# 52. The Safer and Less Scandalous Way to repress the Arrogance of One who has risen to Power in a Republic is to forestall him in the Methods he uses to come by this Power

We have seen in the last chapter what credit the nobility, acquired with the plebs by their seeming bounty of granting the soldiers pay, and by the way in which taxes were levied. Had the nobility kept up this practice, they would have prevented any tumult in the city, would have deprived the tribunes of the credit they had with the plebs, and so would have deprived them of their authority. For certainly in a republic, and especially in a corrupt republic, there cannot be a better, less scandalous, or easier way of thwarting the ambition of any citizen than by forestalling him in the routes he traverses to get to the goal he proposes to reach.

If this method had been adopted by the enemies of Cosimo de’ Medici it would have been much better than driving him out of the city. For had his competitors among the citizens adopted his style and played up to the populace they would have taken out of his hands the weapons which availed him most, and there would have been no tumults and no violence. Piero Soderini had acquired great repute in the city of Florence simply by using this method, i.e. playing up to the public, who thus came to look upon him as a man who was devoted to the liberty of the city. It would certainly have been much easier, much more honest, less dangerous and less harmful to the republic, had those citizens who were envious of his greatness, forestalled the methods by which he made himself great, instead of opposing him in such a way that they ruined themselves, and, in doing so, brought ruin also on everybody else in the republic. For, if they had taken from his hands the weapons he used to make strong his position – which they could easily have done – they would have been able to oppose him on all councils and in all public debates without incurring suspicion and without regard for anybody. And, should anyone answer that, if the citizens who hated Piero made the mistake of not forestalling the methods whereby he had acquired repute with the people, Piero himself had made the same mistake in that he had not forestalled the methods used by his adversaries in order to frighten him, there was in Piero’s case an excuse. For it would have been difficult to do; and such methods were in his eyes dishonest because the methods they used in attacking him consisted in playing up to the Medici, with whose help they got the better of him and in the end ruined him. Piero, therefore, could not in decency play such a part, which would have meant destroying not only his good name, but the liberty of which he had been appointed the guardian. Nor could he have supported the Medici in secret and for the time being, since this would have been most dangerous in his case; for, should he have been discovered to be the friend of the Medici, he would at once have become suspect and odious to the populace; and this would have made it yet easier for his enemies to attack him than it had been before.

Men ought, therefore, in choosing between alternatives, to consider the snags and the dangers involved, and not to adopt that which may entail more danger than advantage, even though they have the backing of an assembly in what they have decided upon. Because, if they do otherwise, it may well happen in their case as it did in that of Tullius [Cicero], who, in attempting to remove those who favoured Mark Antony, did but increase their numbers. For Mark Antony had been declared by the senate to be an enemy of the state, and had collected together a large army consisting for the most part of soldiers who had espoused Caesar’s cause. In order to deprive him of these soldiers, Tullius advised the senate to give preferment to Octavian, and to send him with the consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, against Mark Antony; alleging that, as soon as the soldiers who were following Mark Antony heard the name of Octavian, who was Caesar’s nephew and had adopted the name of Caesar, they would leave the former and join him; which would leave Mark Antony devoid of supporters, so that it would be easy to overcome him. The result was just the opposite; for Mark Antony won over Octavian, who left Tullius and the senate in the lurch, and joined him. This affair led to the utter destruction of the aristocratica party.

This might easily have been foreseen. The senate ought not to have given credence to Tullius’s arguments, but should have borne ever in mind that name which had so gloriously wiped out its enemies and acquired the princedom of Rome. Nor should they have expected to be able to do anything consistent with the name of liberty with the help of his relatives and his supporters.