# 27. Prudent Princes and Republics should be content with Victory, for, when they are not content with it, they usually lose

Speaking to the disparagement of an enemy is usually due to the arrogance aroused in you by victory or by the false hope of victory. False hopes of this kind not only cause men to make mistakes in what they say, but also in what they do. For, when such hopes enter men’s breasts they cause them to dispense with caution, and often to miss the chance of obtaining a sure thing in the hope, but by no means the certainty, of improving on it. This matter is worth considering, since very often men make mistakes in regard to it, detrimental to their country. Wherefore, since it cannot be so clearly proved by an appeal to reason, I shall cite examples both ancient and modern in support of it.

After routing the Romans at Cannae, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage to announce his victory, and to ask for reinforcements and supplies. During the discussion in the senate as to what should be done, Hanno, an old and prudent Carthaginian citizen, urged that it would be wise to use the victory as a lever for securing peace with the Romans which they should be able to obtain with honour since they had beaten them, instead of waiting till their own defeat caused them to make it. The aim of the Carthaginians should be to make it clear to the Romans that to have fought with them sufficed. Having won, they should not now go and spoil their chances in the hope of improving on them. This course was not adopted by the Carthaginian senate, though it recognized later the wisdom of it when the opportunity had been lost.

When Alexander the Great had conquered the whole of the East, the republic of Tyre, which in those days ranked high and was powerful, since, like Venice, it was on the coast, recognized Alexander’s greatness, and so sent ambassadors to say that they were ready to become his loyal subjects and to obey his behests, but that they were not prepared to receive either him or his troops in their town. Alexander was indignant that a city should want to shut in his face a door that the whole world had thrown open, declined to accept their conditions, and set out to besiege the city. But this sea-girt and fortunate town was so well stocked with provisions and other supplies needed for its defence, that after four months Alexander saw that it was taking him longer to win glory in the case of this city than it had taken him to acquire many other places, and hence decided to make peace overtures and to concede the point that Tyre had asked. But the men of Tyre, elated with success, not only refused to accept his terms, but killed the envoy who came to arrange matters. Whereupon Alexander, becoming indignant, put such life into the siege that he took and demolished the city, and either killed or made slaves of its inhabitants.

In 1512 a Spanish army invaded the dominions of Florence with a view to restoring the Medici and levying a tax on the city, acting on behalf of fifth columnists who had led them to expect that, once they had crossed the border, they would take up arms in their favour. On entering the plain [of the Arno] they found none of them, and, as they were short of provisions, they made overtures of peace. The people of Florence were too proud to accept them. Hence the loss of Prato, and the ruin of that state.

Rulers of states, when attacked, therefore, cannot make a greater mistake than to refuse to come to terms when the forces attacking them are a good deal stronger than their own, especially if the overtures are made by the enemy: for the terms will never be so hard but that in them some benefit will accrue to those who accept them, so that in a way they will share in the victory. The people of Tyre, for instance, should have been content that Alexander had accepted the conditions which he had at first refused, and the victory thus gained would have been considerable, since with their armed forces they had compelled a great man to condescend to their wishes. It should, in like manner, have sufficed the people of Florence that the Spanish army had yielded to any of their demands instead of fulfilling all their own, for this, too, would have been a considerable victory. For what the Spanish army wanted was to change the form of government in Florence, to put an end to its attachment to France, and to levy tribute. If of these three things the Spaniards had gained the last two, and the people of Florence had gained the first, that is the retention of their form of government, each would have acquired a certain honour and a certain satisfaction; nor would the people have been likely to trouble much about the other two things, so long as their lives were sare. Nay, even had they seen there was a good, and almost certain, chance of a greater victory, they should not have placed themselves wholly at the discretion of fortune and ventured their last stake, which it is never wise to risk unless driven to it.

When Hannibal, who had enjoyed great glory in Italy for sixteen years, left it on being recalled by the Carthaginians to help his own country, he found Hasdrubal and Syphax routed, the kingdom of Numidia lost, and the Carthaginians cooped up within their own walls, destitute of hope except what he and his army should bring. Realizing that his country was reduced to its last stake, he was determined not to risk that till he had tried all other remedies, and so was not ashamed to sue for peace, since he was convinced that, if there was any hope at all for his country, it lay in this and not in war. When peace was refused, he did not decline to fight though bound to lose, since he felt that he could still win, but if he had to lose, he could at least lose gloriously. If, then, Hannibal, who was so full of virtuosity, and had his army still intact, preferred peace to war when he saw that, by losing, his country would be enslaved, what should a man do who has neither the efficiency nor the experience of Hannibal? Yet there are men who make this mistake, in that to their hopes they set no bound, and are ruined because they rely on such hopes and take no account of other things.





Book Two



[DISCOURSES 28–33]


[Rome’s Dealings with Neighbouring States and Cities in Peace and War]