# 17. In what Esteem Artillery should be held by Armies at the Present Time, and whether the Opinion universally held in its Regard is Sound

When in addition to what I have just written, I consider how many open battles which in our time the French call ‘days’ and the Italians call ‘feats of arms’, were fought by the Romans at different times, there comes to my mind the common opinion so many hold, an opinion which would have it that, had there been artillery in those days, it would not have been possible for the Romans to have conquered provinces and to have made peoples become their tributaries so easily as they did; nor would they have been able in any way to make such bold acquisitions. They allege, too, that the use of these destructive weapons prevents men from employing and displaying their virtue as they used to do of old. And as a third point they add that it is more difficult than it was then to come to an engagement, and that it is impossible to keep to the ancient usages. In fact, war before long will be reduced to the question of artillery.

I do not think it beside the point to discuss whether this view is sound, or to inquire whether artillery has increased or has lessened the strength of armies, and whether it has deprived good generals of, or has provided them with, an opportunity for acting ‘virtuously’. So let me begin by dealing with the first of these claims, namely, that Roman armies of old would not have made the acquisitions they did make, if in those days there had been artillery.

In reply to this I would point out that wars are either offensive or defensive. Hence we must first ask to which of these two kinds of warfare artillery is the more useful or the more dangerous. Though there is something to be said for either view, yet I am convinced that artillery is incomparably more harmful to defenders than to those who attack. The reason why I say this is that the defenders are either in a walled town or are encamped behind a stockade. If they are within a walled town, either it is small, as are most fortresses, or it is large. In the first case, it is all up with the defenders, for the force of artillery is such that no wall can stand it, not even the thickest, for more than a few days. Hence if those within have not a goodly space into which to retire and dig trenches and build ramparts they are doomed. Nor can they withstand the attack of an enemy determined to force his way through a gap in the walls, even if they have artillery to help them, for it is an accepted maxim that against a heavy massed attack artillery is powerless. For this reason the defending of towns against the fury of ultramontane attacks has not been successful but against the assaults of Italians they have been highly successful, for the latter do not attack en masse but in detachments, a form of attack for which much the best name is skirmishing. To advance thus coolly in such weak formation towards a breach in the walls where there is artillery, is to advance to certain death, and against such attacks artillery is of service. But when the attackers form a dense mass and come on one after the other to a breach in the walls, they get through anywhere unless held up by trenches and ramparts. Artillery will not hold them, for, though some get killed, there will not be so many killed as to prevent a victory.

That this is so is shown by the many towns stormed by the ultramontanes in Italy, and especially by that of Brescia. For when this town rebelled against the French who still held the citadel on behalf of the king of France, in order to prevent raids being made on the town from the citadel, the Venetians fortified the whole of the street leading down from the citadel to the city with artillery, placing it both in front and on the flanks and in any other convenient place. But of this Monsieur de Foix made no account. On the contrary, with a squadron of his cavalry, who dismounted, he got right through the artillery and took the city; nor do we hear that the artillery caused him any appreciable loss. So that the defenders of a small town, as we have said, when they find their walls laid low and have no space into which to retire behind ramparts and in trenches, but have to rely on their artillery, are speedily undone.

If you are defending a large town where you have all you need for a withdrawal, artillery is still of far greater use to those who are outside than to those who are within. First, because, if artillery is to do any damage to those who are outside, you must needs raise it above the level of the ground, for, if on the level, every little trench the enemy digs and every rampart he puts up will afford him security, and you can do him no harm. So much so that, having raised your artillery and dragged it into some recess in the walls or having in some other way elevated it above the ground, you will then meet with two difficulties. First, you cannot bring into action artillery of the same size and power as those outside can avail themselves of, since in a small space it is impossible to manipulate large pieces. Secondly, should you succeed in getting it there, you will not be able to construct reliable and safe ramparts whereby to protect the said artillery, which can be done quite easily outside, on terra firma, where there are all the conveniences and as much space as anyone can want. Hence it is impossible for the defenders of a town to have their artillery in high positions when those who are outside have enough artillery and that of a powerful kind; and if they are driven to place it in a low position, it is in large part useless, as has been said. Consequently, the defence of a city has to be carried on by hand-to-hand fighting, as was done of old, supported by artillery of very light calibre. Wherefore, though some slight benefit may accrue from this light artillery, it brings with it a disadvantage which counterbalances the advantage due to artillery, because, owing to the heavy artillery, the walls of towns are demolished and lie flat, buried, as it were, in ditches, so that, when it comes to hand-to-hand fighting, the defenders have a worse time of it than they had before, since their walls have been battered down or their trenches filled up. These engines of war, therefore, as was said above, are of more use to the besiegers of towns than they are to the besieged.

