# BOOK SIX BOOK SIX ZANOBI. [1] I believe that it is well, since the reasoning must be changed, that Batista take up his office and I put down mine. And in this case we will end up imitating the good captains, according to what I have just understood here from the lord. They put the best soldiers ahead and behind the army, since it seemed necessary to them to have ahead whoever joins the fight hardily and behind whoever sustains it hardily. [2] Therefore, Cosimo began this reasoning prudently, and Batista will finish it prudently. [3] Luigi and I have carried it on in these middle [parts]. [4] And just as each of us has taken his own part willingly, so I do not believe that Batista is going to refuse his. BATISTA. [5] I have let myself be governed up to here; so am I going to let myself in the future. [6] Therefore, Lord, I would be content to follow your reasonings, and, if we interrupt you with these practices, may you excuse us. FABRIZIO. [7] As I told you already, you’ve done something very gratifying. For your interrupting me does not take away my fancy,1 indeed it refreshes it in me. [8] But wanting to follow our material, I say that it is now time that we encamp this army of ours. For you know that everything desires rest, as well as security, for to rest and not to rest securely is not perfect rest. [9] I very much fear2 you desired me first to encamp it, then have [it] march, and, lastly, [have it] fight.3 And we have done the contrary. [10] We were led to this by necessity. For wanting to show, while marching, how an army was arranged from the form of marching into that of fighting, it was necessary first to have shown how it was ordered for a fight. [11] But to return to our material, I say that in wanting the encampment to be secure, it must be strong and ordered. [12] The industry of the captain makes it ordered, the site or art makes it strong. [13] The Greeks used to seek strong sites, and would never have put themselves where there was not a ditch or a riverbank or a multitude of trees, or another natural shelter that might defend them. [14] But the Romans encamped securely not so much from the site as from art. Nor would they ever have encamped in places where they would not have been able to extend all of their men according to their discipline. [15] From this it arose that the Romans were able to keep one form of encampment, for they wanted the site to obey them, not they the site. [16] The Greeks could not observe this. For since they obeyed the site, and sites vary in form, they also had to vary their mode of encamping and the form of their encampment. [17] Thus, where the site lacked strength, the Romans supplied it with art and with industry.4 [18] And because in this narration of mine I have wanted to imitate the Romans, I will not depart from them in their mode of encamping. Though I do not therefore observe their orders in everything, but take that part of them that seems to me to suit the present times. [19] I have said several times5 that in their consular armies the Romans had two legions of Roman men, which [together] were around eleven thousand infantrymen and 600 cavalrymen. And they had another eleven thousand infantrymen more from troops sent by friends to help them. Nor did they ever have more foreign than Roman soldiers in their armies, except for cavalrymen. They did not care if the latter exceeded6 the number in their own legions.7 And, as in all of their actions, they put the legions in the middle and the auxiliaries on the sides. [20] They observed that mode when encamping as well, as you yourselves could have read in those who write on their affairs. Therefore, I am not going to narrate to you exactly how they encamped, but am going to tell you only with what orders I would at present encamp my army, and you will then recognize which part I have taken from Roman modes. [21] You know that, in contrast to8 the two Roman legions, I took two brigades of infantrymen, of six thousand infantrymen and three hundred useful cavalrymen per brigade, and [you know] into what battalions, with what arms, and with what names I divided them. [22] You know how in ordering the army for marching and for fighting, I did not make mention of other troops, but have only shown how, in doubling the troops, one did nothing but double the orders.9 [23] But wanting at present to show you the mode of encamping, it seems [well] to me not to remain with only two brigades, but to put together one whole10 army composed, like the Roman, of two brigades and of as many auxiliary troops. [24] I do this because the form of the encampment is more perfect by encamping a perfect army. This did not appear necessary to me in the other demonstrations. [25] So wanting to encamp a whole11 army of 24 thousand infantrymen and of two thousand useful cavalrymen, since they are divided in four brigades, two of our very own troops and two of foreign ones, I would take this mode.12 [26] Having found the site where I want to encamp, I would raise the captain-flag, and around it I would describe a square that has each face fiftybraccia distant from it, each one of which looks to one of the four regions of heaven, that is, East, West, South, and