# 34. Dictatorial Authority did Good, not Harm, to the Republic of Rome: it is the Authority which Citizens arrogate to Themselves, not that granted by Free Suffrage, that is harmful to Civic Life

Those Romans who were responsible for the institution of a dictatorship in Rome are condemned by some Roman writers who find in the dictatorship the cause which eventually led to tyranny in Rome. They point out that the person who became its first tyrant, had authority there in virtue of his title as dictator, and assert that, if it had not been for this, Caesar would not have succeeded under any other public title in making his tyranny look honest and above board.

The case, however, was not well examined by the person who held this view, and the view has been accepted without good ground. For it was neither the name nor the rank of the dictator that made Rome servile, but the loss of authority of which the citizens were deprived by the length of his rule. If in Rome there had been no such rank, the dictator would have found some other; for it is easy for force to acquire a title, but not for a title to acquire force.

It is clear that the dictatorship, so long as it was bestowed in accordance with public institutions, and not assumed by the dictator on his own authority, was always of benefit to the state. For it is magistrates that are made and authority that is given in irregular ways that is prejudicial to a republic, not that which is given in the ordinary way, as is clear from the fact that during a very long period in Rome’s history, no dictator ever did anything but good to that republic.25

The reasons for this are obvious. First, if a citizen is to do harm and is to obtain extraordinary authority, he must have many attributes which in a republic that is not corrupt it will be impossible for him to acquire; for he will need to be very rich and to have numerous adherents and partisans, which he cannot have so long as the laws are observed; and, even if he had them, men of this kind are so dreaded that people would not freely vote for him.

Furthermore, a dictator was appointed for a limited time, and for the purpose of dealing solely with such matters as had led to the appointment. He had authority to make what decisions he thought fit in order to meet a definite and urgent danger, and to do this without consultation; and anyone he punished had no right of appeal. But he could do nothing to diminish the constitutional position of the government, as would have been the case if he could have taken away the authority vested in the senate or in the people, or have abolished the ancient institutions of the city and made new ones. Wherefore, in view of the short duration of the dictatorship, of the limited authority which the dictator possessed, and of the fact that the Roman people were not corrupt, it was impossible for the dictator to overstep his terms of reference and to do the state harm. On the contrary, experience has shown that the dictatorship was always useful.

Actually, then, of Rome’s various institutions this is one that deserves to be considered and ranked among those to which the greatness of Rome’s vast empire was due. For without such an institution cities will with difficulty find a way out of abnormal situations. For the institutions normally used by republics are slow in functioning. No assembly nor magistrate can do everything alone. In many cases they have to consult one another, and to reconcile their diverse views takes time. Where there is question of remedying a situation which will not brook delay, such a procedure is most dangerous.

Republics, therefore, ought to have among their institutions some device akin to this. The republic of Venice, which ranks high among modern republics, has reserved to a few of its citizens authority to deal with urgent questions with regard to which, if they all agree, they can make decisions without reference to any other body. Whereas in a republic in which no such provision is made, it is necessary either to stand by the constitution and be ruined, or to violate it and not be ruined. But that events should happen in a republic which have to be dealt with by extraordinary measures, is not desirable; for though the extraordinary measures may do good at the time, the precedent thus established is bad, since it sanctions the usage of dispensing with constitutional methods for a good purpose, and thereby makes it possible, on some plausible pretext, to dispense with them for a bad purpose. No republic is ever perfect unless by its laws it has provided for all contingencies, and for every eventuality has provided a remedy and determined the method of applying it.

In conclusion, then, I claim that republics which, when in imminent danger, have recourse neither to a dictatorship, nor to some form of authority analogous to it, will always be ruined when grave misfortune befalls them.

In the matter of this new institution, the great wisdom which the Romans displayed in the method of electing to it, is to be noted. For, since the appointment of a dictator was in a way a reflection on the consuls, who, though at the head of the state, had to obey like everyone else, and since it was assumed that this might arouse resentment among the citizens, the Romans decided that the power to appoint a dictator should lie with the consuls; for they thought that, when circumstances became such that Rome had need of this royal prerogative, they would have to make the appointment of their own accord, and, since they themselves had made the appointment, it would pain them less. Because wounds and other ills which are inflicted of one’s own accord and choice, grieve you much less than those that are inflicted on you by others. Besides, during the last period, instead of appointing a dictator, the Romans used to invest the consul with dictatorial authority, with the words: ‘Let the consul see to it that the republic takes no harm.’

I close with a remark relevant to the matter we are discussing. It was Rome’s neighbours who in their desire to crush her, caused her to set up institutions which not only enabled her to defend herself but also to attack them with greater force, counsel and authority.