# 12. Whether it is better, when threatened with Attack, to assume the Offensive or to await the Outbreak of War

I have sometimes heard men with considerable experience in matters connected with war, discussing whether, if of two rulers of approximately equal strength the more aggressive has declared war on the other, it is the better course for that other to await the enemy within his own boundaries or to assume the offensive and attack him in his own country; and for each course I have heard arguments adduced. Those who maintain that he should assume the offensive, cite the advice Croesus gave to Cyrus when he reached the borders of the Messagetans’ territory to make war on them, and Tomyris, their queen, sent him word that it was up to him to choose between two courses, either to enter her kingdom, where she was awaiting him, or to let her come and seek him out. When the matter came up for discussion Croesus, contrary to the views expressed by others, advised him to go and seek her out, on the ground that, if he defeated her when she was outside her own kingdom, he would not deprive her of it, for she would have time to re-form her forces; but that, if he defeated her on her own territory, he should be able to pursue her when she fled, and, since this would give her no chance to re-form, he would deprive her of her state.

They allege, too, the advice which Hannibal gave to Antiochus, when this monarch was contemplating a war with the Romans. The Romans, he argued, could only be beaten in Italy, for others might there be able to avail themselves of their arms, their riches and their allies; whereas anyone who fought with them outside Italy and left Italy unmolested, would leave them with that inexhaustible source whence to draw forces as need arose. He ended by saying that Antiochus had better first try to take Rome before attacking the empire, and Italy before attacking the other provinces.

They also point out that when Agathocles was unable to cope with war at home, he took the offensive against the Carthaginians who were making war on him, and forced them to sue for peace. They point out, too, that Scipio took the offensive in Africa in order to stop the war in Italy.

Those who take the opposite view say that if one wants an enemy to succeed ill one should get him away from his home. They cite the Athenians who kept the upper hand so long as they were waging war conveniently at home; but who, when they left it and took their armies to Sicily, lost their freedom. They also appeal to poetical fables which tell how Antaeus, king of Libya, when attacked by Hercules Ergidius, was insuperable as long as he awaited him within the confines of his own kingdom, but how, when induced by the craft of Hercules to leave it, he lost both his throne and his life. This gave rise to the fable depicting Antaeus on the ground drawing strength from his mother, the Earth, and Hercules, on seeing this, lifting him up and holding him away from the earth.

They also cite modern opinions. Everybody knows that Ferdinand, king of Naples, was held in his time to be a very wise prince, and that two years before his death it was rumoured that Charles VIII, king of France, intended to come and attack him; for which Ferdinand made due preparation, but then fell ill. When about to die he left to his son, Alfonso, among other memoranda, one telling him to await the enemy within his own domains; and to let nothing on earth persuade him to lead his forces outside the state, but to keep well within his own borders awaiting invasion with all his forces intact. Of this advice he took no notice, but sent an army into the Romagna, where without fighting a battle he lost both his army and his throne.

Besides the reasons adduced above, others are adduced by either side, such as that he who takes the offensive shows more spirit than he who awaits an attack, and so inspires his army with more confidence; and, in addition to this, deprives the enemy of the power to utilize his own resources since he cannot avail himself of those subjects who have been despoiled. Also, owing to his having the enemy within his own domain, the ruler has to be more careful about imposing taxes and other intolerable burdens on his subjects; so that, in the end, as Hannibal said, the fount from which he can draw supplies for the war, will run dry. Moreover, the invader’s troops being in a foreign country, there would be all the more necessity for them to fight, and necessity engenders virtue, as we have often remarked.

On behalf of the other view it is said that to await the enemy’s attack has many advantages; for, without any disadvantage to yourself, you can impose on him many disadvantages in the matter of provisions and of anything else of which an army has need; you can also the better thwart his plans owing to your having a better knowledge of the country than he has; and, again, you can oppose him with stronger forces owing to the ease with which you can bring them all together, which you could not do were they all at a distance from their homes; also, if you are routed, you can easily reform, both because a considerable part of your army will survive since it has a refuge at hand, and because reinforcements have not to come from a distance: so that, though you may have to risk all your forces, you will not be risking your whole fortune, whereas, abroad, you would be risking your whole fortune, but not risking all your forces. There have, indeed, been some who, in order to weaken the enemy more, have allowed him to advance for several days into their country and take a number of towns, so that he may weaken his army owing to the garrisons he leaves in all of them, and thus it will be easier to face him in battle.

Let me now say what I think about this. I think a distinction must be made. For either I have my country well equipped with arms, as the Romans had and as the Swiss have; or I have a country ill equipped with arms, as the Carthaginians had, and as have the king of France and the Italians today. In the latter case the enemy should be kept at a distance, for, since your virtue lies in money, not in men, as soon as anything gets in the way of your obtaining it, you may be undone; nor does anything impede you so much as does war in your own domains. This is exemplified by the Carthaginians, who, so long as their country was unoccupied, could use the revenue to make war on the Romans, but, when it was attacked, could not withstand Agathocles. Nor had the Florentines any remedy against Castruccio, Lord of Lucca, because he waged war on them within their own lands, so that, to defend themselves, they had to submit to Robert of Naples. Yet, after Castruccio’s death, these same Florentines summoned up courage to attack the duke of Milan in his own territory and strove to deprive him of his kingdom. Thus, they displayed great virtue in waging war away from home, but great cowardice when it was near at hand.

But when states are strongly armed, as Rome was and as the Swiss are, the more difficult it is to overcome them the nearer they are to their homes: for such bodies can bring more forces together to resist attack than they can to attack others. Nor on this point am I impressed by the authority of Hannibal, for it was resentment and self-interest that made him say what he did say to Antiochus. For, had the three disastrous defeats Hannibal inflicted on the Romans in Italy taken place in Gaul in the same space of time, the Romans would undoubtedly have been undone, since they would have been unable to make use of the forces that survived, as they were able to do in Italy; nor would it have been so easy for them to re-form; nor yet would they have been able with such forces to withstand the enemy, as they were able to do. One does not find that, in attacking a foreign country, they ever sent out armies of more than fifty thousand men; but for home defence they put under arms against the Gauls after the first Punic war eighteen hundred thousand. Nor would they have been able later on to vanquish them in Lombardy as they vanquished them in Tuscany because against so numerous an enemy they would not have been able to bring to that distance such strong forces, nor have fought them under the same advantageous conditions. The Cimbri broke up a Roman army in Germany, and the Romans had no way to repair their defeat. But, when the Cimbri arrived in Italy, and against them the Romans could bring all their forces to bear, they were undone. The Swiss are easy to beat when away from home, whither they cannot send more than thirty or forty thousand men; but to defeat them at home where they can muster a hundred thousand, is very difficult.

In conclusion, therefore, I say again that a ruler who has his people well armed and equipped for war, should always wait at home to wage war with a powerful and dangerous enemy, and should not go out to meet him; but that one who has ill-armed subjects and a country unused to war should always meet the enemy as far away from home as he can. Both of them will in this way defend themselves better, each in his degree.