# 19. Acquisitions made by Republics, when not well governed nor handled with the Virtue the Romans displayed, contribute to the Downfall, not to the Advancement, of such Republics

The erroneous views, based on ill-chosen examples, which have been introduced by our corrupt age, prevent men from considering whether to depart from the customary methods. Who could have persuaded an Italian, thirty years ago, that ten thousand infantry could attack ten thousand cavalry and as many infantry in an open plain and not only engage them in battle but defeat them, as happened at Novara – to cite a case already mentioned more than once? Even though history is full of such examples, nobody would have credited them; and, had they been credited, it would have been objected that in these days there are better arms, and that a squadron of men-at-arms should be able to hurl itself against a rock, not merely against an infantry battalion. With such false pretexts men impaired their judgement; nor would they have taken into account that Lucullus with a small force of infantry routed a hundred and fifty thousand cavalry under Tigranes, and that among these horsemen was a type of cavalry precisely similar to our own men-at-arms; nor yet again how this fallacy has been exposed by the example of ultramontane peoples.

And since what history teaches about infantry is thus seen to be true, in the same way one should give credit to, and profit by, all other ancient practices. Were this done, republics and princes would make fewer mistakes, would be stronger in repelling an attack which should catch them unawares, and would not set their hopes on flight. Those who have to handle a body politic would know better how to direct its policy, whether with a view to its expanding or to holding its own; would realize that the right way to make a republic great and for it to acquire an empire is to increase the number of its inhabitants, to make other states its allies, not its subjects, to send out colonies for the security of conquered territory, to fund the spoils of war, to subdue the enemy by raids and battles, not by sieges, to enrich the public but to keep individuals poor, to attend with the utmost care to military training. And, should this method of providing for expansion not meet with their approval, they should reflect that acquisitions made in any other way spell ruin to a republic and so should bridle all ambition, provide well for the internal administration of their city-state by means of laws and customs, forbid it to make acquisitions, and look only to its defence, for which good preparation should be made. This is how the republics of Germany act, and, because they have taken such steps, they enjoy freedom, and have enjoyed it for quite a spell.

None the less, as I have said elsewhere49 when discussing the difference between constituting a state with a view to expansion and with a view to its maintaining the status quo, it is impossible for a state to remain for ever in the peaceful enjoyment of its liberties and its narrow confines; for, though it may not molest other states, it will be molested by them, and, when thus molested, there will arise in it the desire, and the need, for conquest. It will find, too, that, when it has no external foe, there will be one at home, for this seems necessarily to happen in all large cities.

That the republics of Germany have been able to live in this way [i.e. to maintain their status quo], and have lasted a considerable time, is due to the conditions which prevail in that country and are not found elsewhere, conditions without which it is impossible to maintain this type of polity. The part of Germany of which I am speaking was, like France and Spain, subject to the Roman empire; but, when later the Empire declined and the Imperial title was transferred to Germany, its more powerful towns, owing either to the weakness or to the exigences of the emperors, began to free themselves, recompensing the emperor by the payment of a small annual tribute, so that little by little all the towns which had been directly dependent on the emperor and were not subject to any other prince, purchased their freedom in like manner. It also happened that, whilst these towns were in process of recovering their freedom, other communes which were subject to the Duke of Austria, rebelled against him – among them Fribourg, the Swiss communes, and others like them. These communes prospered from the start, and grew little by little to such dimensions that not only did they never fall under the Austrian yoke again, but they became the terror of all their neighbours. I mean the communes now called Switzerland.

Germany, then, is divided among the Swiss, republics called free states, princes and the emperor. And the reason why amidst such diverse forms of constitution wars do not arise, or, if they do arise, do not last long, is the Imperial title, for, though the emperor has no power to enforce his will, yet he has such standing among them that he acts as an arbitrator, and by interposing his authority, mediates between them and at once puts an end to any dissension. The more important and the longest wars that have occurred there, have been those between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria; and, though for many years the Emperor and the Duke of Austria have been identical, this has not enabled the Duke to overcome the boldness of the Swiss, among whose communes there would never have been an entente if they had not been driven to it. Nor has the rest of Germany given the Emperor much help; for, on the one hand, the communes do not want to harm those who desired, like themselves, to be free, and, on the other, the princes are in some cases unable to help on account of their poverty, and in others do not care to help, since they envy the Imperial power.

These communities, therefore, are able to live, content with their small dominions, since with respect to the Imperial authority they have no cause to desire more. Within their walls they live united because in the offing there is an enemy who, should there be internal disorder, would take the opportunity to subjugate them. Were conditions in Germany other than these, they would have to seek expansion and disrupt their present tranquillity. And, since elsewhere such conditions are not present, other states cannot adopt this type of polity, but must needs expand either by means of confederations or in the way the Romans did. To adopt any other policy is to seek not life but death and ruin; since conquests are harmful in a thousand ways and for many reasons. For it is easy to acquire dominion but not at the same time military strength, and yet it must needs be that those who acquire dominion and not at the same time military strength are ruined. Nor can one who has been impoverished by wars acquire forces even if he be victorious, because he spends on them more than he gets from what he has acquired. This is what the Venetians and the Florentines did, and, when the one held Lombardy and the other Tuscany, they were both much weaker than when the one was content with the sea and the other with boundaries six miles long.

The trouble in all such cases is that with the will to acquire there does not go the wisdom to adopt the right method. This is the more blameworthy in that today there is less excuse for it; for the way the Romans behaved is there for all to see, and their example can be followed, whereas the Romans had no example before them, and had to use their own intelligence in order to discover what to do.

In addition to this, conquests sometimes do no small harm even to a well-ordered republic when the province or city it has acquired is given to luxurious habits which can be taken up by those who have intercourse with it; as happened first to Rome when she acquired Capua, and then to Hannibal. Indeed, had Capua been so remote from Rome as to have had no remedy at hand for the mistake the soldiers made, or had Rome then been in any way corrupt, the acquisition of Capua would undoubtedly have been the end of the Roman republic. Titus Livy bears witness to this when he says: ‘Capua was by no means good for military discipline, for it afforded all manner of opportunities for indulgence which obliterated the memory of their fatherland in the debilitated minds of the troops.’ In this way cities and provinces avenge themselves on their conquerors without either battle or bloodshed, for, when the latter have become imbued with their deplorable habits, they are liable to be beaten by anyone who attacks them. This could not be put better than it is by Juvenal in his Satires, where, in dealing with this question, he says that the acquiring of foreign lands familiarized the minds of the Romans with foreign customs, so that, in place of frugality and its other high virtues, ‘gluttony and self-indulgence took possession of it and avenged the world it had conquered’.

If, then, the acquisition of territory did so much harm to the Romans at a time when their conduct was conspicuous for prudence and virtue, what effect will it have upon states whose conduct is very far removed from this? Upon states which, in addition to the other mistakes they make, of which enough has been said above, in their wars use either mercenary or auxiliary troops? From which there results harm of diverse kinds which will be mentioned in the next chapter.