# 35. How it came about that the Appointment of the Decemviri in Rome was harmful to that Republic in spite of their having been appointed by Free and Public Suffrage

To what was said in the preceding discourse as to the authority which is seized with violence, not that which is obtained by suffrage, being harmful to republics, the election of the ten citizens which the Roman people instituted that they might draw up laws for Rome, appears to be incompatible; for in course of time they became tyrants, and, regardless of everybody and everything, deprived Rome of her liberty. The way in which the authority was conferred and the period for which it was granted must here be taken into account. When unrestricted authority is given for a long time, where by a long time I mean a year or more, it may always be dangerous, and will produce good or bad effects according as those to whom it is given are evil or good. Now, if we look at the authority which the Ten had and at that which the dictators had, it will be seen that the authority of the Ten was incomparably greater. For, when a dictator was appointed, the tribunes, the consuls, the senate, with their respective powers, remained; nor could the dictator take them away. He had, indeed, the power to deprive any one person of the consulate or of his senatorial rank, but he could not annul a decree of the senate, nor could he make new laws. The result was that, as the authority of the senate, the consuls and the tribunes still stood, they came to be, as it were, his guardians, to see that he kept to the straight path. Quite the contrary happened when the Ten were appointed; for the appointment of consuls and tribunes was suspended, and the Ten were given power to make laws and in general to act as if they were the Roman people. So that, finding themselves on their own, without consuls, without tribunes, and without there being any appeal to the people, and that, in consequence, there was no one to look after them, they were able in their second year, urged on by the ambition of Appius, to become arrogant.

It should be noted, then, that in saying that authority, granted by free suffrage, never harms any republic, it is presumed that a people is never persuaded to give it except under certain conditions and for a specified time. But when, whether by mistake or owing to some other contributory cause, a republic is persuaded to give it imprudently, in the way in which the Roman people gave it to the Ten, the same thing will happen as happened in their case. This is easily proved if we consider what causes kept dictators good and what made the Ten bad; and if we consider further how those states which are looked upon as well-ordered, acted when they gave a long-termed authority, as the Spartans did to their kings and as the Venetians do to their doges. For it would appear that in both these cases supervisors were appointed to see to it that they should not be able to abuse their authority. Nor to the autocrat is it of any consequence whether the material be corrupt, for absolute power will very soon corrupt it by making friends and partisans. Nor yet does it hurt him to be poor or without lineage, for riches and every other advantage will at once accrue to him, as will be shown when we come to discuss in detail the aforesaid Decemviri.