# 22. How the Severity of Manlius Torquatus and the Sociabilitya of Valerius Corvinus won for Each the same Degree of Fameb

There were living in Rome at the same time two first-class generals, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, equal in virtue, equal in the number of their triumphs and equal in fame. In dealing with the enemy the virtue they each displayed in the conquests they made was also on a par, but in the way they handled the army and in their treatment of the troops they behaved very differently. For Manlius was a commander who used every type of severity, and never let his soldiers off either fatigues or punishments. Valerius, on the other hand, treated them with the utmost consideration in every way, and in his bearing was familiar and homely. Consequently one finds one of them killing his own son in order to secure the obedience of the troops, and the other harming nobody. None the less, from their diverse methods they reaped the same fruit, alike in contest with the enemy and in the honour brought both to the republic and to themselves. For no soldier ever shirked battle, or mutinied or failed to comply with the wishes of either of them; though so peremptory were Manlius’s commands that all orders which exceeded the bounds of moderation came to be called ‘Manlian orders’. Hence we must first inquire how it came about that Manlius was constrained to behave with such rigidity: secondly, what enabled Valerius to behave with such consideration; thirdly, what caused these different methods to produce the same effect; and, finally, which is the better way and which the most useful to imitate.

If anyone considers carefully the character of Manlius from the time when Titus Livy first mentions him, he will realize that he was a very brave man, devoted to his father and to his country, and very respectful towards his superiors. This is shown in his killing of that Gaul, by his defence of his father against the tribune, and from what he said to the consul before he went to fight the Gaul, namely: ‘Without an order from you I will never fight against any enemy, even though I am sure of victory.’ When, therefore, a man of this kind obtains the rank of commander he expects to find everybody else like himself, and the boldness which characterizes him makes him order bold actions, and what he orders he expects to be carried out in precisely the way he prescribes. It is indeed a very sound rule that, when harsh commands are given, one should be harsh in seeing them carried out; otherwise you will find yourself let down. It should also be noted that, if one wants to be obeyed, one should know how to command, and that one can know how to command only if one has compared one’s own character with the character of those who have to obey, and gives orders only when one sees that they harmonize and, when they clash, abstains.

It has been said by a wise man that, if one is to hold a state by violent means, the force employed should be proportionate to the resistance offered. So long as this proportion obtains, it is to be expected that the violence will last; but should the violated be stronger than the violator, it is probable that the violence will some day cease.

But to return to our discourse. I maintain that, if bold things are to be ordered, one must be a bold man; and that, given a man has the strength and that he issues bold orders, then he cannot be soft in seeing that his orders are obeyed; whereas a man who has not this strength of character, should be careful not to give such out-of-the-way orders, but in giving orders can afford to act in accordance with his common humanity, because ordinary punishments are not ascribed to the ruler, but to the laws and institutions. It must be supposed, therefore, that Manlius was constrained to act thus rigidly owing to the extraordinary orders he gave, to which he was inclined by his nature. And that such orders should be given is useful in a republic, since they restore its discipline to its pristine state and revive its ancient virtue. And, as we have said before, should a republic be so fortunate as frequently to have men who by their example give fresh life to its laws, and do not merely stop them going to rack and ruin, but restore their former vigour, such a republic would last for ever.

Such a one was Manlius, for by the harshness of his commands he maintained military discipline in Rome, whereunto he was constrained first by his nature and then by his desire to see those orders carried out which his natural appetite had prompted him to issue. Valerius, on the other hand, could go gently, as one to whom it sufficed to see done what it was customary to do in the Roman armies. These customs, since they were sound, were enough to keep up his reputation, and since they were not hard to observe, there was no need for Valerius to punish delinquents, because there weren’t any, but had there been any they would have ascribed their punishment, as was said, to the ordinances, not to the brutality of their prince. So that Valerius could indulge his natural bent for kindliness of all sorts, and by these means acquire gratitude from the troops and be able to keep them contented. It thus came about that, since the same obedience was shown to both, both were able to produce the same effect though by different means. Those who desire to imitate them may, however, fall into the vices I mentioned in connection with Hannibal and Scipio, namely, the evoking of contempt or of hatred, vices which you can avoid only if in you there be more than ordinary virtue, but not otherwise.

