# 55. That it is very easy to manage Things in a State in which the Masses are not Corrupt; and that, where Equality exists, it is impossible to set up a Principality, and, where it does not exist, impossible to set up a Republic

Though what is to be feared and what is to be hoped for in statesa that are corrupt has been sufficiently discussed elsewhere,31 it does not seem to me irrelevant to consider here a decision made by the senate in regard to the vow which Camillus had made to give a tenth part of the booty taken from the Veientes to Apollo. This booty had come into the hands of the Roman plebs; and, since there was no other way of obtaining an account of it, the senate made an edict requiring everyone to bring to the public treasury a tenth part of what he had seized. This decision was not carried into effect since the senate later adopted other ways and means of rendering to Apollo the satisfaction which was due from the plebs. It is apparent, none the less, from this decision what trust the senate had in the goodness of the plebs in that it felt sure that no one would fail to bring forth immediately all that the edict prescribed. It shows, too, that the plebs had no thought of acting fraudulently in regard to the edict by handing over less than was due. What they did, instead, was to get rid of the edict by showing plainly how indignant they were with it.

This example, and many others which have already been cited, show how great was the goodness and the respect for religion which then prevailed among the Roman people, and how much could be expected of them. For where such goodness prevails one cannot but anticipate good conduct. It cannot, on the other hand, be expected in these days in territories which are obviously corrupt, as is Italy above all other lands. France and Spain, too, share in this corruption; and if in these countries disorders are apparently not so great as those that occur daily in Italy, this is not so much due to the goodness of the people there – for in goodness they are noticeably lacking – as to their having a king who keeps them united, not merely by his personal virtues, but by constitutional methods, which in those kingdoms as yet are not corrupt.

In the province of Germany it is quite clear that goodness and respect for religion are still to be found in its peoples, with the result that many republics there enjoy freedom and observe their laws in such a way that neither outsiders nor their own inhabitants dare to usurp power there.32

And that it is true of these republics that in them there still prevails a good deal of the goodness of ancient times, I propose to make clear by giving an example similar to that related above of the Roman senate and people. When these republics have need to spend any sum of money on the public account, it is customary for their magistrates or councils, in whom is vested authority to deal with such matters, to impose on all the inhabitants of a town a tax of one or two per cent of the value of each one’s property. The decision having been made, each person presents himself to the tax-collectors in accordance with the constitutional practice of the town. He then takes an oath to pay the appropriate sum, and throws into a chest provided for the purpose the amount which he conscientiously thinks that he ought to pay; but of this payment there is no witness save the man who pays. This is an indication of how much goodness and how much respect for religion there still is in such men; for presumably each pays the correct sum, since, if he did not do so, the tax would not bring in the amount estimated on the basis of previous collections made in the customary way, and failure to realize it would reveal any fraud, and in that case some other method of collecting the tax would have been adopted.

This goodness is the more to be admired in these days in that it is so rare. Indeed, it seems to survive only in this province. This is due to two things. In the first place the towns have but little intercourse with their neighbours, who seldom go to visit them, or are visited by them, since they are content with the goods, live on the food, and are clothed with the wool which their own land provides. The occasion for intercourse, and with it the initial step on the road to corruption, is thus removed, since they have no chance of taking up the customs either of the French, the Spaniards or the Italians, nations which, taken together, are the source of world-wide corruption.

The second reason is that those states where political life survives uncorrupted, do not permit any of their citizens to live after the fashion of the gentry.a On the contrary, they maintain there perfect equality, and to lords and gentry residing in that province are extremely hostile; so that, should any perchance fall into their hands, they treat them as sources of corruption and causes of trouble, and kill them.33

To make it clear what is meant by the term ‘gentry’, I would point out that the term ‘gentry’ is used of those who live in idleness on the abundant revenue derived from their estates, without having anything to do either with their cultivation or with other forms of labour essential to life. Such men are a pest in any republic and in any province; but still more pernicious are those who, in addition to the aforesaid revenues, have castles under their command and subjects who are under their obedience. Of these two types of men there are plenty in the kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna and Lombardy. It is owing to this that in these provinces there has never arisen any republic or any political life, for men born in such conditions are entirely inimical to any form of civic government. In provinces thus organized no attempt to set up a republic could possibly succeed. To reconstitute them, should anyone want to do so, the only way would be to set up a monarchy there. The reason for this is that, where the material is so corrupt, laws do not suffice to keep it in hand; it is necessary to have, besides laws, a superior force, such as appertains to a monarch, who has such absolute and overwhelming power that he can restrain excesses due to ambition and the corrupt practices of the powerful.

This argument is borne out by the case of Tuscany, in whose territory, small as it is, one finds that there have long been three republics, Florence, Siena and Lucca; and that the other cities of this province, though in a way servile, yet are of such a mind and have such a constitution that either they maintain their freedom, or would like to do so. All of which is due to there being in Tuscany no baronial castles, and either none or very few gentry, and to the presence there of so great an equality that a wise man, familiar with ancient forms of civic government, should easily be able to introduce there a civic constitution.a But, so great has been Tuscany’s misfortune that up to the present she has come across nobody with the requisite ability and knowledge.

From this discussion the following conclusion may be drawn: (i) that, where the gentry are numerous, no one who proposes to set up a republic can succeed unless he first gets rid of the lot; and (ii) that, where considerable equality prevails, no one who proposes to set up a kingdom or principality, will ever be able to do it unless from that equality he selects many of the more ambitious and restless minds and makes of them gentry in fact and not in name, by giving them castles and possessions and making of them a privileged class with respect both to property and subjects; so that around him will be those with whose support he may maintain himself in power, and whose ambitions, thanks to him, may be realized. As to the rest they will be compelled to bear a yoke which nothing but force will ever be able to make them endure. Between force and those to whom force is applied a balance will thus be set up, and the standing of every man, each in his own order, will be consolidated. But, since to convert a province, suited to monarchical rule, into a republic, and to convert a province, suited to a republican regime, into a kingdom, is a matter which only a man of outstanding brain-power and authority can handle, and such men are rare, there have been many who have attempted it but few who have had the ability to carry it through. For the magnitude of an undertaking of this kind is such that it breaks down at the very beginning, partly because men get terrified and partly because it hampers them.

With my thesis that where there are gentry it is impossible to set up a republic, the experience of the Venetian republic may, perhaps, appear to be incompatible, for in that republic no man may hold any office unless he be a ‘gentleman’. To which the answer is that this case in no way conflicts with my thesis, since ‘gentlemen’ in this republic are so in name rather than in point of fact; for they do not derive any considerable income from estates: their great wealth is based on merchandise and movable goods. Moreover, none of them have castles, nor have they any jurisdiction over men. The name ‘gentleman’ in their case is but a title, indicative of their standing. It is not based on any of the grounds which lead other cities to call people ‘gentlemen’. Just as in other republics different classes go by different names, so in Venice the population is divided into ‘gentlemen’ and ‘commoners’; and it has decided that of these the former alone shall hold, or be eligible for, office, from which the latter are wholly excluded. Why this does not cause disorder in that town has already been explained.

Let, then, a republic be constituted where there exists, or can be brought into being, notable equality; and a regime of the opposite type, i.e. a principality, where there is notable inequality. Otherwise what is done will lack proportion and will be of but short duration.34





Book One



[DISCOURSES 56–60]


[The Advantages of Popular Government]