# CHAPTER 2 — How Many Kinds of Republics There Are, and What Kind the Roman Republic Was

I wish to set aside an examination of those cities that had their beginnings while subject to others, and I shall speak of those cities that had their beginnings far removed from any kind of external servitude and were immediately governed by their own will either as republics or as principalities, that have had different laws and institutions just as they have had different beginnings. For some of them, either at their origin or after a short time, were given laws all at once by one person alone, like those given by Lycurgus to the Spartans; others received their laws by chance, on different occasions, and according to unforeseen circumstances, as did Rome. That republic may be called fortunate if it produces a man so prudent that he gives it laws organized in such a fashion that it can live safely under them without needing to reform them. We can see that Sparta observed its laws for more than 800 years without corrupting them or without any dangerous strife and that, on the contrary, that city remains to some degree unfortunate when it has not happened upon a prudent founder and is forced to reorganize itself. Of these cities, the one furthest from order is still more unfortunate, and the city furthest from it is the one in which the institutions have gone completely off the straight path that can lead it to the perfect and true goal, since it is almost impossible for cities in this condition to set themselves aright through some unexpected turn of events; those other cities that, although lacking a perfect order, have given themselves good beginnings and have taken actions to become even better, can become perfect through an unforeseen turn of events. But it is certainly true that they will never reorganize themselves without risk, for most men will never agree to a new law that concerns a new order in a city unless a certain necessity shows them it is required, and since this necessity cannot arise without risk, it is an easy thing for that republic to be ruined before it can be brought to perfection in its organization. The republic of Florence testifies to this, for it was reorganized on account of what happened in Arezzo in 1502, and, on account of what happened in Prato in 1512, its institutions were destroyed. *

Since I wish, therefore, to discuss the institutions of the city of Rome and the unforeseen events which brought them to perfection, let me say that some of those who have written about republics declare that in each of them is one of the three forms of government, which they call principality, aristocracy, and democracy, and they say that those who organize a city must turn to one of these types, whichever, in their view, seems most suitable. Some other and, in the opinion of many, wiser men hold the opinion that there are six kinds of governments: three of these are very bad; three others are good in themselves but so easily corruptible that they also come to be pernicious. * Those which are good are the three mentioned above; those which are bad are three others which depend upon the first three, and each of them is in a way similar to its counterpart, so that they all easily jump from one form to the other: the principality easily becomes tyrannical; aristocracy quite easily becomes the government of the few; and democracy without difficulty turns into anarchy. For this reason, if the founder of a republic organizes one of these three governments in a city, he organizes it there for a brief time, because no remedy can prevent it from slipping into its contrary due to the similarity that exists, in this case, between the virtue and the vice.

These variations in governments arise among men by chance, for in the beginning of the world, when its inhabitants were few, they lived for a time scattered like the beasts; then as the generations multiplied they gathered together, and in order better to defend themselves, they began to consider carefully who among them was stronger and braver, and they made him their leader and obeyed him. From this arose knowledge of things honourable and good as opposed to those which are pernicious and evil, for noticing that when someone did harm to his benefactor it aroused hatred and compassion among men, since they condemned the ungrateful and honoured those who showed gratitude, and thinking that the same injuries could also be inflicted upon themselves, they set about making laws in order to avoid similar evils and ordained punishments for whoever violated them: from this arose knowledge of justice. The result was that later when they had to elect a prince, they did not support the boldest but, instead, the man who was most prudent and just. Yet later when they began creating princes through hereditary succession and not by election, the heirs immediately began to degenerate from their ancestors, and abandoning acts of special worth, they thought princes had nothing to do but surpass others in luxury and lasciviousness and all other forms of licentiousness, so that as the prince came to be hated, then became afraid on account of this hatred, and quickly passed from fear to harmful acts, tyranny immediately arose. Subsequently, this gave rise to the beginning of the collapse and the conspiracies and plots against princes, executed not by those who were either timid or weak but by those who surpassed others in generosity, greatness of soul, wealth, and nobility; such men as these could not endure the dishonourable life of such a prince. The masses, following the authority of these powerful men, therefore, took up arms against the prince, and once he had been eliminated, obeyed them as their liberators. And since these men hated the very idea of a single leader, they constituted a government among themselves, and in the beginning, mindful of past tyranny, they governed themselves according to the laws they had instituted, subordinating their own interests to the common good, and with the greatest care they managed and maintained both their private and public affairs. This administration later passed to their sons, who did not understand the changeability of fortune since they had never experienced evil, and unwilling to remain content with civic equality, they turned to avarice, ambition, and the unlawful seizure of women, causing a government of aristocrats to become a government of the few, without regard for civic bonds of any kind, so that in a brief time what happened to the tyrant happened to them, because, disgusted by this system of government, the multitude became the instrument of anyone who designed any kind of plan to attack these rulers, and someone thus soon rose up, who, with the aid of the multitude, destroyed them. Furthermore, since the memory of the prince and the injuries he inflicted was still fresh, after having destroyed the government of the few and unwilling to re-establish that of a prince, the people turned to democratic government, and they organized it in such a way that neither the few powerful men nor a single prince would ever have any authority whatsoever. Since all governments receive some respect in the beginning, this democratic government was maintained for a while but not for long, at the most until the generation that had founded it passed away, for it immediately fell into a state of undisciplined liberty, where neither private citizens nor public officials were feared; as a result, with each person living according to his own wishes, a thousand injuries were inflicted every day, so that, forced by necessity or by the suggestion of some good man, in order to flee such permissiveness they returned once again to the principality, and from that, step by step, they returned towards a state of undisciplined liberty in the ways and for the reasons given.