It remains to consider which of these two ways of behaving is the more praiseworthy. This is open to question, I think, for some authors praise one and some the other. Yet writers who describe how a prince should govern, incline rather to Valerius than to Manlius, and Xenophon, whom I have cited already, gives many instances illustrative of Cyrus’s consideration for others, and thus agrees closely with what Titus Livy says of Valerius. For, when he was consul in the Samnite war, and the day came on which they had to give battle, he addressed his troops with the same consideration he usually displayed in dealing with them. Having given the speech, Titus Livy adds these remarks: ‘No commander was ever more familiar with his soldiers, for he deemed it no burden to share their duties with the meanest of them. He would take part especially in their military sports, in which men contend with one another in speed and strength as equals, and in this easy comradeship never changed his countenance whether he won or was beaten. He was never contemptuous towards anyone who challenged him as an equal. In his actions he was kind when circumstances permitted, and in his conversation was scarce less mindful of the liberty of others than he was of his own dignity. And – what is more popular than aught else – he behaved towards them just as he had behaved when a candidate for office.’

Titus Livy speaks with the same respect of Manlius, pointing out that the severity he showed in killing his son, made the army obey him when he was consul, which was the cause of the victory gained by the Roman people over the Latins. Indeed, in praising him he goes further than this, for, after mentioning this victory, he describes in detail how he drew the troops up for this battle, points out the dangers which the Roman people ran in it, and the difficulty they had in winning it, and ends with the remark that it was the virtue of Manlius alone that gave the Romans the victory. He compares, too, their respective forces, and asserts that whichever side had had Manlius as consul would have won. Hence, in view of what historians have said, it is difficult to judge between Manlius and Valerius.

I do not want to leave the matter undecided, however, so shall say this. For a citizen who is living under the laws of a republic I think it is more praiseworthy and less dangerous to adopt the procedure of Manlius, since this way of behaving was entirely in the public interest, and was in no way affected by private ambition, for it is impossible to gain partisans if one is harsh in one’s dealing with everybody and is wholly devoted to the common good, because by doing this one does not acquire particular friends or – as I have just called them – partisans. Wherefore, than such a procedure none can be more advantageous or more desirable in a republic, since it neither fails to take account of the interests of the public nor does it suggest that personal power is in any way being sought. But of Valerius’s procedure the contrary is true, for, though so far as the public is concerned, it has the same effects, yet, if a man should win the special goodwill of the troops and should retain his command for long, there is grave reason to fear that the result may be prejudicial to liberty.

If such prejudicial effects were lacking in the case of Publicola, the reason was that the minds of the Romans were not as yet corrupt, and that he did not hold office for a long time without intermission. But if one takes the case of a prince, which is the case Xenophon is considering, we should have to side wholly with Valerius and to discard Manlius. For a prince should seek to gain the obedience and affection of his soldiers and of his subjects; their obedience by his fidelity to the constitution and by the reputation he has for virtue; their affection by his affability, kindliness, compassion, and the other qualities for which Valerius was conspicuous; and Cyrus also, so Xenophon tells us. For that a prince should be well liked by each of his subjects and should have a devoted army, is in conformity with other features appertaining to his princely status. But for the army to be devoted to the cause of a private citizen is not consistent with his position, since he is bound by the laws and should obey the magistrates.

We read in the annals of ancient Venice, that when the galleys of this republic had returned to port, a quarrel arose between the sailors and the populace resulting in disturbances in which arms were used; nor could the tumult be quelled either by the police force or by highly respected citizens, or by fear of the magistrates, until a gentleman who had been in command of the sailors the year before, suddenly appeared before them and they stopped fighting out of the affection they had for him. This subservience aroused such suspicions in the senate that the Venetians shortly afterwards made sure of him either by imprisonment or death.

I conclude, therefore, that Valerius’ method is advantageous in the case of a prince but harmful in the case of a private citizen, alike to his country and to himself; to his country because such behaviour prepares the way for tyranny; to himself because the suspicion his behaviour arouses forces his city to protect itself against him to his own undoing. On the other hand, I claim that in a prince the behaviour of Manlius is harmful and in a private citizen of advantage, especially to his country. Nor will it hurt the private citizen unless the hatred you incur by your severity is intensified by the suspicion to which the great reputation your virtue has brought you, may give rise; as we shall now show that it did in the case of Camillus.