# 18. That Infantry should be more highly esteemed than Cavalry is shown by the Authority of the Romans and by the Example of Ancient Military Practice

It is possible to give many reasons and to cite many cases showing clearly how much greater esteem the Romans had for foot-soldiers than for cavalry in all military operations, and how upon this basis they drew up all plans for their forces. Numerous instances illustrate this; among others the battle fought with the Latins near Lake Regillus, where, when the Roman army began to give way, to support them some troops on horseback were ordered to dismount and fight on foot, by which means the battle was renewed and a victory gained. From which it is obvious that the Romans had more confidence in their men when on foot than when mounted. They used this expedient in many other battles, and always found it the best remedy in dangerous situations.

Nor can this be countered by the opinion expressed by Hannibal when during the battle of Cannae he noticed that the consuls had made their cavalry dismount, and joked about it, saying: ‘Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites,’ i.e. ‘I should have liked it better had they handed the horsemen over to me bound.’ Though this opinion is voiced by a first-class man, yet, if it be a question of authority, one should put more credence in a Roman republic and in the many first-class generals who were in it than in Hannibal alone. Furthermore, apart from an appeal to authority, sound reasons can be adduced; for a foot-soldier can get to many places to which a mounted man cannot go; infantry can be taught to keep their ranks, and, when broken, know how to re-form them, whereas it is difficult for cavalry to keep their ranks, and impossible for them to re-form when their ranks are disorganized. Besides which, one finds that horses, like men, sometimes have little spirit and sometimes a great deal, and quite often it happens that a spirited horse is ridden by a timid man and a timid horse by a man of spirit; and of whichever kind the disparity be, the result is subversive of utility and order.

Infantry when well drawn up, can easily break cavalry, but with difficulty are routed by them. This view is corroborated not only by many instances, both ancient and modern, but also by authors who prescribe rules for the conduct of civic affairs and in them show that wars were first fought with cavalry, since there were then no rules for drawing up infantry; but when these were made, it was at once recognized that infantry are more useful than cavalry. But it does not follow from this that cavalry is not essential to an army alike for the purpose of scouting, of raiding and pillaging the country, of pursuing the enemy when in flight, and again as a partial counterpoise to the cavalry of the adversary: but it is infantry that should constitute the basis and sinews of an army and that should be held in the higher esteem.

Among the sins committed by Italian princes who have made Italy the slave of the foreigner, there is none more grave than that of having held this arm of small account and of having devoted all their attention to mounted troops. This mismanagement is due to the perversity of captainsa and to the ignorance of those who hold office. For the Italian militia having lost all official status during the last twenty-five years had become like soldiers of fortune. It occurred to the militia that their reputation would be made if they had the armed forces while the rulers had none. Since, then, they could not maintain a large number of infantry continually in their pay and they had no subjects of whom they could avail themselves, and since a small number would not make their reputation, they turned to cavalry; for with two or three hundred cavalry in his pay, the reputation of a condottiere was safe, and the pay was not such as to prevent him getting it from ministers of state. So the more easily to attain their end and to keep up their reputation they made light of all the esteem and repute in which infantry was held, and applied it instead to their own cavalry: an abuse which has grown to such an extent that even of the largest armies the infantry constitute but a fraction. It is this practice, conjoined with numerous other abuses associated with it, that has made the Italian militia so weak that Italy has become an easy prey, downtrodden by all the ultramontanes.

To show yet more clearly what a mistake it is to prefer cavalry to infantry, I shall take another example from Rome. The Romans were encamped before Sora. From the town there came forth a troop of cavalry to attack their camp. The Roman master of horse advanced to meet them with his cavalry. When they met, luck would have it that at their first encounter the officers commanding both bodies of troops were killed. Though without their leaders, the fight none the less went on, and that they might the more easily get the better of their foes, the Romans dismounted, and forced the enemy’s cavalry in order to defend themselves, to do the same; by which means the Romans gained the victory. Than this example none shows better how much more virtue there is in infantry than in cavalry; for in other actions the consuls made the Roman cavalry dismount that they might help the infantry who were hard pressed and were in need of support; but in this case they dismounted, not to help the infantry, nor yet to engage the enemy’s foot-soldiers, but because, while fighting as cavalry against cavalry, it occurred to them that, since as cavalry they could not prevail, they might win more easily by dismounting. Whence I infer that it is only with the greatest difficult that infantry when properly drawn up, can be overcome except by other infantry.

