# 28. That a Strict Watch should be kept on the Doings of Citizens since under cover of Good Works there often arises the Beginning of Tyranny

When the city of Rome was suffering from famine and the public resources had come to an end, a certain Spurius Maelius, a very rich man in those days, took it into his head to lay in a private supply of corn and to dole it out to the plebs to acquire gratitude. He thereby gained such favour with the crowd that the senate, foreseeing the inconvenience to which this liberality of his might give rise, in order to put a stop to it before he should acquire more power, appointed forthwith a dictator and put Maelius to death. Our attention is thus drawn to the fact that actions which appear to be done from a sense of duty and cannot reasonably be found fault with, may lead to victimization and prove very dangerous to a republic unless they are corrected in good time.

Let me further elaborate this point. I agree that a republic cannot survive nor be governed at all well unless in it there are citizens of good repute. On the other hand, the reputation citizens acquire in a republic may bring about a tyranny; and to provide against this, it is essential to exercise control in such wise that the reputation of a citizen shall be helpful, not harmful to the city and to its liberties. Hence the means whereby a reputation is obtained, must be inquired into. Such means are of two kinds in point of fact: public or private. The means taken are public when a person, by the soundness of his advice and the even greater efficiency of his performance, benefits the public, and so acquires a reputation. To acquire such a reputation should be open to citizens, and rewards should be offered both to those who advise and to those who act, so that they may thus acquire honour and satisfaction. And provided reputations gained by such means be honest and above board, they should never be dangerous to the state; but when acquired in the other way we mentioned, i.e. by private means, they are very dangerous and extremely harmful. The private way consists in conferring benefits on this or that individual, such as lending him money, marrying off his daughters for him, protecting him from the magistrates and doing other favours of a personal nature which cause men to become partisans, and encourage those who are thus favoured, to become corrupters of public morals and law breakers.

A well-ordered republic, therefore, should, as we have said, make it open to anyone to gain favour by his services to the public, but should prevent him from gaining it by his services to private individuals. And this is what we find Rome did; for she rewarded those who laboured well in the public cause, by giving them triumphs and all the other honours she was wont to bestow on her citizens, while she condemned those who under various pretexts sought by private means to acquire greatness, and ordered them to be prosecuted; and, should this not suffice owing to the populace being dazzled by a kind of spurious goodness, she appointed a dictator who by using his royal prerogative should constrain them to return to the fold they had deserted, as she did to punish Spurius Maelius. For should anything of this kind be left unpunished, it is liable to ruin a republic, since to restore it to normal life is difficult after such an example has been set.