And this is the cycle * through which all states that have governed themselves or that now govern themselves pass, but rarely do they return to the same forms of government, because almost no republic can be so full of life that it may pass through these mutations many times and remain standing. But it may well happen that in the course of its troubles, a republic ever lacking in counsel and strength becomes subject to a nearby state that is better organized; but if this were not to occur, a republic would be apt to circle about endlessly through these types of government.

Let me say, therefore, that all the forms of governments mentioned above are defective, because of the brief duration of the three good ones, and because of the evil nature of the three bad ones. Thus, since those men who were prudent in establishing laws recognized this defect, they avoided each of these forms by itself alone and chose a form of government that combined them all, judging such a government steadier and more stable, for when in the same city there is a principality, an aristocracy, and a democracy, one keeps watch over the other.

Among those who have deserved most praise for such constitutions is Lycurgus, who organized his laws in Sparta in such a way that, allocating to the kings, the aristocrats, and the people their respective roles, he created a state that lasted for more than 800 years, resulting in the highest praise for him and in tranquillity for that city. * The opposite happened to Solon, who organized the laws in Athens, and who by instituting only a democratic form of government there gave it such a brief existence that, before he died, he saw the tyranny of Pisistratus arise, and although after forty years the heirs of Pisistratus were driven out and Athens regained its freedom, since a democratic form of government was re-established following Solon’s laws, it did not last more than 100 years, even though to preserve it many constitutions were devised to repress the insolence of the upper class and the abuse of freedom on the part of the populace, laws which were unforeseen by Solon. Nevertheless, since Solon did not mix a popular form of government with the power of the principality and that of the aristocrats, Athens endured a very brief time in comparison to Sparta.

But let us turn to Rome where, despite the fact that this city never had a Lycurgus to organize it at the beginning in such a way that it might live in freedom for a long period of time, so many special circumstances nevertheless arose from the conflict that existed between the plebeians and the senate that what a founder had not done was brought about by chance. If Rome was not allotted the first arrangement, it was allotted the second, for its early institutions, even if defective, did not, none the less, deviate from the straight path which could lead them to perfection. In fact, Romulus and all the other kings passed many good laws suitable to living in liberty, but because their goal was to found a kingdom and not a republic, when that city became free it lacked many public institutions which should have been organized in a manner favourable to liberty, institutions which had not been established by those kings. Even though its kings lost their empire for the reasons and in the ways already discussed, those who drove them out, having immediately established two consuls who took the place of the kings, nevertheless drove out of Rome only the title of king and not kingly power, so that, since that republic had only the consuls and the senate, it came to be nothing more than a mixture of two of the three elements mentioned above, that is, the principality and the aristocracy. It remained only for the city to give way to popular government: once the Roman nobility became insolent for reasons to be related below, the people rose up against it, so that in order not to lose everything, the nobility was forced to concede to the people its share of power, but for their part, the senate and the consuls still retained so much authority that they were able to preserve their rank in that republic. In this manner the creation of the tribunes of the plebeians came about, after which the condition of the republic became more stable, since all three forms of government had their roles. And fortune was so favourable to Rome that although this city passed from a government of kings and aristocrats to a government of the people, through the same steps and for the same reasons that were discussed above, the kingly authority none the less was never entirely abolished to give authority to the aristocrats, nor was the authority of the aristocrats completely diminished in order to give it to the people, but since this authority remained mixed, it created a perfect republic, and Rome came to this perfection through the discord between the plebeians and the senate, * as will be demonstrated at greater length in the following two chapters.