# CHAPTER 59 — Which Confederation or Other Kind of League Is Most Reliable, That Created With a Republic or That Created With a Prince

Because it happens every day that one prince and another, or one republic and another forge a league and a friendship with each other, and, likewise confederations and agreements are also formed between a republic and a prince, it seems proper to me to examine whose word is more reliable and should be given greater consideration, that of a republic or that of a prince. After examining everything, I believe that in many cases they are similar, and that in some cases there is some difference. I believe furthermore that agreements made by force will never be observed either by a prince or by a republic; I believe that when the fear of losing the state arises, both kinds of government will break faith with you and will treat you with ingratitude in order to avoid losing it. Demetrius, the man who was called conqueror of cities, had bestowed countless benefits upon the Athenians: then it happened that after he had been defeated by his enemies and sought refuge in Athens, as in a friendly city obligated to him, he was not received by that city; this grieved him even more than if he had suffered the loss of his troops and his entire army. * Defeated by Caesar in Thessaly, Pompey took refuge in Egypt with Ptolemy, whom in the past he had put back on the throne, and he was killed by him. * Such things are seen to have the same causes; none the less, more humanity was displayed and less injury inflicted by the republic than by the prince. Wherever fear exists, however, we shall in fact discover the same kind of loyalty. And if it is discovered that either a republic or a prince runs a risk in keeping faith with you, this can also arise from similar causes. As for the prince, it can very well happen that he may be the friend of some other powerful prince who lacks the opportunity to defend him at that moment, but he can still hope that with the passage of time his ally will restore him to his principality, or he may certainly believe that, since he has followed him as a supporter, this prince will make no agreements or treaties with his enemies. Of this type were those princes of the kingdom of Naples who supported the French factions, and among republics of this type were Saguntum in Spain, * which awaited its destruction because it took the side of Rome, and Florence, which in 1512 supported the French factions. When everything has been taken into account, I believe that in these cases, where danger is imminent, somewhat more stability will be found in republics than in princes. Yet, although republics may possess the same courage and inclinations as a prince, the fact that they move more slowly will always cause them to find it more difficult to come to a decision than a prince, and, as a result, they will always find it more difficult to break their word than he will. Confederations are broken to gain some advantage. In this respect, republics are far more likely to abide by agreements than princes. And, it is possible to cite examples where the smallest advantage has caused a prince to break his word, but where even an enormous advantage has not caused a republic to break its word: for example, the policy Themistocles proposed to the Athenians, to whom in a speech he claimed to have some advice that would be highly beneficial to their city but that he could not say what it was in order to avoid revealing it, since to do so would deny them the opportunity of discovering it. As a result, the people of Athens elected Aristides to whom he might communicate the proposal, so that they could later decide according to Aristides’ opinion in the matter; Themistocles demonstrated to Aristides that the fleet of all the Greeks, while it was still bound by their word of honour, was in a position where it could easily be captured or destroyed, which would make the Athenians sole arbiters of that province. When Aristides reported to the people that the proposal of Themistocles was most advantageous but extremely dishonest, the people completely rejected it for that reason. * Philip of Macedonia and other princes would not have acted in this fashion, for they sought and gained more advantage by breaking their word than by any other method. With respect to breaking pacts on account of some failure to comply with them, this is a normal occurrence about which I shall speak, but I shall speak about those treaties which are broken for extraordinary reasons, and in these cases, from what we have seen, I believe that the people commit less serious errors than the prince, and that for this reason, it is possible to place more trust in the people than in the prince.