# 18. Nothing becomes a General more than to anticipate the Enemy’s Plans

Epaminondas, the Theban, used to say that nothing is more essential or more useful to a general than to discover what the enemy has decided and is planning to do. And since it is difficult to discover this, the more praiseworthy does he become who conjectures it aright. Nor is the difficulty confined to understanding the enemy’s plans, it is sometimes difficult also to understand his actions, and this not only when they are remote, but when they are done here and now in the neighbourhood. For it has often happened that, when a battle has gone on into the night, the winner thinks he has lost, and the loser thinks he has won. This kind of mistake has made people adopt courses which did not contribute to the safety of those adopting them, as happened to Brutus and Cassius, who through a mistake of this kind lost the war; for, whereas Brutus had been victorious on his own flank, Cassius, who had lost, thought that the whole army must have been routed, a mistake which led him to despair of its safety, so that he killed himself.

In our time in the battle which Francis, King of France, fought with the Swiss at Santa Cecilia in Lombardy, that portion of the Swiss army which had remained intact, thought they had won when night came, for they knew nothing of those who had been routed and killed. In consequence of this mistake they did not save themselves, but remained to fight again in the morning to their very great disadvantage. Their mistake also caused the Papal and Spanish army to make a mistake, and on account of it almost to get wiped out; for, on receiving false news of the victory, they crossed the Po and, had they advanced too far, would have been taken prisoners by the victorious French.

Such mistakes as these occurred in the camps of the Romans and of the Aequi. For instance, when the consul, Sempronius, led an army out to meet the enemy and engaged them in battle, the fight lasted till the evening with varying fortune on either side, and, when night came on, both had lost half their men, so that neither of them returned to their camps, but, instead, withdrew to neighbouring hills where they thought they would be more secure. The Roman army was divided in two parts, of which one went with the consul and the other with one, Tempanius, a centurion, to whose valour it was due that the Roman army had not been entirely routed during the battle. When morning came, the Roman consul, who was without further news of the enemy, retired towards Rome. The army of the Aequi withdrew in like manner; for each of them thought the enemy had won, and in consequence, each retired without troubling about the booty that had been left in their camps. It so happened, however, that Tempanius, who was also retiring with the rest of the Roman army, heard from certain wounded Aequi that their generals had departed and had abandoned their camp. So, on receipt of the news, he went to the Roman camp and salvaged it, then sacked that of the Aequi and returned to Rome victorious. This victory, as we see, depended simply upon which came first to hear of the enemy’s panic. It should be noted, therefore, that it may often happen that two armies confronting one another have each been thrown into disorder and are pressed by the same necessity, in which case that army will come out victorious which first hears of the necessity in which the other is placed.

I shall now give of this an example which concerns ourselves and occurred recently. In 1498, when the Florentines had a large army enveloping Pisa and were pressing that city hard, the Venetians, who had undertaken to protect Pisa, since they did not see any other way of saving it, decided to create a diversion by sending another expedition to attack the Florentine dominions. So, with a powerful army they entered the Val di Lamona, took the town of Marradi and laid siege to the citadel of Castiglione, which stands on a hill above it. When the Florentines got to know of this, they decided to send help to Marradi, but not to weaken the forces they had before Pisa. So they made new levies of infantry and enrolled fresh troops of cavalry, and sent them there under the command of Jacopo IV d’Appiano, Lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio da Marciano. When, therefore, these troops reached the hill above Marradi, the enemy raised the siege of Castiglione and all withdrew into the town. After the two armies had been facing one another for several days, both of them began to suffer considerably from lack of provisions and other necessities; and neither of them daring to attack the other, nor aware of the other’s difficulties, each of them decided one fine evening to raise their camp the following morning, and to retire, the Venetians on Bersighella and Faenza, the Florentines on Casaglia and the Mugello. When morning came and each of the camps had begun to send away its baggage, it so happened that a woman came out of the town of Marradi and approached the Florentine camp, for on account of her age and poverty she felt safe and was anxious to see some of her relations who were in that camp. From her the commanders of the Florentine forces heard that the Venetians had struck camp, so, on this news, they plucked up courage, changed their plans to those they would have adopted had they dislodged the enemy, went after them and wrote to Florence announcing that they had repelled the enemy and won the war. This victory was due solely to their having been the first to hear of the enemy’s departure, and had this knowledge come first to the other side, they would have done against our men precisely the same thing.





Book Three



[DISCOURSES 19–23]


[Administrative Methods: The Rival Claims of Severity and Good Fellowship]