# 59. What Confederations or Leagues can be trusted most; those made with a Republic or those made with a Prince

Since it happens every day that a prince forms a league or an alliance with another prince, or a republic with some other republic; and in like manner confederations and agreements are made between a republic and a prince: I should, I think, inquire which contracts are the more stable and on which ought more store to be set, on those made by a republic or on those made by a prince. All things considered, I believe that in many cases they are alike, but that in some there is a difference. Furthermore, I believe that forced agreements will be kept neither by a prince nor by a republic. I believe that when they come to be afraid for the safety of their estate, both the one and the other, rather than lose it, will break their agreement with you, and treat you with ingratitude.

Demetrius, who was called the conqueror of cities, had conferred endless benefits on the Athenians. But, when, later, he was beaten by his enemies and sought refuge in Athens, a friendly city which was under an obligation to him, it refused to admit him, a thing that caused him more pain than did the loss of his people and the loss of his army.

After Pompey was beaten by Caesar in Thessaly, he sought refuge with Ptolemy in Egypt, whom, earlier on, he had reinstated in his kingdom; and was killed by him. These events were clearly due to the same causes; yet more consideration and less injustice was displayed by the republic than by the prince.

It will be found, then, that where there is fear there is in fact the same attitude towards contracts. And, should one find either a prince or a republic facing ruin in order to keep a contract, this, too, may be due to like causes. It may well happen, for instance, in the case of a prince that he is the ally of some powerful prince who has no opportunity of defending him at the time, but by whom he may hope to be restored to his principality in due course; or, again, having acted as one of his partisans, he may think it impossible to find one of the prince’s enemies with whom he can make an agreement or come to terms.

This was the lot of all those princes of the kingdom of Naples who espoused the cause of the French. It was also, in the case of republics, the lot of Saguntum in Spain which saw itself ruined because it had espoused the cause of Rome; and of Florence owing to her having in 1512 remained loyal to the cause of the French.

If all things be taken into account, however, I am of opinion that in cases in which there is imminent danger, republics will be found to be more reliable than princes. For though republics may have the same intention and the same desire as a prince, they are slower to act and take more time than a prince in arriving at a decision. Consequently they take more time over the breaking of a treaty than does a prince. Confederations are dissolved for the sake of some advantage, and in this republics abide by their agreements far better than do princes. Instances might be cited of treaties broken by princes for a very small advantage, and of treaties which have not been broken by a republic for a very great advantage.

This happened in regard to a proposal which Themistocles laid before the Athenians, to whom he announced in a speech that he had a piece of advice to give them which would be of great advantage to their country, but that he dare not mention it in public, for, if he did, it might spoil their chance of acting on it. Hence the Athenians deputed Aristides to hear what he had to say, and to decide what to do about it according to what he thought of the proposal. Themistocles then pointed out that the warships of all Greece, with respect to which they had treaty obligations, lay in a place where they could easily get hold of and destroy them, which would make the Athenians masters of that country. When Aristides reported to the people that Themistocles’ plan was highly advantageous, but extremely dishonest, the people on this account would have nothing at all to do with it.

Philip of Macedon would not have acted thus.37 Nor would other princes who in their enterprises and conquests have gained more by breaking their word than by any other device. I say nothing of pacts which are allowed to lapse through non-observance, since this is the ordinary thing. I am speaking of those which are broken for some reason outside the ordinary; and with respect to these am of opinion, in view of what I have said above, that the populace is guilty of fewer faults than is the prince, and that, in consequence, it is more to be trusted than is a prince.