# 33. The Romans gave to Army Commanders Discretionary Powers

If one is to profit from the perusal of Livy’s history one ought, I think, to take account of all the modes of procedure used by the people and senate of Rome and among other points worthy of notice there is the authority we find them giving to their consuls, dictators and other army commanders when in the field. It was of a very high order, for the senate reserved to itself only the power to initiate fresh wars and to confirm peace treaties. All else was left to the discretion and power of the consul. For, when the people and senate had decided to go to war, against the Latins, for instance, they left everything else to the discretion of the consul, who could either give battle or not give it, and attack this or that town as he thought fit.

This is confirmed by numerous examples, but especially by what occurred in an expedition against the Tuscans. The consul, Fabius, had defeated those who were near Sutrium, and was planning next to lead his army through the Ciminian forest en route for Tuscany. About this, not only did he not consult the senate, but he did not even inform them, though the war was to be carried on in a new, unexplored and dangerous country. Further confirmation is afforded by the action the senate here took, which was of the opposite kind; for, when they heard of the victory which Fabius had gained and wondered whether his next step would be to pass through the said forest into Tuscany, they thought it best not to run the risk this war would entail, and so sent two legates to Fabius to stop him from going on to Tuscany. But, when they arrived, he had already got there and had won a victory, so that, instead of preventing a war, the legates came home bringing news of a conquest and of glory won.

Whoever considers carefully this technique will see that it was very wise to make use of it. For, if the senate had required a consul in conducting a war to proceed step by step according as they directed, it would have made him less circumspect and slower to act, for it would have seemed to him that the glory of victory would not be wholly his, but that the senate would share in it, since it would have been carried out under its directions. Furthermore, the senate would have had to advise on matters of which it had no immediate cognizance; for, though the senators were all men of considerable experience in military matters, yet, as they were not on the spot, they would not be acquainted with the multitudinous details which it is essential to know before one can give sound advice, and so would have made numerous mistakes. This being so, they preferred that the consul should decide what to do, and that the glory should be wholly his, for they thought his actions would be so restrained and regulated by his love of glory that he would do his utmost.

To this I have the more willingly called attention, because I notice that the republics of today, such as the Venetian and the Florentine republics, act differently, for if their generals, administrators or commissioners, have to set up a piece of artillery, they want to know of it and to advise about it, – a procedure as praiseworthy as are others of that ilk, which together have brought us to our present pass.