As to the third point, if your camp has been placed behind a stockade so as to avoid open battle unless it suit your convenience and is to your advantage, I claim that in this case you are ordinarily no better off in regard to preventing an engagement than was the case in the old days, and that there are times when, on account of artillery, you may be at a greater disadvantage. For, should the enemy come upon you and have a slight advantage in position, as may easily happen should he find himself on higher ground than yours; or should you on his arriving not yet have made your trenches and dug yourself well in; straightway, and without your being able to do anything about it, he will dislodge you and you will have to quit your fortified position and join battle. This happened to the Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna. They had fortified themselves on the banks of the Ronco, but the earthworks they had thrown up were not sufficiently high and the French had a slight advantage in position, so that they were compelled by artillery to quit their fortifications and join battle. But suppose, as should usually be the case, that the site you have chosen for the camp is above that occupied by the enemy and that its earthworks are good and strong, so that, owing to your position and the other preparations you have made, the enemy does not dare to attack, it will be found that in such a case recourse will be had to the methods that were used in ancient times when someone had his army in a position in which it could not be attacked, namely, to scouring the country, taking or laying siege to towns that are friendly to you, and cutting off your supplies, so that you will be forced under such conditions to leave your camp and come out into the open, where artillery, as I shall presently point out, cannot do much. In view, therefore, of the reasons for which the Romans made war, and seeing that almost all their wars were of the offensive and not of the defensive type, it would seem that what we have said above holds good, namely, that it would have been to their advantage and would have speeded up their conquests, had there been artillery in those days.

As to the second charge, which alleges that men cannot display their valour as they used to do of old, on account of artillery, I admit it is true that, where men in small detachments have to expose themselves, there is greater danger now than then, should they have to scale the walls of a town or to make an assault of this kind not with a compact body of troops but individually, first one appearing and then another. It is also true that the officers and generals of an army are more exposed to the danger of death now than then, since anywhere they may come under artillery fire. Nor does it help them to be in the last squadron or to be supported by very brave men. One finds, none the less, that rarely does either of these two dangers occasion any out-of-the-way loss. For the walls of well-fortified towns cannot be scaled, nor are attacks on them made with weak troops. If a town is to be taken, it has to be besieged, just as it was of old. Nor, even when it is taken by assault are the dangers much greater now than they were then, for the defenders of towns even in those days did not lack equipment for launching projectiles, which, if not so terrifying, were no less effective in the matter of killing men. As to the death of officers and army commanders, in the last twenty-four years during which there have been wars in Italy, there have been fewer cases than there were during ten years of war in olden times. For, except for Count Ludovico della Mirandola, who was killed at Ferrara when the Venetians attacked that state a few years ago, and for the Duke of Nemours, who was killed abroad at Cerignuola, artillery has not killed anybody; for Monsieur de Foix was killed with a sword, not by a cannon-ball. Hence if men do not, as individuals, display their valour, it is not due to artillery, but to bad methods and to the weakness of [modern] armies, for since they lack valour as a whole, they cannot display it in the part.

To their third allegation which is that it is impossible to bring about a hand-to-hand fight and that war will eventually become a matter of artillery, I reply that this statement is altogether false, and will always be looked on as false by those who want their armies to display in their operations the virtue of ancient times. For it behoves him who wants to form a good army, to accustom his men by means of sham fights or real fights to engage the enemy at close quarters, sword in hand. Hence he should rely more on infantry than on cavalry, for reasons which will presently be given. And, if he does rely on infantry, trained as we have said, artillery becomes quite useless, since it is easier for infantry when engaging the enemy to avoid cannon-balls than it was of old for them to avoid an attack by elephants or by chariots armed with scythes, or other unfamiliar weapons such as the Roman infantry had to encounter. Against such devices they always found a remedy; and against artillery would the more easily have found a remedy in that the time during which it may harm you is shorter than that during which elephants and scythed chariots could do you harm. For the latter throw you into disorder during a battle, whereas the former is a nuisance only before the fight begins; and this nuisance infantry easily avoid either by availing themselves of such cover as the site offers or by lying flat on the ground when a volley comes. Experience, however, has shown that this is unnecessary, especially as a defence against heavy artillery; for with heavy artillery the range cannot be so nicely adjusted. Hence either the fire is too high, and does not get you, or it is too low and falls short of you.

Again, when armies come to hand-to-hand conflict, it is as clear as the day that neither heavy nor light artillery can hurt you. For if the enemy place it in front, you capture it; and, if he puts it behind, it hits his own folk before it hits you; while on the flanks it cannot do you so much damage but that you can go and get it, so that in the end it all comes to much the same thing. Nor is there much question about this. For it is clear from the case of the Swiss, who at Novara in 1513 were without either artillery or cavalry, yet went for the French army, which was supported by artillery in a fortified position, and found no difficulty on this account in breaking it up.

The reason for this, besides what I said above, is that, if artillery is to function, it must be protected either by walls or trenches or earthworks, and, if either form of protection is lacking, it either gets taken or becomes useless, just as happens when men have to defend it in pitched battles and open engagements. Nor can it be used on the flanks except in the way the ancients used projectile launching devices. Such instruments were then placed outside the main body, in order that they might function outside the ranks, and, should those who used them be overcome at any time by cavalry or other forces, they took refuge behind the regular troops. Those who expect anything more from artillery do not understand it properly and place their trust in what can easily let them down. And if by using artillery the Turk gained a victory over Sophy and the Sultan, it was solely in virtue of the panic caused among their cavalry by its unfamiliar noise.

On coming, then, to the end of this discourse, my conclusion is that artillery is useful to an army provided it be backed by valour such as was displayed of old; but, without this, it is of not the least use against a valorous army.47