. But Tuscany’s misfortune has been so great that until recently, it has not come upon any man who has been capable or knowledgeable enough to accomplish this.

It is possible, therefore, to draw a conclusion from this discourse: that anyone wishing to establish a republic where there are many noblemen cannot do so unless he first does away with them all; and that anyone wishing to establish a kingdom or a principality where there is great equality cannot ever do so unless he removes from that state of equality a large number of men with ambitious and restless spirits and makes them noblemen in fact, and not in name only, giving them castles and possessions and favouring them with goods and with men, so that when he is placed in their midst he may maintain his power through their support, while through his presence they further their ambition, and the others are forced to bear the yoke that force and force alone can make them endure. Since a proportion is established in this way between those who force and those who are forced, each man will remain fixed in his own rank. And since forming a republic out of a province well suited to being a kingdom, and a kingdom out of one well suited to be a republic, is a matter for a man who is rare in intelligence and authority, there have been many who have wished to do so but few who have known how to carry it out. For the grandeur of the task frightens men in part and in part hinders them and causes them to fail in the very first stages. I believe that this opinion of mine—that where noblemen exist it is impossible to organize a republic—will seem contrary to the experience of the Venetian republic, in which no one may hold any rank whatsoever unless he is a nobleman. To this objection, one can reply that such an example does not constitute any contradiction, because the noblemen of that republic are noblemen more in name than in fact, for they obtain no large revenues from their possessions, since their great wealth is founded upon commerce and moveable property. Moreover, none of them possesses a castle or has any jurisdiction over other men, but for them the title of nobleman is a title of dignity and respect without being based upon any of those qualities required in other cities for bestowing the title of nobleman. Just as other republics have divisions under different names, so Venice is divided into noblemen and commoners, and the Venetians allow only the former to hold (or to be able to hold) all the offices, while the others are completely excluded. This does not create disorder in that city for the reasons stated on another occasion. The founder of a republic should, therefore, organize it where there exists or has existed great equality, and on the contrary, whoever institutes a principality should do so where there exists great inequality; otherwise, he will do something lacking in proportion and of brief duration.