Crassus and Mark Antony, two Romans, overran the domains of the Parthians for many days with very few cavalry but plenty of infantry, though against them they had vast numbers of Parthian cavalry. Crassus with part of the army got killed, but Mark Antony fought valiantlya and escaped. None the less, in the misfortunes the Romans suffered, we see how much more value infantry were than cavalry, for the country was vast, mountains scarce, streams very scarce, the sea far away, and no conveniences at hand; yet Mark Antony, as the Parthians themselves admitted, saved himself by his outstanding virtue; nor did the Parthian cavalry, numerous as it was, ever dare to try conclusions with his army. And, if Crassus was left behind, he who studies closely the record of his doings, will see that it was by deceit rather than by force that he was undone, for, in spite of all his troubles, the Parthians never ventured to attack him. On the contrary, they always went roaming about, intercepting his convoys, making promises which they did not keep, till they had reduced him to dire extremity.

I should have been at more pains, I think, to prove that the ‘virtue’ of infantry is more potent than that of cavalry if there had not been so many recent examples which provide abundant evidence of this. There were the nine thousand Swiss we have already mentioned, who at Novara proceeded to attack ten thousand cavalry and as many infantry, and beat them; for the cavalry could not get at them, and they thought little of the infantry, since it consisted for the most part of Gascons and was badly organized. Then there were the twenty-six thousand Swiss who went as far as Milan to look for Francis, king of France, who had with him twenty thousand cavalry, forty thousand infantry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; and if they did not win the day as they had done at Novara, they fought valiantlya for two days, and, though routed, got away with half their forces. Marcus Regulus Atilius had the courage to oppose not only cavalry, but elephants, with infantry; and, if his project did not succeed, it was not because his infantry were so lacking in virtue, that he had not sufficient confidence in them to believe that they would overcome the difficulty. I repeat, then, that to get the better of well-disciplined infantry it is necessary to bring against them better disciplined infantry; otherwise the case is plainly hopeless.48

In the days of Philip Visconti, Duke of Milan, there descended on Lombardy about sixteen thousand Swiss. Whereupon the Duke, whose forces were then commanded by Carmignuola, sent him with about a thousand cavalry and a few infantry to meet them. Carmignuola, unacquainted with their way of fighting, attacked them with his cavalry, assuming that he would be able to break them at once. But they stood firm, and, having lost many of his men, he retired. Being, however, a very brave man, who knew how to take fresh chances when circumstances changed, as soon as reinforcements came along to make up his strength, he went to meet them, told all his men-at-arms to dismount, and, putting them at the head of his infantry, set out to attack the Swiss. For whom there was no escape, because Carmignuola’s men-at-arms having dismounted and being well protected by armour, they could easily pierce the ranks of the Swiss without suffering any harm, and, having got through, could easily overcome them. The result was that of all the Swiss there remained alive only those whom the humanity of Carmignuola chose to spare.

I believe many are aware of the difference in virtue that exists between these two kinds of troops, but so unhappy are these our times that neither ancient nor modern examples nor its being admittedly a mistake is sufficient to make modern rulers revise their point of view and realize that, if a province or a state is to keep up its military reputation, it is essential to resuscitate these services, to have them at hand, to restore their credit, to put fresh life into them, so that they may bring to the ruler both life and reputation. But, as rulers have departed from these ways, so they have departed from others mentioned above, and in consequence acquisitions do harm to a state instead of contributing to its greatness, as will presently be pointed out.





Book Two



[DISCOURSES 19–23]


[The Administration of Conquered Territory and Other Problems Which Admit of No Middle Course]