# 49. If those City-States which from the Outset have been free, as Rome was, find it difficult to formulate Laws whereby to maintain Liberty, those which have just been servile are faced with a Quasi-impossibility

How difficult it is in constituting a republic to foresee all the laws required for the maintenance of liberty, is clearly shown in the development of the Roman republic; in which, notwithstanding that many laws were laid down first by Romulus, then by Numa, Tullus Hostilius, and Servius, and finally by the ten citizens appointed for this purpose, in the managing of this city new needs continually cropped up and it was necessary to introduce new institutions. An instance of this occurred when they instituted censors. This was one of those provisions which helped to keep Rome free at a time when it was actually enjoying freedom. For in that the censors became the arbiters of Roman customs, they constituted a very powerful instrument which the Romans used in order to postpone the advent of corruption.30 At the outset, however, they made a serious mistake in the creating of this magistracy in that the censors were appointed for five years. But, before very long, this was corrected by the prudence of the dictator, Mamercus, who by a new law reduced the term of their office to eighteen months. This the censors, who were on the watch, took so ill that they deprived Mamercus of his senatorial rank, an action of which both the plebs and the patricians strongly disapproved. That history does not tell us whether Mamercus was able to do anything to defend himself, is due either to an omission on the part of historians, or to Rome’s institutions being in this respect defective; for it is not well that the procedure of a republic should be such that a citizen can be impugned without redress for promulgating a law in conformity with civic life and liberty.

But to return to the question at issue in this discourse. I say that in the creation of this new magistracy the point to notice is that, if in a state which had been free from the outset and had directed its own affairs, as Rome did, there was great difficulty in devising good laws whereby to maintain liberty, it is no wonder that a city which at the outset was in servitude to another, should find it not merely difficult, but impossible, ever to draw up a constitution that will enable it to enjoy tranquillity in the conduct of its affairs.

This is illustrated by what happened to the city of Florence, which, owing to its having been at the outset under the dominion of the Roman empire, and to its having always lived under foreign rule, remained for a time abject and without thought for its own condition. Later, however, when it got time to breathe, it began to make its own institutions; but found it impossible to make good ones for they were mixed up with the old ones, which were bad. It carried on thus for two hundred years, of which there are reliable records, without ever getting a form of government such as would entitle it rightly to be called a republic. The difficulty which it experienced, all states experience which have had a like beginning. And although time and again, ample authority was given by free and public suffrage to a few of its citizens to reform it, they never used it to draw up a constitution to the common advantage, but always in the interests of their own party; with the result that not order, but greater disorder, was brought about in that city.

Take, for instance, one particular point. I maintain that one of the things that has to be taken into account by one who is drawing up a constitution for a republic, is the question into the hands of what men should authority to inflict punishment on its citizens be placed. Rome’s institution here was a good one, for an appeal to the people was ordinarily allowed, and if an important case arose in which to defer action, pending an appeal, was dangerous, they had recourse to a dictator who dealt with it straightway; but to this remedy they never had recourse unless driven to it by necessity. Whereas Florence, and other cities which came into being in the same way, being servile, vested this authority in a foreigner, who fulfilled this function as his prince should direct. When, later on, they obtained their freedom, they continued to give this authority to a foreigner whom they called the ‘Captain’; which was a most pernicious practice, seeing how easily such an official could be corrupted by powerful citizens. But later still, owing to a change in the form of government a change took place in this institution and they appointed eight citizens to fulfil the function of the captain. This institution was bad and became worse, for reasons which have been given elsewhere, namely, that the few were always the servants of the few, and these the more powerful men.

Against this abuse the city of Venice has safeguarded itself by having ten citizens who are empowered to punish any citizen without appeal; and, lest the ten should not suffice for the punishing of the powerful, though they have authority to do this, they have set up the tribunal of Forty and, yet further, have decided that the Court of Rogation, which is the Greater Council, shall have power to punish them; so that there is no shortage of judges there to keep the powerful in check, given that there be no shortage of accusers.

Seeing, then, that in Rome, which had its own constitution drawn up by so many wise men, there were ever arising fresh causes which forced it to introduce new institutions in support of the liberties it enjoyed, it is no wonder that in other cities which were more lacking in order at the start, there should arise such difficulties that they can never be reconstituted aright.





Book One



[DISCOURSES 50–55]


[The Management of the Populace]