# 16. How far the Discipline of Troops in our Day falls short of that maintained in Days gone by46

The most important battle ever fought by the Romans in any war with another nation was the battle they fought with the Latin peoples in the consulate of Torquatus and Decius. For everything shows that, just as the Latins by losing became a subject people, so the Romans would have become a subject people, had they not won. This is the view held by Titus Livy, for in all respects the two armies were alike in discipline, virtue, truculence and in numbers; the only difference was that the commanders of the Roman army had more virtuosity than those of the Latin army.

One notes, too, how in the conduct of this battle there occurred two unprecedented incidents of which there have been but few examples since; namely, to strengthen the resolution of the soldiers and to make them obey orders, of the two consuls one killed himself and the other killed his son. The parity which Titus Livy says held between the two armies was due to their having for a long time waged war together, and consisted in their having the same language, the same discipline, and the same kind of arms, for in drawing up troops for battle they used the same formation, and both units and officers bore the same names. It was essential, therefore, since both in strength and in virtù they were equal, that something extraordinary should take place whereby to strengthen the ardour and truculence of the one rather than the other, for, as we have remarked on other occasions, it is on determination that victory depends, since, so long as it lasts in the breasts of those who are fighting, an army will never turn tail. And in order that it might last longer in the breasts of the Romans than with the Latins it came about, owing partly to chance and partly to the virtue of the consuls, that Torquatus had to kill his son and Decius to kill himself.

When pointing out this parity in strength Titus Livy describes in detail how the Romans drew up their armies and how they disposed them for battle. He has done this at considerable length, so I shall not repeat it all, but shall discuss the points which I deem worthy of note, points which are ignored by all present-day commanders, with the result that there is a grave lack of proper order alike in drawing up armies and in battle. From Livy we gather that in the Roman army there were three main divisions for which the Tuscan term three ‘ranks’ may be used. They called the first Hastati, the second Principes, the third Triarii. Each had its own cavalry attached. In drawing them up for battle, they put the Hastati in front; in the second place, immediately behind the Hastati, they put the Principes; in the third, all covering precisely the same space, they placed the Triarii. The cavalry pertaining to each of these divisions they put on the right and on the left of the three formations. These mounted troops, on account of their formation and their position, were called alae, because they looked like two wings attached to the body. They drew up the first rank, consisting of the Hastati who were in front, in close formation, so that they might thrust forward and hold up the enemy. The second rank, consisting of Principes, since they were not to be engaged at the outset, but were to come to the aid of the first should they be beaten or hard pressed, they did not draw up in such close formation, but kept their lines thinner so that this rank could receive the first rank, without disturbing its formation, should the latter be overcome by the enemy and have to fall back. The third rank consisting of Triarii, were drawn up in yet thinner lines than the second, so as to receive the two first ranks, comprising Principes and Hastati, should need arise. When their ranks had thus been drawn up in this formation, they went into battle; and, should the Hastati be forced back or defeated, they fell straight back upon the thinner ranks of the Principes, and the two ranks, thus united to form one compact body, resumed the fight. Should these ranks be beaten and forced to retreat, they retired upon the thinner ranks of the Triarii, and all three ranks, together forming one body, renewed the fight. But should they be overcome, the day was lost, since they had no further chance to re-form. Wherefore, since every time this last rank of Triarii became engaged, it meant danger to the army, there arose the proverb: ‘It all depends on the Triarii’, or, as we say in the Tuscan idiom: ‘We have played the last stake’.

As generals in our days have abandoned all other traditions and pay no attention to any point in ancient military discipline, so they have abandoned it in regard to this point, which is of no small importance. For where an army is so drawn up as to be able to re-form three times during a battle, to lose the day luck must go against it three times and the valour of those attacking it must be sufficient to beat it three times over. But an army that can withstand but one attack, as is the case with all Christian armies, may easily lose, for, if it become in any way disorganized or its valour be but indifferent, its chance of victory goes. The inability of our armies thrice to re-form is due to their having dropped the custom of receiving one rank into the other. This in turn is due to there being in present-day battle-formations one of two defects: either they station their ranks one alongside the other, and make their formations broad in extent but thin in the line of attack, which makes them weaker owing to their lack of depth; or when, to make them stronger, they actually draw up the ranks in Roman fashion, then, since no arrangement is made for the first to be received by the second, when the first is routed, all get mixed up together and defeat themselves. For if the rank in front gets the worst of it, it collides with the second; and, if the second wants to advance, it is impeded by the first. Hence when the first falls back on the second, and the second on the third, so much confusion arises that the whole army is frequently ruined should the least misadventure befall.

At the battle of Ravenna, in which Monsieur de Foix who commanded the armies of France was killed – a well-fought battle as things go today – both the Spanish and the French armies were drawn up in one of the ways just described, i.e. each of the two armies advanced with all its troops drawn up shoulder to shoulder so that both presented but a single front which was much greater in extent than it was in depth. This is always their procedure when they are operating on a large plain such as they had at Ravenna; for, realizing the disorder a retreat causes when troops are arranged in files, they avoid this, when they can, by making their front broad, as has been said. But should the available space be narrow they put up with the aforesaid bad arrangement without providing any remedy. And in the same bad formation they ride through the enemy’s country, whether to loot it or to perform any other military manoeuvre.

Again, at San. Regolo in the territory of Pisa, as also at other places in which the Florentines were routed by the Pisans during the war which took place between the Florentines and that city owing to its having rebelled after Charles, king of France, passed through Italy, the disaster was entirely due to the allied cavalry which, being in front and having been repulsed by the enemy, fell back on the Florentine infantry and broke it up, so that the rest of the troops all turned tail. Messer Ciriaco dal Borgo, once a captain of Florentine infantry has also often stated in my presence that he had never been routed except by the cavalry of his allies. The Swiss, who are masters of modern warfare, when fighting on the French side, make it their first care to station themselves on the flanks, so that, should the allied cavalry be driven back, it will not clash with them. Yet, though such things are both easy to understand and very easy to carry out, none the less there has not appeared as yet any of our contemporary generals who has adopted the ancient formations and emended the modern ones. And though they may again have the threefold army formation, called respectively the vanguard, the main body and the rearguard, it serves no purpose other than that of disposing men in billets. Moreover, when they make use of it, as was said above, it rarely happens that the self-same fortune does not befall all these bodies.

Since many, to cover their ignorance, assert that the destructive power of artillery does not in these days permit the use of many ancient practices, I propose to discuss this question in the following chapter, and to inquire whether artillery renders it impossible to display the valour of days gone by.