North. I would want the encampment of the captain to be within that space. [27] And because I believe that it is prudent, and because the Romans did so in good part, I would divide the armed from the unarmed and I would separate the impeded from the unimpeded men. [28] I would encamp all or the better part of the armed on the Eastern part, and the unarmed and the impeded on the Western part, making the East the front13 and the West the back of the encampment, and the South and the North would be the flanks. [29] And so as to distinguish the encampments of the armed, I would take this mode: I would make14 a line from the captain-flag and would guide it toward the East for a space of 680 braccia. [30] I would then make two other [parallel] lines that have the former [line] in between them and are the [same] length as that one, but each one fifteen braccia distant from it. At the extremity of these I would want the East gate to be, and the space that is between the two extreme lines would be a street15 that goes from the gate to the captain’s encampment. It would end up being thirty-braccia wide and 630 long (because the encampment of the captain would occupy fifty braccia of it) and this would be called Captain Street. I would then make one street from the South gate all the way to the North gate, and it would pass through the front of Captain Street and graze the captain’s encampment toward the East. It would be 1,250 braccia long (because it would occupy the whole width of the encampment)16 and it also would be thirty-braccia wide and would be called Cross Street. [31] So having drawn what would be the captain’s encampment and these two streets, one would begin to draw the encampments of our own two brigades. One of them I would encamp on the right side of Captain Street, and one on the left. [32] Therefore, having crossed the space taken by the width of Cross Street, I would place thirty-two encampments on the left side of Captain Street and thirty-two on the right side, leaving between the sixteenth and seventeenth encampments a space of thirty braccia, which serves as a traverse street that would traverse all the encampments of the brigades, as will be seen in their distribution. [33] I would encamp the heads of the men-at-arms in the first [encampment], which would end up being joined to Cross Street, at the front of these two orders of [fifteen encampments]. In the fifteen encampments that follow after [the first encampments] on each side [of Captain Street], [I would encamp] the men-atarms themselves. Since each brigade has 150 men-at-arms, they would come out to ten men-at-arms per encampment. [34] The spaces of the encampments of the heads would be forty braccia in width and ten in length. [35] And let it be noted that, anytime I say width, I mean the space from the South to the North, and when I say length, that from the West to the East. [36] Those of the men-atarms would be fifteen braccia in length and thirty in width. [37] In the other fifteen encampments that follow on each side (those whose beginning crossed Traverse Street and had the same space as those of the men-at-arms), I would encamp the light cavalrymen. Being 150, they would come out to ten cavalrymen per encampment. And in the sixteenth [encampment] that remains, I would encamp their head, giving to him that same space that is given to the head of the men-at-arms. [38] Thus, the encampments of the cavalrymen of the two brigades would end up putting Captain Street in between [them] and give a rule to the encampments of the infantries, as I will narrate. [39] You have noticed how I encamped the 300 cavalrymen of each brigade, with their heads, in thirty-two encampments placed on Captain Street and beginning from Cross Street; how from the sixteenth to the seventeenth remains a space of thirty braccia to make a Traverse Street. [40] Therefore, wanting to encamp the twenty battalions that the two ordinary brigades have, I would put the encampments of every two battalions behind the encampments of the cavalrymen. These would each be 15 braccia in length and, in width, 30, like those of the cavalrymen, and would be joined at the rear part, so that the one touched the other. [41] And on each side, in every first encampment that is joined to Cross Street, I would encamp the constable of one battalion. This encampment would end up corresponding to the encampment of the head of the men-at-arms and would have only 20 braccia of space in width, and ten in length. [42] In the other fifteen encampments that follow after these on each side up to Traverse Street, I would encamp one battalion of infantrymen on each side. Since they are 450, they would come out to 30 per encampment. [43] I would place the other 15 encampments contiguous with those of the light cavalry on each side, with the same [sized] spaces, in which I would encamp another battalion of infantrymen on each side. [44] And in the last encampment I would put on each side the constable of a battalion, who would end up being joined to that of the head of the light cavalry, with a space of ten braccia in length and twenty in width. [45] So these two first orders of encampments would