# CHAPTER 53 — The People, Deceived by a False Kind of Good, Often Desire Their Own Ruin, and How Great Hopes and Bold Promises Easily Move Them

Once the city of Veii had been defeated, the Roman people came to be of the opinion that it would be a useful thing for the city of Rome if half the Romans went to live in Veii, concluding that since the city was rich in territory, full of buildings, and near to Rome, it was possible to enrich half of their own citizens due to the proximity of the site without causing any political disorders. This proposal seemed to the senate and to the wisest Romans to be so useless and so damaging that they openly said they would rather suffer death than consent to such a decision. Thus, when the matter came up for debate, the plebeians were so incensed against the senate that they would have come to the point of taking up arms and shedding blood if the senate had not used as a shield some old and esteemed citizens, their reverence for whom restrained the plebeians from pursuing their insolence any further. Here, two things should be noted. The first is that very often the people, deceived by a false image of good, desire their own ruin, and unless someone they trust can make them capable of distinguishing the good from the bad, this will bring endless danger and damage to republics. When fate decrees that the people will have faith in no one, as sometimes occurs, after they have been deceived in the past either by events or by men, this inevitably leads to ruin. In this regard Dante declares in his discourse that makes up On Monarchy that the people frequently cry out: ‘Long live’ their death and ‘Death’ to their life. * From such scepticism arises the fact that in republics the proper decisions are sometimes not made, as was said above about the Venetians who, when attacked by so many enemies, could not take the decision to win the support of some by restoring to them what they had taken away from others (for this is what caused the war and created the conspiracy of princes against them) before their downfall. *

Thus, turning to consider when it is easy and when it is difficult to persuade a people, this distinction can be made: either what you have to persuade them of represents at first sight either a gain or a loss, or the proposal truly seems either courageous or cowardly. When profit is seen in matters put before the people, even though there may be a loss concealed beneath them, or when something seems courageous, even though the ruination of the republic may be concealed beneath it, it will always be easy to persuade the crowd to follow, and thus, it will always be difficult to persuade them to accept those decisions that appear to involve either cowardice or loss, even though salvation and profit may be concealed beneath them. What I have declared can be confirmed by countless Roman and foreign examples, both modern and ancient. From this attitude arose the unfavourable opinion in Rome that surrounded Fabius Maximus, who could not persuade the Roman people that it was useful for the republic to proceed slowly with the war and to endure the assaults of Hannibal without actually engaging in battle, because they judged this choice to be cowardly and did not see the usefulness it contained, nor did Fabius have sufficient arguments to prove it to them. Most people are so blinded by bold opinions that, although the Roman people had made the error of authorizing Fabius’ master of the horse to engage in battle, even though Fabius was unwilling to do so, and this authority would have led to the destruction of the Roman camp had Fabius’ prudence not provided a remedy, this experience was not sufficient; indeed, the Roman people later made Varro consul, for no other merit than because, throughout all the squares and the public places of Rome, he had promised to rout Hannibal whenever he was given the authority to do so. This gave rise to the battle and the defeat of Cannae, and, very nearly, to the fall of Rome. *

I want to set forth yet another Roman example on this subject. Hannibal had been in Italy for eight or ten years, and he had covered the entire province with the dead bodies of Romans, when Marcus Centennius Paenula, a man of extremely low rank (in spite of the fact that he had held some position in the militia), came to the senate and offered to bring them Hannibal in a very short time either dead or captured, if they would grant him the authority to raise a volunteer army in whatever place he wished within Italy. To the senate this request seemed reckless; nevertheless, thinking that if they refused, and the people later came to learn of his request, it would give rise to some disturbance, jealousy, or ill will against the senatorial order, they granted it, preferring to expose all those who might follow him to danger rather than to cause new feelings of indignation to arise among the people, knowing how such proposals were likely to be accepted and how difficult it would be to dissuade them from it. This man, therefore, went with a disorderly and disorganized mob to find Hannibal, and he had barely arrived for the encounter when he and all those who followed him were routed and killed. *

In the Greek city of Athens, Nicias, * a most serious and prudent man, persuaded the people that it was not a good idea to go and attack Sicily, so that when the Greeks took that decision against the wishes of their wise men, the complete destruction of Athens was the result. When Scipio was made consul and wanted the province of Africa, promising the complete destruction of Carthage, and the senate did not agree with the plan given the unfavourable opinion of Fabius Maximus, Scipio threatened to bring the matter before the people, since he knew very well how much such proposals please the people. *

One could also provide examples for this purpose from our own city: for instance, when Messer Ercole Bentivogli, commander of the Florentine troops, together with Antonio Giaco-mini, after having defeated Bartolommeo d’Alviano at San Vincenti, went into the field at Pisa; this undertaking was decided upon by the people based on the bold promises of Messer Ercole, even though many wise citizens were opposed to it. None the less, they had no way to prevent it, carried away by that general will founded upon the bold promises of the commander. *

I must say, therefore, that there is no easier way to ruin a republic where the people have power than to involve them in bold enterprises, because wherever the people have any importance whatsoever, such proposals will always be accepted, and anyone of a contrary opinion will have no way to prevent this. But if this gives rise to the city’s ruin, it even more frequently gives rise to the ruin of particular citizens who are put in charge of such undertakings, because once the people have taken victory for granted, when defeat arrives, neither fortune nor the incompetence of the commander is blamed but, rather, his wickedness and ignorance, and the people usually either kill or imprison or banish him, as happened to countless Carthaginian and Athenian generals. Nor did any of their previous victories prove useful, since the present defeat cancelled them all, as happened to our own Antonio Giacomini who, after failing to take Pisa as the people had assumed and as he had promised them he would, fell into such disgrace among them that, notwithstanding his countless good deeds of the past, he remained alive more due to the humanity of those who had authority over him than to any other argument that might have defended him among the people. *