# 10. That a General cannot avoid an Engagement if the Enemy is determined to force him to it at All Costs

‘Gaius Sulpicius, the dictator, when waging war with the Gauls, was unwilling to try his fortune in an engagement with an enemy whose position time and an awkward situation was steadily making worse.’ When there occurs an error which all men, or most men, are liable to make, it is not a bad thing, I think, to warn them often against it. Since, therefore, as I have frequently pointed out, the way in which important matters are dealt with today does not come up to the standard of the ancients, it does not seem to me superfluous at this juncture to point it out once again. For, if there be any way in which there has been a departure from ancient customs, it is especially so in military matters, in which none of the things the ancients esteemed so highly are now done. This inconvenience is due to republics and princes having entrusted such matters to other people. To avoid danger they themselves keep clear of military operations and, though one does sometimes find a king in these days sallying forth in person, I do not on this account think that it leads him to do much else that is worthy of commendation. For when they actually do engage in military operations, they do it for the sake of display and not for any praiseworthy reason. True, in that they occasionally review their troops and reserve to themselves the title of commander, they make mistakes of less moment than do republics, especially Italian republics, which rely on others and understand nothing which has to do with war, and yet in their desire to look like a prince in the eyes of the army, make decisions, and, in doing so, commit innumerable blunders.

And although some of these blunders I have discussed elsewhere, I cannot here be silent about one which is very important. When these idle princes or effeminate republics are sending one of their generals on an expedition, it seems to them that the wisest thing they can commission him to do, is on no account to engage in open battle, but, on the contrary, above all else to be on his guard against an engagement; for they think that in so doing they are emulating the prudence of Fabius Maximus who, by putting off an engagement, saved the Roman state from destruction; wherein they overlook the fact that, more often than not, such a commission is nonsensical or dangerous. The point one has to bear in mind here is that a general who proposes to remain in the field cannot avoid battle if the enemy is determined to force one on him at all costs. Hence what such a commission amounts to is just this: ‘Join battle at the enemy’s behest, not at your own.’ For, if one wants to remain in the field and not join battle, the only safe thing to do is to put at least fifty miles between oneself and the enemy, and then to have good scouts so that, should he come your way, you may have time to get farther off. Another alternative in this case is to shut yourself up in a city. But both courses are extremely harmful. For the first leaves your country at the mercy of the enemy, and a valiant prince would sooner try his fortune in battle than prolong a war at such cost to his subjects. While the second alternative is manifestly that of a lost cause, for what it comes to is that, when you have got your army into a city, you may be besieged, and before long to be reduced by the pangs of hunger to surrender. Hence to avoid battle in either of these two ways is extremely hurtful. The plan adopted by Fabius Maximus of occupying strong positions is good so long as you have so valianta an army that the enemy does not dare come and seek you out in your position of vantage. Nor can it be said that Fabius avoided battle, but rather that he preferred to fight when he had the advantage. For, if Hannibal had gone to seek him out, he would have awaited him and made a day of it. But Hannibal did not dare to fight with him on these terms. So that it was as much Hannibal who avoided battle as Fabius; but, if either had determined at all costs to fight, the other would have had to adopt one of three courses, i.e. either to adopt one of the two courses mentioned above, or else to run away.

That what I am saying is true can be clearly seen from a host of cases, and especially in the war the Romans had with Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus. For, when Philip was attacked by the Romans, he decided not to join battle, and, to avoid it, did at first what Fabius Maximus did in Italy: posted himself with his army on top of a mountain where he erected fortifications, thinking that the Romans would not dare to go and seek him out. But they did go, and, having fought with him, drove him from the mountain, and he, being powerless to resist, fled with the greater part of his forces. What saved him from being utterly undone was the impossible country, which prevented the Romans from following him up. Philip, therefore, still desirous of avoiding battle and being encamped in the neighbourhood of the Romans, had to get away; and, having learned by experience that, to avoid battle, it is not enough to take up a position on top of a mountain, and being averse to shutting himself up in towns, decided to take the remaining course and to put many miles between himself and the Roman camp. Hence, when the Romans were in one province, he moved to another, and, in like manner, whenever the Romans moved out, he moved in. But when at length he came to see that by prolonging the war in this way his situation was getting worse, and that, now by him, now by the enemy, his subjects were being harassed, he decided to try his fortune in battle. He thus came to an engagement with the Romans, as was proper.

It is useful then not to fight under the conditions in which Fabius’ army found itself, or again in those in which Gaius Sulpicius found himself, i.e. when you have so good an army that the enemy does not dare to come and oust you from your fortified position; or when the enemy is in your country, but without having the footing there that would guarantee provisions. In this case the course adopted is useful for the reasons Livy gives when he says: ‘he was unwilling to try his fortune in an engagement with the enemy so long as time and his adverse situation were daily making the enemy’s position worse’. But under all other conditions battle cannot be avoided without incurring dishonour and danger, for if you run away, as Philip did, it is as bad as being routed, and is the more shameful in that you afford less proof of your virtue. And if he thus succeeded in getting away, another who is not helped by the country may not be so successful as he was.

That Hannibal was a past master in warfare no one will deny. Hence, when he was up against Scipio in Africa, if he had seen any advantage in prolonging the war he would have done so; and peradventure, being a good general and having a good army, he might have done as Fabius did in Italy. But, as he did not do it, it must be supposed that strong grounds impelled him to act thus. For a commander who has an army massed together and sees that for lack of funds or of allies he cannot keep it long in the field, is quite mad if he does not put his fortune to the test before his army has to be disbanded; because, if he waits, he is surely lost; but if he tries, he may succeed.

Another point of importance to be considered here is that one ought, if one is going to lose, to try to acquire glory, and there is more glory in being overcome by force than there is when it is through some other inconvenience that you come to lose. Hannibal must have been constrained by these necessities. On the other hand, should Hannibal have put off giving battle and Scipio had not enough courage to go and attack him in his strong positions, Scipio would have been none the worse for this, since he had already beaten Syphax and acquired so many towns in Africa that his position there was as safe and as comfortable as if he were in Italy. This was not the case with Hannibal when he was up against Fabius, nor with the Gauls when they were up against Sulpicius.

Still less, again, is it possible for him to avoid battle who with his army is attacking a foreign country, for if he wants to get into the enemy’s country, it behoves him when the enemy shows fight, to give battle, and if he takes up his position before a town, he is so much the more obliged to give battle. This happened in our times in the case of Charles, Duke of Burgundy, who, when encamped before Morat, a Swiss town, was attacked and routed by the Swiss; and in the case of the French army which was besieging Novara and was in like manner routed by the Swiss.