consist half of cavalrymen and half of infantrymen. [46] And because I want all the cavalrymen to be useful, as I told you in its place,17 and since through this they do not have attendants who assist them in governing the horses or in the other necessary things, I would want these infantrymen who encamp behind the cavalrymen to be obliged to help their masters provide for and govern them, and for this they would be exempt from the other actions of the camp. This mode was observed by the Romans. [47] Then, on each side having left after these encampments a space of 30 braccia that makes a street, the one called First Street on the Right Hand, and the other, First Street on the Left, I would put on each side another order of 32 double encampments. They would turn their rear parts to one another, with the same [sized] spaces that I have mentioned, and be divided in the same mode after the sixteenth [encampment] so as to make Traverse Street. There I would encamp on each side four battalions of infantrymen with their constables on the ends18 at the foot and at the head. [48] Having then left on each side another thirty-braccia space that makes a street that on one side is called the Second Street on the Right Hand and, on the other side, the Second Street on the Left, I would put on each side another order of thirty-two double encampments with the same distance and divisions. There I would encamp on each side another four battalions with their constables. [49] And thus the cavalrymen and the battalions of the two ordinary brigades would come to be encamped in three orders of encampments per side, and would have Captain Street in between [them]. [50] Because I had them composed of the very same men,19I would encamp the two auxiliary brigades on each side of these two ordinary brigades, with the same orders of double encampments, first putting one order of double encampments where they would encamp half cavalrymen and half infantrymen, thirty braccia distant from the others, so as to make a street, one of which is called Third Street on the Right Hand, and the other, Third Street on the Left. [51] And then I would make two other orders of encampments on each side, distinct and ordered in the same mode as the ordinary brigades, which would make two other streets. All of them would be called by the number and the side where they would be located. [52] So all of these bands of the army would end up being encamped in twelve orders of double encampments, and on thirteen streets, counting Captain Street and Cross [Street]. [53] From the encampments to the ditch, I would want a space to remain of one hundred braccia all around. [54] And if you calculate all of these spaces, you will see that from the middle of the encampment of the captain to the East gate [there] are 680 braccia. [55] There now remain two spaces, one of which is from the encampment of the captain to the South gate, the other [of which] is from the former to the North gate. So that by measuring from the point in the middle, each ends up being 625 braccia. [56] Then, taking from each of these the fifty braccia that the encampment of the captain occupies, the 45 braccia for the piazza that I want to give on each side, the 30 braccia of the street that divides each of the mentioned spaces in the middle, and the hundred braccia that are left on each part between the encampments and the ditch, a space remains on each side [of the captain’s quarters] for encampments 400-braccia wide and one hundred long, measuring the length by the space that the captain’s encampment takes.20 [57] Hence, by dividing the said length through the middle, one would make on each side of the captain 40 encampments [that are] fifty-braccia long and 20 wide, which would end up being 80 encampments in all. In these would be encamped the head-general of the brigades, the bursars, the quartermasters,21 and all of those who would hold office in the army, leaving some empty for the foreigners who come and for those who serve in the military by favor of the captain. [58] On the side behind the captain’s encampment, I would make22 a street, 31-braccia wide, from the South to the North, and it would be called Front Street. It would end up being placed along the 80 encampments mentioned, because this street and Cross Street have between them the captain’s encampment and the 80 encampments that would be on its flanks. [59] From this Front Street, and on the side opposite the captain’s encampment, I would make23 another street, also 30-braccia wide, that would go from it to the West gate. It would correspond in site and in length to Captain Street and would be called Piazza Street. [60] Having placed these two streets, I would order the piazza where the market is held. I would place [the piazza] at the head24of Piazza Street, opposite the captain’s encampment and adjoining Front Street. I would want it to be a square,25 and would assign 96 braccia per side.26 [61] On the right hand and the left hand of the said piazza, I would make two orders of encampments, so that each order would have 8 double encampments that would occupy 12 braccia in length and 30 in width. So 16 encampments would end up being on each