# 15. That at the Head of an Army there should be One, not Several, Commanders, and that to have a Plurality is a Nuisance

When the Fidenates rebelled and put to the sword the colony the Romans had sent to Fidenae, to right the insult the Romans appointed four tribunes with consular power, of whom one was left to guard Rome, and the other three were sent against the Fidenates and the Veientes. Owing to the divided command and to the tribunes being at loggerheads one with the other, they returned discredited, though there had been no disaster. For the discredit they were responsible, but that there had been no disaster was due to the valour of the troops. Hence when the Romans saw what was wrong, they had recourse to the appointment of a dictator so that one man should be responsible for putting right the disorder that three had caused. This shows us the futility of having several persons in command of the same army or in charge of the defence of the same town. Nor can the case be put more clearly than it is by Titus Livy. when he writes: ‘The three tribunes with consular power afforded an illustration of how futile it is for many to share the imperium in a war, for each inclined to follow his own counsel, and since the others thought otherwise, they gave the enemy their chance.’63

And though this example is sufficient to show the disorders that a plurality of commanders causes in a war, I propose to give two more, one modern and the other ancient, the better to establish this point.

In 1500, after the King of France, Louis XII, had retaken Milan, he sent his troops to Pisa to recover it for the Florentines. The commissaries, Giovambatista Ridolfi and Luca di Antonio degli Albizi, were in command. Since Giovambatista was a man with a reputation and had seen more service, Luca left the management of everything to him, but though he did not display his own ambition by opposing him, he displayed it by his silence, by his negligence and by criticizing everything, with the result that he helped the siege operations neither by action nor advice, but behaved like a man of no account. Later on, however, when something occurred which necessitated Giovambatista’s returning to Florence, one finds everything quite different; for, when Luca was left in sole charge, he showed his worth alike by his courage, his industry and his sound sense, all of which characteristics had failed to show themselves so long as he had a colleague.

In confirmation of this remark of Titus Livy’s I would cite another example: the expedition which the Romans sent against the Aequi under Quintius and his colleague, Agrippa. Agrippa who wanted the whole conduct of the war to be undertaken by Quintius, says: ‘In the administration of affairs of moment it is highly advisable that the supreme command should be in the hands of one man.’

This is just the opposite of what our republics and princes do today, for to improve the administration they now send to a place more than one commissioner and more than one head, and this leads to indescribable confusion. Indeed, were one to seek the causes of the disasters that have befallen Italian and French armies in our own times, it would be found that this is the most potent. In conclusion, then, one may be quite certain that it is better to entrust an expedition to one man of average prudence than to give to two men of outstanding ability tie same authority.





Book Three



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