# 12. That a Prudent General should make it absolutely necessary for his own Troops to Fight, but should avoid forcing the Enemy to do so

We have in other discourses shown how useful a part necessity plays in human affairs, and to what glorious deeds it may lead men. As some moral philosophers in their writings have remarked, neither of the two most noble instruments to which man’s nobility is due, his hands and his tongue, would have attained such perfection in their work or have carried man’s works to the height which one can see they have reached, if they had not been driven to it by necessity.62 Since, therefore, army commanders of old were aware of the virtue that lies in necessity, and how steadfast, when necessity drives, the minds of soldiers can become in their resolve to fight, they used every endeavour to put their troops under such constraint and, on the other hand, employed any device that would free the enemy from such constraint. To this end they often left open to the enemy a route they might have closed, and closed a route to their own soldiers which they might have left open. If, then, anyone wants a city to be obstinately defended or an army in the field to fight obstinately, he should, first and foremost, seek to instil this necessity into the minds of those who have to do the fighting.

It follows that a prudent general who has to go and lay siege to a city should base his estimate of how easy or how difficult it is going to be to take it on the knowledge and consideration of the extent to which necessity will constrain the inhabitants to defend it; and, if he find the necessity con straining them to defend it, considerable, should account the siege difficult, but, if otherwise, should account it easy. It is for this reason that towns which have rebelled are more difficult to acquire than they are to acquire in the first instance; for in the first instance they have no cause to expect punishment for having given offence, and so surrender easily; but, since they are aware, when in revolt, of having given offence, and in consequence fear punishment, they become difficult to take. Again, obstinacy of this kind is also aroused by the natural hatred which neighbouring princes and neighbouring republics have for one another; which, in turn, is occasioned by the ambition which moves states to dominate one another, and by their jealousy, especially if they are republics, as was the case in Tuscany, and this rivalry and competition have made it difficult, and will continue to make it difficult, for one to seize the other. If, therefore, one considers carefully what neighbours the city of Florence has and what neighbours the city of Venice has, it is not so extraordinary as many make out that Florence should have spent more on wars and have acquired less than Venice, since it is all due to the towns in the neighbourhood of Venice not being so obstinate in defending themselves as are those in the neighbourhood of Florence. This comes about because the cities abutting on Venetian territory are accustomed to live under a prince, and are not free cities; and cities accustomed to subjection are usually not so particular about changing masters: on the contrary, they are often glad to do so. Hence, though Venice’s neighbours are more powerful than those of Florence, yet, on account of its having found the towns less obstinate, Venice has been able to subdue them more quickly than has Florence, which is surrounded entirely by free cities.

But to return to the main topic of this discourse. When a general is attacking a town he should endeavour with all diligence to relieve its defenders of the necessity we have been discussing, and so of their obstinacy; by promising them pardon if they are afraid of punishment, and, if they fear for their liberty, by explaining that no attack is being made on the common good, but only on a few ambitious citizens. This has often facilitated the attack on, and the taking of, towns. And, though such false colours are easily seen through, especially by men of prudence, the populace is none the less often deceived; for, in its eagerness for a speedy peace it shuts its eyes to any trap which may underlie generous promises. Innumerable cities have by this means been reduced to servile states. It was so with Florence, for instance, quite recently; and it happened to Crassus and his army; for, though he realized the emptiness of Parthian promises, made merely to deprive his troops of the need to defend themselves, this did not enable him to sustain their steadfastness, blinded as they were, by the offers of peace which the enemy had made: a point one sees clearly if one reads his life.

In this connection I might mention that when the Samnites, in contravention of their treaty and owing to the ambition of the few, raided and pillaged the lands of Rome’s allies; and then sent ambassadors to Rome to sue for peace, offering to restore what they had taken and to hand over those responsible for the disturbances and for the booty taken, their offer was turned down by the Romans. On their returning to Samnium without hope of an agreement, Claudius Pontius, then in command of the Samnite army, in one of his remarkable speeches, pointed out that the Romans had anyhow wanted war, and that, though on their part they were anxious for peace, necessity constrained them to go to war. He then used these words: ‘War is justified, if necessity forces one to it, and to arm is a duty, if in arms lies one’s hope’ and upon this necessity he based the hope of victory for his troops.

That I may not have to return later to this topic, it will be best for me to mention the more noteworthy instances in Rome’s case. There was that of Gaius Manlius who led his army against the Veientes, and, when a section of the Veientine army broke through his stockades, hurried with a detachment to defend them and, to prevent the Veientes escaping, put a guard on all the exits from the camp. Hence, finding themselves shut in, the Veientes began to fight so furiously that they killed Manlius, and would have got the better of all the rest of the Romans if one of the tribunes had not had the sense to let them out. Thus we see that, so long as necessity constrained the Veientes to fight, they fought with great ferocity, but, when they saw the way was open, thought more of getting away than of fighting.

The armies of the Volsci and the Aequi had crossed the Roman frontiers. Against them the consuls were sent. In the course of the battle the Volscian army, commanded by Vettius Messius, found itself at one moment shut up between its stockades which the Romans had taken, and the other Roman army. Seeing that he must needs die or use his sword to fight for his life, Vettius Messius said to his soldiers: ‘Follow me. There is neither wall nor rampart in the way, but just armed forces to oppose armed forces. In valour we are equal, but in necessity which is the last weapon and the best of all, you have the advantage.’ Thus Livy calls necessity ‘the last and best of all weapons’.

Camillus, the most prudent of all Rome’s generals, having already got into the city of Veii with his army, in order to facilitate the taking of it and to deprive the enemy of a last necessity to defend it, gave orders within the hearing of the Veientes to the effect that no one should touch those who were without arms. The result was that they threw down their arms and the city was taken almost without bloodshed. This device was afterwards adopted by many generals.