# 10. Money is not the Sinews of War, as it is commonly supposed to be

Since it is open to anyone having the requisite authority to begin a war but not to end it, a ruler before committing himself to such an undertaking should calculate what forces he has at his disposal and act accordingly. Moreover, he should also take good care not to make any mistake about such forces, as he will do every time he bases his calculations on money or on the terrain or on the goodwill of men, but, on the other hand, lacks troops of his own. For though such things undoubtedly add to your strength, they certainly do not provide you with it; and, as such, are nought and of no avail without faithful troops. For, without these no amount of money will suffice you: the natural strength of the country will not help you; nor will the goodwill of men last, since they cannot remain faithful to you unless you are able to protect them. Every mountain, every lake, every inaccessible fastness, becomes but as a plain, when strong defenders are lacking. Money, too, not only affords you no protection, but makes you the sooner fall a prey. Nor can any opinion be more false than that which asserts that money is the sinews of war.

This view was advocated by Quintus Curtius in connection with the war which took place between Antipater, the Macedonian, and the king of Sparta; where he tells how, for want of money, the king of Sparta of necessity had to join battle, and was beaten; whereas, had he postponed the battle for a few days, he would have had news from Greece of the death of Alexander, and so would have remained the victor without putting up a fight. But, since he was without funds and feared lest for lack of them his army might desert, he was forced to try his luck in battle. On which ground Quintus Curtius maintains that money is the sinews of war.

The view adopted by Quintus Curtius is put forward daily, and is followed by rulers whose prudence is not up to the mark. Taking this as their basic principle, they think they can defend themselves if they have a well-filled treasury, and do not consider that, if treasures guaranteed victory, Darius would have conquered Alexander, the Greeks would have conquered the Romans, in our day Duke Charles would have conquered the Swiss; nor yet, but a few days ago, would the combined forces of the Pope and the Florentines have had any difficulty in overcoming Francesco Maria, the nephew of Julius II, in the war of Urbino. Yet all those mentioned were overcome by those who held that the sinews of war lay not in money, but in good soldiers.

Among the other things that Croesus, king of Lydia, showed to Solon, the Athenian, was a treasure too great to count. Solon was then asked what opinion he had formed of the king’s power, to which he replied that he did not think him more powerful on this account, for war is made with steel, not with gold, and if anyone came along who had more steel than he had, he could deprive him of his power.

Again, when, after the death of Alexander the Great, a host of Gauls crossed into Greece, and then to Asia, and sent ambassadors to arrange a treaty with the king of Macedonia, the king, in order to display his power and to frighten them, showed them a lot of gold and silver; whereupon the Gauls who up till then had been intent on peace, broke off negotiations, so eager were they to relieve him of that gold. So the king was despoiled on account of the very thing he had accumulated for his defence.

The Venetians, a few years ago, also had a well-filled treasury, yet lost all their dominions without being able to use their treasures to defend them.

I assert, then, that it is not gold, as is acclaimed by common opinion, that constitutes the sinews of war, but good soldiers; for gold does not find good soldiers, but good soldiers are quite capable of finding gold. If the Romans had chosen to wage war rather by means of money than by the sword, not all the treasure in the world would have sufficed in view of the great enterprises they undertook and the difficulties they had to encounter in them. But, since they made war with the sword, they did not suffer for want of gold, because those who were afraid of them brought it right into their camps. And if that Spartan king for lack of money had to try his luck in battle, what happened to him on the score of money has very often happened for other reasons; for it is obvious that, when an army is short of provisions and must needs either die of hunger or fight, it always chooses to fight, since this is the more honourable course, and one that gives fortune some chance to show you favour. Again, it often happens that when a general sees that the enemy’s army is about to be reinforced, he must either engage it and try his fortune in battle, or wait till the enemy’s force has increased, and then have to fight it anyhow to his own great disadvantage. One sees, too – as happened to Hasdrubal when he was attacked jointly by Claudius Nero and the other Roman consul in the March [of Ancona] – how a general who is obliged either to run away or to fight, always chooses to fight, since it seems to him that this course, even should the issue be extremely doubtful, gives him a chance to win, whereas the other would mean losing in any case. There are, then, many situations which compel a general to prefer the alternative of fighting even though he had no intention of so doing, of which lack of money may sometimes be one. But one ought not for this reason to infer that money is the sinews of war, any more than are other situations which place men in a like predicament.

I repeat, therefore: gold is not the sinews of war, but good soldiers are. Gold is necessary, but is of secondary importance, and good soldiers can get it for themselves; for it is as impossible for good soldiers to fail to find gold as it is for gold to find good soldiers. That in this we are speaking the truth history shows again and again, in spite of the fact that Pericles advised the Athenians to wage war with the whole of the Peloponnese on the ground that their industry and their pecuniary resources should enable them to win it. And, though during the war the Athenians sometimes prospered, in the end they lost, so that Sparta’s wisdom and good soldiery was worth more than Athens’ industry and money. On this point Titus Livy is a better witness than anybody else. I refer to the passage in which he discusses whether, if Alexander the Great had come to Italy, he would have beaten the Romans. In it he points out that three things are necessary for war; plenty of good soldiers, wise generals and good luck; and then, having inquired whether the Romans or Alexander was the better off in these things, he draws his conclusion without any mention of money. The Capuans, when they were asked by the Sidicines to take up arms for them against the Samnites, must have calculated their strength on a monetary basis, and not on the basis of troops, for, when they decided to help them, after being twice routed, they were forced to become Rome’s tributaries if they wished to survive.43





Book Two



[DISCOURSES 11–15]


[Diplomacy and War]