# 35. What Dangers are run by one who takes the Lead in advising some Course of Action; and how much greater are the Dangers incurred when the Course of Action is Unusual

How dangerous it is to take the lead in a new enterprise in which many may be concerned, and how difficult it is to handle and direct it, and once directed on its way, to keep it going, would be too long and too deep a topic for us to discuss here. Reserving it, therefore, for a more convenient place,69 I shall here speak only of the dangers incurred by citizens or by those advising a prince to take the lead in some grave and important matter in such a way that for the whole of this advice they may be held responsible. For men judge of actions by the result. Hence for all the ill that results from an enterprise the man who advised it is blamed, and, should the result be good, commended; but the reward by no means weighs the same as the loss.

The present Sultan, Selim, called the Great Turk, had – according to those who have lately returned from his dominions – made preparations to invade Syria and Egypt, when he was strongly advised by one of his pashas whom he had posted on the frontiers of Persia, to attack the Sophy. Acting on this advice, he set forth on the enterprise with a very large force. On reaching a broad expanse of open country where there were many deserts but few streams, he found himself in the very difficulty that had proved fatal to many a Roman army; so much so that, though he was victorious in the war, he lost through famine and pestilence the greater part of his troops. Hence he was angry with the person who had advised him, and put him to death.

We read of many citizens who, having promoted some undertaking that turned out badly, were sent into exile. It was owing to some Roman citizens who took the lead that a plebeian consul was first appointed in Rome. It then happened that the first time he led forth the armies he was beaten. Consequently those who had advised the appointment would have been in trouble, had they not been protected by the party in whose interests the appointment had been made.

The advisers of a republic and the counsellors of a prince are undoubtedly in a difficult position; for, unless they recommend the course which in their honest opinion will prove advantageous to that city or to that prince regardless of consequences, they fail to fulfil the duties of their office, while, if they recommend it, they are risking their lives and endangering their position, since all men in such matters are blind and judge advice to be good or bad according to its result. Nor do I see any way of avoiding either the infamy or the danger other than by putting the case with moderation instead of assuming responsibility for it, and by stating one’s views dispassionately and defending them alike dispassionately and modestly; so that, if the city or the prince accepts your advice, he does so of his own accord, and will not seem to have been driven to it by your importunity. If you act thus, it is unreasonable for a prince or a people to wish you ill on account of your advice, since it has not been adopted against the will of the majority. Danger is incurred only when many have opposed you, and, the result being unfortunate, they combine to bring about your downfall. And, though, in the case we have taken, there is lacking the glory which comes to the man who in opposition to the many, alone advocates a certain course which turns out well, it has two advantages. First, it does not entail danger. Secondly, if you tender your advice with modesty, and the opposition prevents its adoption, and, owing to someone else’s advice being adopted, disaster follows, you will acquire very great glory. And, though you cannot rejoice in the glory that comes from disasters which befall your city or your prince, it at any rate counts for something.

I do not think any further recommendations can be made on this point, for, if one recommended men to be silent and not to express their views, this would be no use to the republic or to their prince; nor would danger thereby be eliminated, for before long they would become suspect, and that might happen which happened to some friends of Perseus, king of Macedonia. He had been defeated by Paulus Aemilius, and had escaped with a few of his friends. While they were reviewing what had taken place, it happened that one of them began to tell Perseus of the many mistakes he had made, and how they had been the cause of his undoing. At which Perseus was so annoyed that he said: ‘Traitor, for you have delayed until now to speak of what I cannot undo!’ On saying which, he killed him with his own hands. Thus was a man punished for keeping silent when he ought to have spoken, and for speaking when he ought to have been silent; so that he didn’t avoid danger by not giving his advice. Hence it is best, I think, to keep to, and to act on, the lines laid down above.





Book Three



[DISCOURSES 36–9]


[Advice to Generals in the Field]