# 20. On the Dangers which accrue to the Prince or the Republic that employs Auxiliary or Mercenary Troops

If I had not in another of my works50 discoursed at length on the futility of mercenary and auxiliary troops and on the advantage of one’s own, I should make this discourse of greater length than I shall do; but having spoken at length elsewhere, I shall here be brief. Yet I cannot well omit to mention an important example which I have found in Titus Livy concerning auxiliary troops, where by ‘auxiliary troops’ I mean those that a prince or a republic sends to help you under commanders appointed and paid by that prince or that republic.

Coming then to Livy’s evidence, I would point out that, after the Romans in two different places had routed two Samnite armies with the armies which they had sent to help the Capuans, and had thus freed the Capuans from the war the Samnites had been waging against them, they decided to return to Rome. But lest the Capuans, when deprived of their help, should again fall a prey to the Samnites, they left two legions in the neighbourhood of Capua to defend them. These legions began to enjoy an idleness which was bad for them; so much so that, though it would mean being false to their fatherland and to the respect they owed the senate, they thought of taking up arms and making themselves lords of the country which by their valour they had defended, for it seemed to them that the inhabitants were unworthy to possess good things which they knew not how to protect. When this became known it was stopped by the Romans and matters were put right, as we shall explain at length when we come to speak of conspiracies.

I repeat, then, that of all kinds of soldiers auxiliaries are the most hurtful, for over them the prince or the republic who accepts their aid, has no authority at all: the only person who has authority over them is the person who has sent them. For auxiliary troops are, as I have said, troops sent to you by a ruler under their own commanders, with their own standards, and in his pay, as was the army which the Romans sent to Capua. Such soldiers, when they have won, often prey on those who have commissioned them in the same way as they prey on those against whom they have been commissioned to fight, moved thereunto either by the malignity of the prince who sends them, or by their own ambition. Though the Romans had no intention of breaking the alliance and agreement they had made with the Capuans, yet so easy did the conquest of Capua seem to these soldiers that they were readily induced to consider depriving the Capuans of their lands and of their independence.

Of this numerous examples might be given, but I shall be content with this one and with that afforded by Rhegium, which was robbed of its independent life and of its territory by a legion which the Romans had sent to guard it. A prince or a republic, therefore, ought first to adopt any course rather than bring into the state for its defence auxiliary forces, when it means that they will be entirely dependent on them; for any treaty or convention, however hard, that they can make with any enemy will be light as compared with such an alternative. Those who study closely the past and discuss the present will find that for each case that has led to good results there are any number that turned out to be mistakes. Nor can an ambitious prince or republic have a better chance of getting hold of a city or a province than to be asked to send his armies there to protect it. Hence he who is so ambitious as to invoke such help, not merely to defend himself but to attack others, is seeking to acquire what he cannot keep, for by what he has used to get it, it can easily be taken away. Yet so great is man’s ambition that, in striving to slake his present desire, he gives no thought to the evils that in a short time will follow in its wake. Nor is he stirred by the lessons of the past, as I have shown in regard to this and to other matters; for, if he were moved by them, he would see that the greater the liberality he displays towards his neighbours, and the more averse he is to seizing their lands, the more ready they will be to throw themselves into his lap; as will be shown below from what happened in the case of the Capuans.