# 30. (i) It is necessary for a Citizen who proposes to use his Authority to do any Good Work in a Republic first to extinguish all Envy; and (ii) what Provisions are to be made for the Defence of a City which the Enemy is about to attack

When the Roman senate heard that all Tuscany had made a new levy for the invasion and destruction of Rome and that the Latins and the Hernici, who had hitherto been allies of the Roman people, had come to terms with the Volsci, Rome’s perpetual enemies, it was of opinion that the war would be a hazardous affair. Moreover, since Camillus happened then to be a tribune with consular power, the senate thought it should be possible to manage without appointing a dictator, provided the other tribunes, his colleagues, would entrust him with the supreme command. This the said tribunes did willingly. ‘Nor,’ says Titus Livy, ‘did anybody deem it derogatory to his authority, to subordinate it to his.’ Camillus, therefore, on receiving their promise of obedience, ordered that three armies should be enrolled. Of the first he decided himself to take command and to march against the Tuscans. He appointed Quintus Servilius to the command of the second, which was to remain near Rome to impede the Latins and the Hernici, should they make a move. Over the third army he put Lucius Quintius with orders to protect the city, and to defend the gates and the senate-house in any eventuality that should arise. In addition to this, he gave Horatius, one of his colleagues, charge of providing the arms and the corn and other things requisite in time of war. And yet another of his colleagues, Cornelius, he appointed president of the senate and of the public council to advise it on the actions which had to be taken and carried out day by day. Thus the tribunes in those days with a view to the safety of their country were prepared both to command and to obey.

We see in this incident what a good and wise man may do, how much good he may occasion, and what great advantages he can bring to his country when, thanks to his goodness and his virtue, he has got rid of envy, which is so often the cause why men cannot do good since it prevents them from acquiring that authority which they must needs have if they are to deal with important matters. Envy may be got rid of in two ways. Either by some serious misfortune, difficult to deal with, in which everybody sees disaster ahead and so, dropping any ambition, hastens to obey one whose virtue promises him freedom. This happened in the case of Camillus, for, since he had given such proof of his excellence and, having thrice been dictator, had always administered that office to the benefit of the public, not in his own interests, no one feared his having great power, nor, in view of his deservedly great reputation, thought it an indignity to serve under him. Hence the remark which Titus Livy shrewdly makes: ‘Nor did anybody’ … etc.

The other way in which envy is removed is when, either by violence or in the natural course, those are removed who were your rivals in the contest for fame and power; for, as long as such men see that your reputation is greater than theirs, they will never remain quiet and bear it with patience. Moreover, should such men have been used to living in a corrupt city in which education had not done them any good, it is impossible for any misfortune to convert them to a better state of mind. Rather would they see their country ruined than fail to obtain their ends and satisfy their perverse mentality. To overcome envy of this kind the only remedy lies in the death of those who are imbued with it. When fortune so favours the virtuous man as to bring about their death in the ordinary course, there is no scandal, and he becomes famous by being able to display his virtue without obstacle or offence. But when this does not happen, it behoves him to devise some way of getting rid of the persons in question, and he should take steps to overcome the difficulty before doing anything else.

He who reads the Bible with discernment will see that, in order that Moses might set about making laws and institutions, he had to kill a very great number of men who, out of envy and nothing else, were opposed to his plans. The need for this was clearly recognized by Friar Girolamo Savonarola and also by Piero Soderini, the Gonfalonier of Florence. But one of them, namely, the Friar, was unable to overcome the difficulty, for he lacked the requisite authority, and those of his followers who might have had the authority for it, did not get his meaning right. It was not, however, his fault that this did not happen and his sermons were full of indictments against the wise of this world, and of invectives against them; and by ‘the wise of this world’ he meant those who were envious and were opposed to his ordinances. The other believed that his goodness, the favour of fortune, and his beneficence towards all, in time would extinguish envy. For in view of his being as yet fairly young and of how much favour he had recently gained by his method of governing, he thought he would be able to get the better of those who through envy were opposing him, without either scandal, violence or disturbance. What he failed to realize was that time waits for no man, that goodness alone does not suffice, that fortune is changeable and that malice is not to be placated by gifts. So that both these men were ruined, and in both cases their downfall was due to their not knowing how, or not being able, to overcome envy.

Another noteworthy point about Camillus is the arrangements he made for the defence of Rome, both within and without. It is, indeed, not without reason that good historians, such as our author, give a particularly detailed account of certain incidents that posterity may learn how to defend itself in like situations. And in this it should be observed that no defence is more dangerous or more futile than one that is tumultuous and without order. This is shown by the third army which Camillus caused to be enrolled and left in Rome to guard the city. For many might have thought, and still may think, that his action here was superfluous, since the people were in any case armed and were warlike. Hence it would seem that there was no need of a further enrolment, but that it would have sufficed to hand out the arms when the need arose. But Camillus thought otherwise, and so will anyone else who is as wise as he; for the masses ought never to be allowed to take up arms except under definite instructions and conditions.

From the example of Camillus, therefore, one learns that he to whom the guardianship of a city has been entrusted, should avoid as he would a rock the giving of arms to a tumultuous crowd. Instead, he should first select and enrol those whom he wishes to bear arms, and whom they obey in all things; and those whom he has not enrolled he should order to stay at home and look after their houses. He who orders things in this way can easily defend a city that is attacked; but he who acts otherwise, and declines to emulate Camillus, will not be able to defend it.





Book Three



[DISCOURSES 31–5]


[Equanimity, Insurrection, Confidence, Electioneering and the Tendering of Advice]