# 9. What Causes commonly give rise to Wars between Different Powers

The cause of the war between the Romans and the Samnites, with whom for a long time they had been in alliance, is one which arises commonly between powerful states. It consists in some incident which is brought about either by chance or by those who are desirous of provoking a war. That which gave rise to war between the Romans and the Samnites was due to chance. For, when the Samnites made war on the Sidicines and then on the Campanians, they had no intention of making war on Rome. But, when the Campanians were attacked and appealed to Rome, which neither the Romans nor the Samnites had expected, the Romans, to whose suzerainty the Campanians had submitted, had to defend them, and so to take on a war which it did not seem to them that they could with honour escape. For, though it did not appear reasonable that they should defend their allies, the Campanians, against their allies, the Samnites, yet, when the former had become their subjects and had accepted their suzerainty, it seemed to them shameful not to defend them; for they thought that, if they did not undertake to defend them, it would put an obstacle in the way of any others who contemplated submitting to their dominion. Since, therefore, Rome was aiming at empire and glory, not at tranquillity, they could not decline to take the matter up.

The same causes were operative at the beginning of the first Punic war, which was due to the Romans having undertaken the defence of the Messinians in Sicily, an undertaking which again was brought about by chance. This was not the case later in the second war which arose between them; for Hannibal, the Carthaginian commander, attacked the Saguntines, who were allies of the Romans, in Spain, not out of hostility to them, but to get the Roman armies to take action, so as to provide him with an opportunity of attacking them and of crossing into Italy.

This method of starting new wars has always been the practice with powerful states who have a certain respect both for treaties and for one another. For, if I want to make war on some prince and between us there is a treaty the articles of which have been observed for a considerable time, rather than attack him, I shall look for some justification and ground for attacking one of his allies, knowing full well that, if his ally be attacked, either he will resent it and I shall get what I want in that war will arise, or, if he takes no notice, he will disclose either his weakness or his unreliability in that he does not defend a dependent state. In either case he will lose his reputation and it will be easier for me to accomplish my designs.

With regard, then, to the provoking of a war, due note should be taken of what has just been said about the submission of the Campanians. It should be noted, too, that a city which does not suffice for its own defence, has a remedy, should it desire at all costs to defend itself against attack. The remedy consists in submitting voluntarily to the state whose protection you propose to invoke. Thus the Capuans submitted to the Romans, and the Florentines to king Robert of Naples, who, though not prepared to defend them on the basis of an alliance, when they became his subjects, defended them against all the forces which Castruccio da Lucca was employing against them.