# 15. The Decisions of Weak States are always fraught with Ambiguity, and the Slowness with which they arrive at them is Harmful

In regard to the topic we have been discussing in connection with the outbreak of war between the Romans and the Latins, it may be remarked that in all consultations it is well to come to the point which is under discussion, not to remain ever hesitant and uncertain in regard to the real issue. This is brought out very clearly in the consultation the Latins held when they were considering whether to leave the Roman confederation. For, when the Romans came to be aware of the ill humour with which the Latin peoples had become imbued, in order to clear up the situation and to see whether they could not regain the loyalty of these peoples without having recourse to arms, they suggested to them that they should send eight citizens to Rome to discuss the matter. On hearing this, the Latins, conscious that they had in many things acted contrary to the wishes of the Romans, held a council to decide who should go to Rome and to instruct them what to say. During the discussion of the question in council, Annius, their praetor, got up and said: ‘It seems to me to be of the utmost importance in this business that you should consider what is to be done rather than what is to be said. It will be easy, when you have arrived at a decision, to accommodate words to acts.’

This assertion is undoubtedly true, and every prince and every republic should ponder it well. For, where there is ambiguity and uncertainty as to what others want to do, it is impossible to choose the right words; but, once one’s mind is made up and it has been decided how to implement one’s decision, it is easy to find the right words. I am the more ready to call attention to this, since I have often noticed what harm such ambiguity has done in public affairs, to the detriment and to the discredit of this republic of ours. Where there is doubt as to which course to choose and it requires courage to decide, this ambiguity will always be found if on the point under discussion the decision rests with weak men.

Slow and tardy decisions are no less harmful than are ambiguous decisions, especially when the point at issue is whether support is to be given to an ally; for by such slowness nobody benefits and to oneself it does harm. Slowness in arriving at decisions proceeds either from lack of courage and of strength, or from malevolence on the part of those with whom the decision rests. In the latter case men who are moved by their own appetites to seek either the downfall of the government or the fulfilment of some other aim of theirs, do not let the discussion follow its normal course, but impede it and raise difficulties; whereas good citizens even though they see that popular indignation is bent on taking a pernicious course, never place obstacles in the way of a decision, especially if the matter be urgent.

After the death of Hieronymus, the tyrant of Syracuse, when the great war between Carthaginians and Romans was still going on, a dispute arose among the Syracusans as to whether they should ally themselves with Rome or with Carthage. So great was the ardour displayed by each side that the issue remained doubtful and no decision was taken until Apollonides, one of the chief men in Syracuse, delivered an extremely prudent speech in which he showed that, though no blame attached to those who were in favour of an alliance with the Romans, nor to those who wanted to throw in their lot with the Carthaginians, yet ambiguity and slowness in reaching a decision was to be deprecated, for it was clear to him that this wavering would bring about the ruin of the republic, whereas, should they arrive at a decision, whichever way it went, they might expect good to come of it.

Nor could Titus Livy have shown more clearly than does this passage the harm that comes from indecision. He shows it, too, in an incident involving the Latins, for, when the Lavinians were asked to help them against the Romans, the former put off deciding so long that, when they were actually marching out through the city gate with an army to give succour to the Latins, news came that the Latins had been defeated. Whereupon Milionius, their praetor, said: ‘For this short journey the Romans will make us pay dear.’ For, had they decided at first either to help or not to help the Latins, they would by not helping them have avoided annoying the Romans, and by helping them in good time, might by means of their combined forces have enabled them to win; but by their procrastination they stood to lose either way, as happened in point of fact.

Nor, had the Florentines noted the significance of this incident, would they have suffered such losses nor such vexations at the hands of the French as they did when the French king, Louis XII, moved into Italy on his way to attack Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan. For, when the king was considering this expedition, he sought to come to terms with the Florentines; and their representatives, who were then at his court, agreed that they should remain neutral, and that, in return, when the king came to Italy, their form of government should be maintained, and Florence should receive his protection. The city was given a month to ratify this agreement. Its ratification, however, was put off, owing to the imprudence of those who sympathized with the cause of Ludovico; so that, when the King was already on the point of victory and the Florentines then wanted to ratify the agreement, their proposal was not accepted, since the King knew that they were forced to take this line, and were not doing it voluntarily out of friendship for him. This cost the city of Florence no small sum of money, and came near to causing a revolution, which on another occasion was actually brought about in this way. The course they took was the more harmful in that it in no way helped the Duke, who, had he won, would have displayed much more hostility towards the Florentines than did the King.

Though the evils to which this weakness gives rise in republics I have already discussed under another heading, I decided to avail myself of the opportunity provided by a fresh incident to repeat what I had said, since it seems to me to be a matter of which republics, especially those that resemble ours, should take careful note.





Book Two



[DISCOURSES 16–18]


[The Army, Its Discipline and Component Parts]