# 46. Men pass from one Ambition to Another, and, having first striven against Ill-treatment, inflict it next upon Others

When the Roman people recovered its liberty and returned to its pristine state which was now the greater in that many new laws had been made whereby its power was strengthened, it looked as if Rome for the time being would be tranquil. Experience, however, showed that this was not to be, for daily fresh tumults and fresh discords arose. How this came about Titus Livy has cleverly explained. Hence it seems to me relevant to cite here his remarks on this point. He says that either the populace or the nobility always became arrogant when the other party was humbled; that when the plebs was quiet and kept its place, the young nobles began to treat it badly, and that the tribunes could do little to mend matters because violence was being used also against them. On the other hand, though to the rest of the nobility it seemed that their young men were going too far, it was none the less to their liking that, if excesses had to be committed, their own men should commit them rather than the plebs. Thus the desire for liberty caused each party to oppress the other in so far as it got the upper hand. And the sequence in which these events occur is such that men seek first to be free from apprehension, then make others apprehensive, and that the injuries of which they had ridded themselves, they proceeded to inflict on others. It was as if it were necessary either to treat others ill or to be ill-treated.

In this we see one of the ways in which republics come to be dissolved; and how men pass from one ambition to another; and how true is the saying which Sallust puts into the mouth of Caesar ‘that all bad examples arise from good beginnings’. The first thing which these citizens who live ambitiously in a republic seek, is, as I have said, not to be ill-treated, neither by private persons nor yet by the magistrates. To obtain this security they form friendships by ways seemingly honest, such as giving pecuniary assistance or protection against the powerful. And, since this appears to be a virtuous act, everyone is easily deceived and so does nothing about it, with the result that such men, persevering and meeting no obstacle, acquire a position of which private citizens are afraid and which the magistrates respect. When they have risen thus far and no obstacle has yet been placed in the way of their greatness, they arrive ultimately at a position which it is very dangerous to assail for the reasons I have already given, namely, the danger of removing an inconvenience from a state in which it has already grown to considerable dimensions. So that in the end it comes to this: either you must look for a way of removing the person concerned with imminent danger of ruin, or you must let him go on, with the prospect of manifest servitude unless death or some accident sets you free. For when a man has reached the stage at which both the citizens and the magistrates are afraid of offending him and his friends, it is not very difficult after that for them to do just what they please and to give offence in their own turn.

A republic, therefore, ought to have some institution whereby to prevent its citizens from doing wrong under pretence of doing right, and to see that their popularity is helpful, and not harmful to liberty – a point which we shall discuss further in its proper place.29