# 7. How necessary Public Indictments are for the Maintenance of Liberty in a Republic

No authority more useful and necessary can be granted to those appointed to look after the liberties of a statea than that of being able to indict before the people or some magistrate or court such citizens as have committed any offence prejudicial to the freedom of the state.b Such an institution has two consequences most useful in a republic. First, for fear of being prosecuted, its citizens attempt nothing prejudicial to the state, and, if they do attempt anything, are suppressed forthwith without respect to persons. Secondly, an outlet is provided for that all feeling which is apt to grow up in cities against some particular citizen, however it comes about; and, when for such ill feeling there is no normal outlet, recourse is had to abnormal methods likely to bring disaster on the republic as a whole. Hence nothing does so much to stabilize and strengthen a republic as some institution whereby the changeful humours which agitate it are afforded a proper outlet by way of the laws.

This can be shown by numerous examples, and especially by one that Titus Livy adduces, namely, that of Coriolanus. Livy tells us that, when the nobility were annoyed with the plebs because it seemed to them that the plebs had too much authority owing to the appointment of tribunes to protect them, and when, besides this, there was a great scarcity of provisions in Rome and the senate had to send to Sicily for corn, Coriolanus, who was hostile to the popular faction, suggested that the time had come to punish the plebs and to deprive them of the authority they had assumed to the prejudice of the nobility. Hence he advised that they should be kept hungry and that the corn should not be distributed among them. When this came to the ears of the populace, indignation against Coriolanus grew so intense that, as he was leaving the senate, he would have been killed in the tumult if the tribunes had not cited him to appear in his own defence. One notes in this incident what has been said above, namely, how useful and necessary it is for republics to provide a legal outlet for the anger which the general public has conceived against a particular citizen, because when no such normal means are available, recourse is had to abnormal means, which unquestionably have a worse effect than does the normal method.

The reason is that, though wrong may be done when a citizen is punished in the normal way, scarce any disorder, or none at all, is brought about in the republic; for in carrying out the sentence no appeal is made either to private or to foreign forces, and it is these that entail the downfall of civic liberties. On the contrary, such force as is employed, is employed by public authority which functions within specified limits, and does not, overstepping them, go on to do things which ruin the republic.

There is no need to corroborate this view by citing further examples from olden times in addition to that of Coriolanus. In his regard, however, all should reflect on the evils that might have ensued in the Roman republic had he been tumultuously put to death, for this would have given rise to private feuding, which would have aroused fear; and fear would have led to defensive action; this to the procuring of partisans; partisans would have meant the formation of factionsa in the city; and factions would have brought about its downfall. As, however, the matter was settled by persons vested with the requisite authority, no opening was provided for the evils that might have resulted had the matter been settled by private authority.

In our own times we have seen disturbances introduced into the republic of Florence owing to the inability of the masses to find a normal outlet for the animus aroused by one of its citizens – as for instance happened at the time when Francesco Valori’s standing in the city was akin to that of a prince.6 He was regarded by many as an ambitious man, likely, owing to his audacity and animosity, to resort to unconstitutional methods. As there was no way of resisting him save by forming a rival party, it came about that he began to collect supporters to defend himself since he had nothing to be afraid of unless extraordinary steps were taken. On the other hand, since to his opponents no ordinary means of suppressing him were available, they made up their minds to use other means, and eventually took up arms. Had it in this case been possible to oppose Valori by constitutional methods, an end would have been put to his authority without harm to anybody but himself; but since it had to be done by unconstitutional methods, harm resulted not only to him, but to many other noble citizens.

One might also cite in support of the conclusion just reached an incident that also happened in Florence. It concerns Piero Soderini, and was entirely due to the absence in this republic of any means whereby legal action might be taken against the ambition displayed by powerful citizens. For to indict a powerful citizen before eight judges is inadequate. There should have been plenty of judges, for the few always act as the few are wont to act. Had this been the case, the citizens would either have indicted him, if his conduct had been bad, and in this way would have found an outlet for the animosity without getting a Spanish army to intervene; or, if his conduct had not been bad, would not have dared to take action against him for fear that they themselves should be indicted. Thus in either case the appetite which occasioned the trouble would have ceased to operate.

We thus reach the conclusion that, whenever one finds outside forces called in by a party of men residing in a city, it may be taken for granted that this is due to a defect in its constitution in that it comprises no institution which provides an outlet for the malignant humours to which men are prone, without their taking unconstitutional action. Adequate provision for this is made when there are many judges before whom indictments may be made, and when judgeship is looked on as an honourable post.

Such matters were so well provided for in Rome that in the great disputes which arose between the senate and the plebs, never did either the senate, the plebs, or any private citizen, contemplate the calling in of outside forces, because, there being a remedy at home, there was no need to seek one abroad. And, though the examples already cited should suffice to prove my case, I am going to give you yet another, taken from Titus Livy’s history. In it he relates how in Clusium – in those days the most noble city in Tuscany – a sister of Aruns had been violated by Lucumon, and how Aruns, unable to obtain justice owing to the power of her ravisher, went to the Gauls who then controlled the province we now call Lombardy, and besought them to bring armed forces to Clusium, pointing out that it would be to their own advantage to avenge the injustice done to him; and how if Aruns had seen how to obtain justice by appeal to the city’s laws he would not have invoked barbarian forces. But if such indictments are of advantage to a republic, calumny is not only useless, but harmful, as we shall show in the next chapter.