# 32. On the Various Methods used by the Romans in taking Towns

Since the Romans were all keen on war, they always and on all occasions took advantage of anything, alike in the matter of expense and of any other matter, that promised to help. It was for this reason that they took care not to besiege the towns they took, for they thought this method so costly and so clumsy that its disadvantages would much more than counterbalance the advantages likely to accrue from the conquest. Hence they deemed it better and more useful to subjugate towns by any other means rather than lay siege to them, so that in all their wars and in all the years they took, there are very few instances of their having used sieges.

In order to get hold of a city, therefore, the Romans either took it by assault or got it to surrender. Their assaults were either carried out openly in strength and with violence, or by force conjoined with fraud. When storming a town openly they used two methods. Either they attacked it on all sides without first demolishing the walls, which is called ‘putting a crown round the city’ since the whole army surrounds it and engages it at all points; and in this way they often succeeded in taking a city, even a very large one, at the first assault, as Scipio took New Carthage in Spain. Or, when an attack failed, they set about breaking down the walls with rams and other siege implements, or made a sap by which they obtained entrance to the city, as was done when Veii was taken; or to get on a level with those defending the walls, they constructed wooden towers, or raised earthworks against the walls from without, so as to be at the same height as the defenders.

Against such assaults the city’s defenders in the first case, where the attack came from all sides, were more quickly exposed to danger and had more dubious remedies. For, since many defenders were needed everywhere, either those they had were not enough to provide them all with reserves and reliefs; or, if they could, not all were equally courageous in resisting, and, if a section shirked the battle, all was lost. Hence it often happened, as I have said, that this method proved successful. But when the first assault was not successful, they did not keep it going long, because this was too dangerous for the army; for, since it covered so much ground, it could as a whole resist but feebly a sortie made by those within. The troops, too, got out of hand and grew weary; but for just once, when it was unexpected, they would try this method. When a breach was made in the walls, it was countered by means of ramparts as at the present time. And to counteract a sap, they made a countersap through which they got at the enemy either with their weapons or by other devices; of which one consisted of barrels filled with feathers to which they applied a light, and, when burning, put them in the sap so that the smoke and the stench might prevent the enemy getting through. While, if attacked from towers, they tried to destroy them by fire; and, if from earthworks, they made a hole in the lower part of the wall on which the earthwork was leaning, and drew in the earth which those outside had put there, so that, since the earth was being piled up outside and being taken away from the inside, the earthwork did not grow.

Such methods of storming a town could not be kept up for long, so they had either to raise their camp or to devise other methods of winning the war, as Scipio did when he got to Africa; for when he attacked Utica, but did not succeed in taking it, he raised his camp and sought to engage the Carthaginian armies and break them. Or they would have recourse to a siege, as they did at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem and other towns which they took by means of sieges.

The acquiring of towns by furtive violence is illustrated in the case of Palaeopolis, which the Romans took by arrangement with fifth columnistsa inside. This form of attack has often been tried by the Romans and by other peoples, but has seldom succeeded. The reason is that at the smallest set back the plan breaks down, and such setbacks easily happen. For in the first place the conspiracy may be discovered before it comes to a head, and in discovering it there is not much difficulty, owing sometimes to the treachery of those who have been told of it, sometimes to practical difficulties. For you must get in touch with the enemy, with whom it is not permitted to speak unless you can find some excuse. And, should the plot not be discovered while arrangements are being made, a host of difficulties occur when the time comes for action. For if you arrive before the time appointed, or get there late, anything may upset the plot. So, too, if there occurs some unexpected noise, such as the geese made at the Capitol, or if the normal course of events is interrupted. Given the least blunder or the smallest mistake, the attack is bound to fail. In addition to which there is the darkness of the night to add to the fear of those engaged in such dangerous tasks; and the fact that most of the men who are taken on such expeditions, having had no experience of the country or of the place to which they are being led, may get muddled and faint-hearted, or upset by some tiny and accidental mishap; and any false impression is enough to make them turn tail.

Anyone more lucky in such stealthy nocturnal ventures than Aratus the Sicyonian is not to be found, yet, bold as he was in these, he was equally nervous about ventures in daylight and in the open. This we may put down to some occult virtue with which he was endowed, rather than to anything in the nature of nocturnal expeditions which makes them more fortunate than others. Though such means are frequently planned, therefore, but few arrive at fruition, and very few succeed.

When towns are acquired by surrender, the surrender may either be voluntary or compulsory. When voluntary, it is due either to some external circumstance which compels a town to seek protection under another’s wing, as Capua sought Rome’s; or to the desire to be well ruled, a desire evoked by the good government exercised by the prince in question over those who of their own accord have placed themselves in his hands, as was the case with the Rhodians, the Massilians and other such cities which surrendered to the Roman people. When the surrender is compulsory, it is either brought about by a long siege, as we have said above; or it is due to the continued vexation produced by raids, depredations and other annoyances, to escape which a city surrenders.

Of all the methods mentioned above, the Romans used the last more than any. For more than four hundred and fifty years they sought to tire out their neighbours by defeats in the field and by raids, and by means of treaties managed to acquire greater repute than their rivals did, as we have pointed out elsewhere. It was on this method that they always relied most, though they tried them all, but found the others fraught with danger or of no use. For sieges are long and costly, assaults of doubtful issue and risky; and conspiracies are unreliable. They also realized that, if the enemy’s army was routed, they acquired a kingdom in a day; whereas, if they besieged an obstinate city, it might take years to get it.