# 22. How frequently Erroneous are the Views Men adopt in regard to Matters of Moment

How frequently men form false opinions has been observed and is still observed by those who happen to be witnesses of their decisions, the which, unless made by men of first-class ability, are very often the reverse of being sound. And because in corrupt republics, especially in untroubled times, men of first-class ability are ousted by the envy and ambitious scheming of others, men fall back on what by a common error is judged to be good, or else by those who are seeking popularity rather than the common good. Such mistakes are discovered afterwards when things go wrong, and recourse is then had of necessity to those who in peaceful times had been, as it were, forgotten, as in its proper place in this connection we shall endeavour to show. There sometimes occur also events about which men who have had no great experience of affairs, are easily mistaken, since such happenings have plausible features which make men believe that the outcome in such a case will be what they have persuaded themselves it will be. These remarks are made with reference to what Numicius, the praetor, persuaded the Latins to do after they had been beaten by the Romans, and to what many believed a few years ago when Francis I, king of France, set out to acquire Milan, which the Swiss were defending.

I would point out, then, that, after the death of Louis XII, Francis of Angoulême succeeded to the crown of France and was anxious to recover the Duchy of Milan, which, a few years before, had been occupied by the Swiss, supported by Pope Julius II. To facilitate his attack, he desired to find help in Italy, so, besides the Venetians whom Louis had won over, he approached the Florentines and Pope Leo X, under the impression that his task would be easier if he could first win them over, since the King of Spain’s troops were in Lombardy and other forces belonging to the Emperor were in Verona. Pope Leo declined to accede to the king’s wish, but was persuaded by his advisers – so it was said – to remain neutral, for they pointed out that by adopting this course he would be certain to emerge victorious, for it did not suit the Church to have as powers in Italy either the king or the Swiss; but, being anxious to restore Italy to its former freedom, it was essential to free it from servitude to either. And since it was impossible to overcome both of them, either singly or both together, the best course was to let one of them overcome the other, and then for the Church with her allies to fall on the victor. Nor could there be a better opportunity than the present, since both armies were in the field, and the Pope had his forces in readiness and could send them to the confines of Lombardy, near to both the armies, under the pretext of protecting his own territory, where they could remain until the battle took place. This might reasonably be expected to be sanguinary on both sides, since both armies were good ones,a and hence should leave the victor so weak that it would be easy for the Pope to attack and break him, which would be a glorious thing since it would leave him master of Lombardy and the arbiter of all Italy.

How false this opinion was is seen by the event; for, when the Swiss were overcome after a long fight, the forces of the Pope and of the king of Spain did not dare to attack the victor, but made ready for flight, and even this would not have helped them, had it not been that the king, for humanity’s sake or because indifferent, did not look to a second victory, but was content to make peace with the Church.

Though, when viewed from a distance, there were grounds which made the view here adopted seem sound, it was in fact utterly false. For it rarely happens that a victor loses very many of his troops; since they are killed in battle, not in flight, and in the ardour of the combat when men are face to face, but few get killed, especially if the battle lasts but for a short time, as usually it does. While even if it lasts long, and many of the victor’s men get killed, the repute gained by the victory and the terror he now inspires, much more than compensates for the loss suffered by the death of his men. Hence anyone who sets out to attack an army, which in his opinion has been weakened by a fight, will find himself mistaken unless his own army be such that at any time, even before the victory, he could afford to fight. In that case he might win or he might lose, according to his luck and to his ‘virtue’; but an army which has just fought and gained a victory would be at an advantage rather than at a disadvantage in his regard.

This is put beyond question by the experience the Latins underwent and the mistake the praetor, Numicius, made, and by what happened to those who believed him. For when the Romans had defeated the Latins, Numicius went about shouting all over Latium that now was the time to attack the Romans since they were weakened by the battle they had fought with them, and all they had gained was a nominal victory, which in reality was a defeat owing to the losses they had suffered, so that any small force which should make a fresh attack on them, would finish them off. So the peoples who believed him, raised a fresh army, and were routed forthwith, wherein they suffered a loss which is always suffered by those who lend ear to such advice.