# 34. What Kind of Reputation or Gossip or Opinion causes the Populace to begin to favour a Particular Citizen; and whether the Populace appoints to Offices with Greater Prudence than does a Prince

We have spoken elsewhere of how Titus Manlius, afterwards called Torquatus, procured the acquittal of his father, Lucius Manlius, from a charge brought against him by Marcus Pomponius, the tribune of the plebs. Though the means he took to save him were somewhat violent and extraordinary, yet his filial devotion was so pleasing to the people at large that, not only was he not condemned, but at a subsequent election of tribunes for the legions Titus Manlius obtained the second appointment. In regard to his success, I think it well to reflect on the way in which the populace estimates the merits of candidates for election, and to consider how far the conclusion drawn above is true, namely that the populace is a better judge in appointing to office than is a prince.

I claim, then, that the populace in choosing between candidates relies on common gossip and on their reputation when it has otherwise no knowledge of them based on noteworthy deeds; or else on some preconceived opinion it has formed of them. In both cases reliance is placed on the fact that their fathers were men of standing who did much for the city, it being assumed that their sons should be like them unless their actions indicate the contrary; or else reliance is placed upon what is said about the way they behave. The points which count most in their behaviour are that they should be known to associate with seriously minded persons, of good habits, and whom everybody esteems as prudent men. For nothing indicates more plainly what a man is than the company he keeps. The man who associates with honest people deservedly acquires a good name, for it is impossible but that he be of the same kidney. Or, again, a reputation with the public may be gained by some out-of-the-way and conspicuous action which, though of a private character, has brought you honourable notice. Of all three ways in which good repute may at the start be obtained, none is more effectual than this last. For the first, in which reputation is based on the doings of relatives and ancestors, is so unreliable that men are slow to accept it and it evaporates unless accompanied by virtue on the part of the person concerned. The second way, in which you become known by way of the company you keep, is better than the first, but not nearly so good as the third. For until you give some indication of what you can do, your reputation is based only on opinion, which may quite easily prove to be wrong. But the third way, since it originates in, and is based on, facts and on what you have actually done, gives you at the start so great a name that you would have to do much that belied your character before your reputation vanished.

Men who are born in a republic, therefore, ought to adopt this course, and to try, by doing things out of the ordinary, to rise above the rank and file. In Rome many did this in their youth by promulgating some law promoting the public good; or by attacking some powerful citizen for violating the laws; or by doing some other such new and remarkable thing as might occasion talk. Not only are such things necessary at the outset to gain a reputation; they are also necessary to maintain it and to augment it. To do this, such actions must be repeated, as they were by Titus Manlius throughout the whole of his life. For he obtained his early reputation by defending his father so virtuously and in so odd a way. Some years later he fought with that Gaul, and, after killing him, took off him that golden collar which gave him the name Torquatus. Nor was this all, for later, when he grew up, he killed his son for having engaged in battle without permission, though he had beaten the enemy. These three deeds gave him a greater name at the time, and made him more celebrated for all time, than any triumph did, or any other victory, though he was as successful in this respect as any other Roman. The reason is that in respect of these other victories very many resembled Manlius, but with respect to his particular actions very few or none.

All his triumphs did not win such glory for Scipio the Elder as did his youthful act of defending his father on the Ticinus, or the oath which with drawn sword he in his fervour made several young men take not to desert Italy after the defeat at Cannae, as some of them had already resolved to do. The beginning of his reputation rested on these two actions, which served as stepping-stones to the triumphs of Spain and of Africa. And his repute was still further increased when in Spain he sent back a daughter to her father and a wife to her husband. This type of conduct is not only necessary to such citizens as desire to acquire fame with a view to obtaining positions of honour in their republic; it is also necessary to princes who wish to keep up their reputation in a principality; for nothing makes a prince so esteemed as when by some singular deed or saying bearing on the common good, he himself sets a striking example which shows his lordship to be either magnanimous or liberal or just, and which is such that it can be circulated in the form of a proverb among his subjects.

But to return to the point first mentioned in this discourse. I maintain that when the populace first assigns some office to one of its citizens, their choice has not a bad basis if it rests on the three grounds aforesaid. But it has a better one, if numerous instances of good conduct have made the person noteworthy, for in that case it is hardly ever possible to make a mistake. I am speaking only of those offices which are given to men early on, before definite experience has been gained as to their character, or they have done something which has changed it for the worse. And here, in regard to forming a false opinion, or judging as to the likelihood of deterioration, the populace always makes fewer mistakes than do princes. Yet, because it is possible for the populace to be deceived in regard to a man’s fame or repute or actions, esteeming them to be greater than they are – a mistake that a prince does not make since he should be told of them and warned by his advisers – and so that a populace also may not lack such counsel, good legislators in founding republics have provided that, when an appointment has to be made to the higher offices in the city to which it would be dangerous to appoint incompetent men, and when it looks as if the popular fancy were inclined to appoint an incompetent person, it shall be lawful, and indeed glorious, for any citizen to broadcast the candidate’s defects so that the people, knowing them, may be better advised.

That this was the custom in Rome the speech of Fabius Maximus attests. He delivered it before the people during the second Punic war, when there was question of appointing consuls and Titus Otacilius was a prime favourite for the post. Fabius thought him not the man to hold the consulate in those times, spoke against him, and pointed out his incompetence with such effect that he kept him out of it and induced the populace to favour one who deserved it more. In appointing to offices, therefore, the populace judges according to the best advice available better substantiated, and, where it can get advice as a prince can, it makes few mistakes than does a prince. So the citizen who contemplates winning popular favour should make sure of it by doing something remarkable, as Titus Manlius did.