# 16. Genuine Virtue counts in Difficult Times, but, when Things are going well, it is rather to those whose Popularity is due to Wealth or Parentage that Men look

It always has been, and always will be, the lot of great and outstanding men to be passed over by a republic in times of peace, for the reputation acquired by their virtue arouses envy, and in peaceful times there are plenty of citizens who seek not merely to become their equals but even their superiors. On this point there is a good passage by Thucydides, the Greek historian, who shows how, when the Athenians had got the upper hand in the Peloponnesian war, and had curbed the pride of the Spartans and brought the rest of Greece into subjection, their reputation was almost so great that they planned to occupy Sicily. When the invasion was under discussion in Athens, Alcibiades and some other citizens urged that it should be undertaken, since they were men who cared little for the public good, but were looking to the honours they would gain, should they command the expedition as they proposed to do. But Nicias, whose reputation stood higher than anyone else’s, dissuaded Athens from the course; and, in addressing the people, the chief reason he gave to show that he was in good faith was that, in advising against the war, he was advising them to do what could not be in his own interests, for, so long as Athens was at peace, he knew that a whole crowd of citizens would try to get ahead of him, but, in case of war, he knew that no citizen would be recognized as his superior or as his equal.

We see, therefore, in this incident a disorder to which republics are liable, namely that of showing but little esteem in time of peace for men of worth. This arouses their indignation on two accounts. First, they are themselves deprived of their position. Secondly, they find unworthy men who lack their competence, being made their associates and superiors. This disorder has brought about the ruin of many republics, for citizens who see that their merits are not appreciated and that this is because the times are untroubled and without danger, set about causing trouble and stirring up wars, prejudicial to the republic.

If one inquires what remedies may be applied, two suggest themselves. First, to keep the citizens poor, so that by wealth without worth they may be able to corrupt neither themselves nor other people. Secondly, to be so prepared that it may be possible at any time to go to war, in which case there will always be a demand for citizens of repute, as there was in Rome in its early days. For, since Rome always had armies in the field, there was always room for men of virtue. Nor could an office be taken from a man who deserved it and be given to one who did not; for though actually this was sometimes done by mistake or in order to test them, there soon followed such disorder and danger that there was a speedy return to the right road. But other republics which are not organized as Rome was, and which go to war only when necessity forces them to it, are unable to protect themselves against these inconveniences. On the contrary, they are ever likely to occur therein, and will always give rise to disorder should a citizen who has been passed over but is efficient, have some standing in the city and some adherents.

And if the city of Rome for a time remained immune, to her also, as we have pointed out elsewhere, when she had vanquished Carthage and Antiochus, and no longer feared war, it seemed permissible to entrust her armies to anyone she pleased on account not so much of virtue as of other qualities which appealed to the people. For we find that Paulus Aemilius was more than once refused the consulate, nor was he made consul till the Macedonian war began, when it was granted to him unanimously since the situation was thought to be dangerous.

There were many wars in which this, our city of Florence, was engaged after 1494, and in them the Florentine citizens all showed up badly, till the city chanced upon someone who taught it how an army should be commanded. This was Antonio Giacomini. So long as the city was engaged in a dangerous war, all the other citizens dropped their ambitions, and in the election of a commissioner and head of the army Antonio had no competitor. But when they were engaged in a war about the issue of which there was no doubt and there were plenty of honours and offices to be had, there were so many candidates that, when three commissioners had to be chosen for the campaign against Pisa, Antonio was passed over. And, though it is impossible to estimate precisely how much harm the public suffered through its having failed to appoint Antonio, yet it can quite easily be conjectured. For, as the Pisans no longer had the means to defend themselves or to obtain food, if Antonio had been in command they would soon have been in such straits that they would have had to surrender to the Florentines unconditionally. But as the siege was being conducted by commanders who did not know how to tighten it up and to apply pressure, they were so long about the business that the Florentines had to purchase what they could have obtained by force. Antonio must have been so disgusted at this as to have needed great patience and goodness not to have sought revenge as he might have done, to the ruin of the city or to the injury of some particular citizen. Against this a republic should be on its guard, as we shall show in the next chapter.64