side27 of the piazza, which would be in the middle, so that there would be 32 [encampments] in all. In these I would encamp those cavalrymen left over from the auxiliary brigades. And if these were not enough, I would assign them some of those encampments that have the captain in between them, and especially those that look out toward the ditches. [62] It now remains to encamp the pikes and the extraordinary velites that each brigade has. You know that each [brigade], according to our order, has a thousand extraordinary pikes and five hundred velites besides the ten battalions. So our own brigades have two thousand extraordinary pikes and a thousand extraordinary velites and the auxiliary [brigades have] as many of these. So one ends up having to encamp another six thousand infantrymen, all of which I would encamp in the part toward the West and along the ditches. [63] From the end of Front Street and toward the North, leaving a space of a hundred braccia from these to the ditch, I would place one order of five double encampments that all take up 75 braccia in length and sixty in width. Such that, having divided the width, each encampment would come out to fifteen braccia in length and 30 in width. [64] And because there would be ten encampments, they would encamp three hundred infantrymen, every encampment coming out to 30 infantrymen. [65] Then, leaving a space of 31 braccia, I would place in like modes and in like spaces another order of five double encampments, and then another, so that there would be five orders of five double encampments. So fifty encampments would end up being placed along a straight line on the North, all one hundred braccia distant from the ditches. They would encamp one thousand five hundred infantrymen. [66] Turning then to the left side28 toward the West gate, in that whole tract that would go from [the fifty encampments just discussed] to the said gate, I would place five other orders of double encampments with the very same spaces and with the very same modes. It is true that from one order to the other there would not be more than fifteen braccia of space, in which a thousand infantrymen would again be encamped. And thus from the North gate to that of the West, as they turn around the ditches in one hundred encampments, partitioned in ten orders of five double encampments per order, would be encamped all the extraordinary pikes and velites of our own brigades. [67] Thus from the West gate to that of the South, as they turn around the ditches in the exact same mode, in another ten orders of ten encampments per order, would be encamped the extraordinary pikes and velites of the auxiliary brigades. [68] Their heads or constables could pick those encampments that seemed most convenient to them on the side toward the ditches. [69] The artillery I would arrange all along the embankments of the ditches. And in all of the other space that remains toward the West, I would encamp all the unarmed and all the impediments of the camp. [70] And one has to understand that under this name of impediments, as you know, the ancients understood that whole train and all those things, besides the soldiers, that are necessary to an army, such as carpenters, smiths, horseshoers, stone-cutters, engineers, bombardiers (even though these could be numbered among the armed),29herdsmen with their herds of geldings and cattle that they need for the army to live, and then workers30of every art, together with the public wagons for the public supplies pertaining to living and arming. [71] Nor would I distinguish these encampments individually.31 I would only draw the streets that they must not occupy. Then to all the said impediments I would assign the other spaces by kind, which would be four, that would remain between the streets; that is, one [space] to the herdsmen, another to the artisans and workmen, another to the public wagons for provisions, the fourth to those for arming. [72] The streets, which I would want left unoccupied, would be Piazza Street, Front Street, and then a street called Middle Street. It would depart from the North and go toward the South and pass through the middle of Piazza Street. It would make that effect on the West part which Traverse Street [makes] on the East part; [73] and, besides this, a street that turns around the inside part, along the encampments of the pikes and the extraordinary velites. [74] And all these streets would be 30braccia wide. [75] And the artillery I would arrange along the ditches of the camp on the inside part. 1. Fantasia (cf. D III 6.12). 2. Lit.: doubt. 3. Cf. AWIII 44; Polybius VI 26; and the beginning of Vegetius III 8. 4. See Polybius VI 42. 5. See AWIII 40–43. 6. Lit.: passed. 7. Cf. AWIII note 15. 8. Or: corresponding to. 9. See AWIII 43–48, 76. 10. Lit.: just. 11. Lit.: just. 12. See figure 7, page 175. For the discussion of the making of the encampment, see Polybius VI 27–32; cf. Vegetius III 8; Xenophon, Education of Cyrus VIII 5.1–16. 13. See Xenophon, Education of Cyrus VIII 5.3; cf. Vegetius I 23; Polybius VI 27. 14. Lit.: move. 15. Lit.: way, throughout the discussion of the encampment. 16. Parentheses in original. 17. See AWII 322–26; cf. AWIII 42. 