# 33. When either within a State or against a State an Inconvenience has made Headway, the Safer Course is to temporize, not to suppress it

When the Roman republic grew in reputation, power and dominion, its neighbours, who had not at first thought this new republic would do them much harm, began too late to realize their mistake, and, with a view to remedying what they had not remedied at the outset, they formed a league of full forty peoples against Rome. Whereupon from among the remedies which they were accustomed to use when danger was imminent, the Romans chose to appoint a dictator, i.e. to give power to some one man to make decisions without consulting others and to carry them out without anyone having the right to appeal. This remedy not only proved useful at the time, and enabled them to overcome the dangers still threatening, but was always of the greatest help in all those eventualities which from time to time betokened ill to the republic as its empire grew.

In regard to such events the first thing to notice is that, when an inconvenience which has arisen within a republic, or is affecting it adversely owing either to internal or external causes, has become so great that everybody begins to get alarmed, by far the safer course is to temporize in its regard, and not try to eradicate it straightway. For, as usual, those who try to suppress it, cause it to grow stronger and speed up the evils which they anticipate and dread.

Events of this kind are more often due in a republic to an internal cause than to an external, for in it very often either a citizen is allowed to acquire more power than is reasonable, or corruption is introduced in the administration of some law on which the nerve and life-blood of freedom depends; and this blunder is allowed to go on till it reaches such a pass that to attempt to remedy it is more harmful than to let it take its course. To discern such inconveniences in their initial stage is the more difficult the more men are by nature inclined to look with favour on new enterprises; a favour which is likely to be bestowed, above all else, on enterprises which seem to have in them a certain virilitya and which are taken up by young men. For, if in a republic there appears some youth of noble birth and outstanding virtue, the eyes of every citizen at once turn towards him, and without further consideration they agree to show him honour; so that, if in him there is a spark of ambition, the favours bestowed on him by nature conjoin with these events to place him in such a position that, when the citizens come to see their mistake, there is but small chance of their putting it right; and any attempt to apply such remedies as they have, does but tend to establish more quickly his power.

Of this it would be possible to adduce plenty of instances, but I propose to give only one from in our city. Cosimo de’ Medici, with whom the greatness of the house of Medici in this our city began, acquired great repute thanks to favours gained by his own prudence and through the ignorance of the citizens. He thus began to arouse alarm for the security of its government; with the result that his fellow-citizens thought it dangerous to touch him, and still more dangerous to let him alone. But there lived in those days one, Niccolò da Uzzano, who was looked on as an expert in politics. He had made the first of the above mistakes in that he had not recognized the dangers to which Cosimo’s reputation might lead, but while he lived he never allowed the second one to be made; that is, that anyone should attempt to get rid of him; since he was convinced that such an attempt would mean the utter ruin of their government, as in fact it was seen to do after his death. For the citizens who survived him failed to follow his advice, grew bold in their opposition to Cosimo, and drove him out of Florence. It thus came about that his faction, resenting this injustice, recalled him shortly afterwards, and made him the ‘prince’ of that republic, a rank to which he would never have been able to rise except for this open opposition.

The same thing happened at Rome in the case of Caesar, whose virtue won for him such favour with Pompey and others that before long this favour gave place to fear; to which Cicero bears witness when he says that Pompey had too late begun to fear Caesar. This fear caused people to look for remedies, but the remedies they applied did but accelerate the ruin of their republic.

I claim, therefore, that since it is difficult to recognize such evils in the initial stage owing to the false impression new enterprizes make on you at the outset, when they are recognized the wiser course is to temporize rather than to oppose them by force. Because, if one temporizes, either the trouble disappears of its own accord, or at least disaster is postponed for a considerable time. In all such matters rulers who plan to remedy the evils or to attack them direct by means of force, should keep their eyes open lest, instead of causing them to decrease, they cause them to increase, and in the belief that they are repelling them make them grow, – as if one could suffocate a plant by sprinkling it with water. Rather should the strength of the disease be considered well, and, if you see that you can cure it, you should set about it without further ado. But otherwise should let it be, and in no wise interfere, lest that happen which, as we have said above, happened to Rome’s neighbours, for whom it would have been safer when Rome’s power had grown so strong, to have sought by peaceful methods to placate it and bold it back, rather than by preparing for war to make Rome think out new institutions and new plans for her defence. For by this league of theirs all they did was to make the Romans more united, more on their guard, and more keen on finding new devices whereby the more quickly to increase their power. Among which was the appointment of a dictator, whereby the Romans were enabled not only to overcome their present dangers, but to obviate a multitude of evils which would have befallen that republic had not this remedy been available.
