# 53. The Populace, misled by the False Appearance of Advantage, often seeks its own Ruin, and is easily moved by Splendid Hopes and Rash Promises

When the city of Veii had been taken it occurred to the Roman populace that it would be of advantage to the city of Rome if half its inhabitants went to live in Veii; for it was argued that, since Veii was situated in a rich neighbourhood, was full of buildings and near to Rome, one half of Rome’s citizens might prosper there, and yet not be so near to Rome as to interfere with its civic proceedings. The project seemed to the senate and to wiser folk in Rome to be so futile and so likely to do harm that they openly declared that it would be better to suffer death than to agree to such a plan. The result was that, when the matter came up for discussion, the plebs became so incensed against the senate that there would have been an armed conflict and bloodshed, had not the senate been shielded by some citizens of mature age and high repute, and had not the plebs been deterred by the respect it had for them from proceeding further with its impertinence.

Two things here are noteworthy. First of all, the populace, misled by the false appearance of good, often seeks its own ruin, and, unless it be brought to realize what is bad and what is good for it by someone in whom it has confidence, brings on republics endless dangers and disasters. Again, when by ill chance the populace has no confidence in anyone at all, as sometimes happens owing to its having been deceived in the past either by events or by men, it spells ruin, and necessarily so. Apropos of which Dante said in the discourse he made On Monarchy that the populace often used to cry Long live its death! and Death to its life!

From this unreadiness to trust anybody it sometimes happens that a republic fails to reach the right decision, as has been said above of the Venetians, who, when attacked by numerous enemies, could not decide whether or not to save the situation by restoring what they had taken from others – for it was this that had led to the war and caused princes to form the League against them – until ruin came upon them.

Turning now to the question of what it is easy and what difficult to persuade a people, this distinction may be made. Either that of which you have to persuade it looks at first sight like a sure thing, or it looks like a lost cause, or, again, it may seem to it a bold thing or a cowardly thing to do. When proposals which have been laid before the populace look like sure things, even though concealed within them disaster lies hid, or when it looks like a bold thing, even though concealed within it lies the republic’s ruin, it will always be easy to persuade the masses to adopt such a proposal. And, in like manner, it will always be difficult to persuade them to adopt a course which seems to them cowardly or hopeless, even though safety and security lie hid beneath it.

What I have said is borne out by numerous instances, Roman and non-Roman, modern and ancient. For instance, it was in this way that a poor view came to be taken in Rome of Fabius Maximus, who failed to persuade the Roman people that the republic would do well to go slowly with the war against Hannibal and to act on the defensive instead of attacking him; for that people thought such a course cowardly and saw no advantage in it, nor had Fabius reasons enough to make them see his point. So blind indeed are peoples in matters concerning their own safety that, although the Roman people had made the mistake of authorizing Fabius’s master of horse to attack, contrary to Fabius’s wish, and although by the action, thus authorized, the Roman army would have been routed had not Fabius had the prudence to come to the rescue, yet so little did they profit by this experience that they afterwards made Varro consul, not on the score of merit, but because he had gone about everywhere proclaiming in the squares and public places that he would break Hannibal if they would but give him the command. The result was the battle and rout at Cannae, which almost ruined Rome.

Let me give yet another instance of such conduct in Rome. Hannibal had been in Italy for eight or ten years and had slaughtered Romans right and left throughout the whole of this province, when Marcus Centenius Penula, a low born fellow – though he had held some rank in the forces – came to the senate and offered, if they would authorize him to form an army of volunteers drawn from any place he pleased in Italy, to present them in a very short time with Hannibal either dead or alive. To the senate this rascal’s request seemed foolhardy; yet, in view of the fact that, if they refused it and the populace got to know of their decision, there would be disturbances and the odium would fall on those of senatorial rank, they granted it, preferring to expose to danger all who should follow him, rather than to arouse fresh resentment in the populace, for they knew how eagerly such a course would be welcomed and how difficult it would be to dissuade them. So the rascal went with a disorderly and undisciplined mob to look for Hannibal, and was defeated and killed, together with all his followers, at the first encounter.

In Greece, in the city of Athens, Nicias, a man both of weight and wisdom, could never persuade the people of that city of the folly of invading Sicily, with the result that against the advice of those who knew better, they took a decision which led to the total ruin of Athens.

When Scipio became consul and was keen on getting the province of Africa, promising that Carthage should be completely destroyed, and the senate would not agree to this because Fabius Maximus was against it, he threatened to appeal to the people, for he knew full well how pleasing such projects are to the populace.

One might cite relevant instances from our own city. For example, when Messer Ercole Bentivoglio, commander of the Florentine forces, together with Antonio Giacomini, after they had defeated Bartolommeo d’Alviano at San Vincenti, went to besiege Pisa, this attack was decided upon by the populace in view of Messer Ercole’s bold promises though many wise citizens were against it. Nor was there any way out since the project had been put forward by the general will, based as it was on the assurances given by the commander of the army.

I claim, then, that there is no easier way of bringing disaster on a republic in which the populace has authority, than to engage it in undertakings which appear bold, for, if the populace is of any account, it is bound to be taken up; nor will those who are of a different opinion be able to do anything to stop it. But if this brings ruin to a city it brings ruin still more frequently to the particular citizens put in charge of such an enterprise. For the populace having taken victory for granted, when defeat comes, do not blame it on fortune or on the helplessness of the person in command, but on his malevolence or his ignorance. Hence usually he gets either killed or imprisoned or exiled, as happened to numberless Carthaginian generals and to many Athenians. Nor does it help such a one to have won victories in the past, for the present disaster cancels them all out. This was what happened to our friend, Antonio Giacomini. For, when he failed to take Pisa, as the populace expected and as he had promised to do, he fell into such disgrace with the populace that, notwithstanding his countless services in the past, he owed his life rather to the compassion of those in power than to any cause which weighed in his favour with the populace.