18. Testa, usually translated “front.” 19. That is, of troops carrying the same types and numbers of weapons. 20. Thus, the “length” from East to West is shorter than the “width” from North to South. 21. Lit.: “masters of the camps.” 22. Lit.: move. 23. Lit.: move. 24. Testa, usually translated “front.” 25. The piazza depicted in figure 7, page 175, is rectangular rather than square. 26. Lit.: square. 27. Lit.: hand. 28. Lit.: hand. BATISTA. [76] I confess that I do not understand this. Nor do I even believe that for me to say so is shameful, since this is not my training. [77] Nonetheless, this order pleases me much. I would only want you to resolve these doubts for me: first, why you make the streets and the spaces around so wide; the other, which gives me more concern, is how these spaces that you drew for the encampments have to be used. FABRIZIO. [78] Know that I make all the streets thirty-braccia wide so that a battalion of ordered32 infantry can go through them. I told you,33 if you remember well, that each of these takes up 25 to 30 braccia in width. [79] It is necessary that the space between the ditch and encampments be a hundred braccia because one can manage the battalions and the artillery there, lead the spoils through it, and, if needed, have space to withdraw with new ditches and new embankments. [80] It is also better for the encampments to be very distant from the ditches, so as to be more distant from the fire and the other things that the enemy can throw to hurt them. [81] As to your second question, my intention is not that every space drawn by me be covered by one shelter only, but [that it] be used as proves convenient to those who encamp there, with either more or fewer tents, so long as one does not go beyond its limits. [82] And to draw up these encampments, there must be very practiced men and excellent architects, who, immediately after the captain has selected the place, know how to give it form and distribute it, distinguishing the streets, dividing the encampments with ropes and with spears so that they are ordered and divided practically at once. [83] And so that no confusion arises, the camp must always wind up in the very same mode so that each one knows on which street and in which space he has to find his encampment. [84] And one must observe this every time and in every place, so that it may seem a mobile city that carries with it the same streets, the same houses, and the same aspect wherever it goes. Those seeking strong sites who have to change form according to the variation of site cannot observe this thing. [85] But the Romans used to make the place strong with ditches, with ramparts, and with embankments, for they used to make a palisade around the camp and, in front of that, a ditch, ordinarily six-braccia wide and three deep. These spaces grew according to [how much] they wanted to stay in one place and according to [how much] they feared the enemy. [86] I for my part would not at present make the palisade, unless I wanted to winter in a place. [87] I would definitely make the ditch and the embankment not less than but greater said, according to necessity. [88] On account of34 artillery, I would also make a ditch in a partial35 circle on each corner of the encampment. From it, the artillery could hit the flank of anyone who came to attack the ditches. [89] One must also drill the soldiers in this drill of knowing how to order an encampment, and with that [drill] make the ministers ready to draw it up and the soldiers quick to know their places. [90] Nor is anything difficult, as will be said in its place.36 [91] For I now want to pass to the guards of the camp, because without the distribution of guards all the other troubles would be vain. 29. Parentheses in original. 30. Or: masters. 31. Lit.: particularly. 32. Ordinanza, usually translated as “militia.” 33. See AWVI 74; cf. AWVI 30, 59. BATISTA. [92] Before you pass to the guards, I would like you to tell me: when someone wants to put the encampments near to the enemy, what mode is taken? For I do not know how there is time to order them without danger. FABRIZIO. [93] You have to know this: no captain encamps near to the enemy, unless the former is arranged to do battle any time the enemy wants. [94] When someone is so arranged, there is no danger but the ordinary one. For two parts of the army are ordered to do battle, and the other part makes the encampments. [95] In this case, the Romans gave the task37 of fortifying the encampments to the triarii, and the principes and the hastati stayed in arms. [96] They did this because if the enemy came, since the triariiare the last to fight, they had time to leave their work and take up their arms and enter their places.38 [97] In imitation of the Romans, you would have to have the encampments made by the battalions that you want to put in the last part of the army in the place of the triarii. [98] But let’s return to reasoning about the guards. [99] It does not seem to me that I have found, among the ancients, that they kept guards, which they [now] call sentinels, outside of the ditches at a distance so as to guard the camp at night, as is done today.39 [100] They did this, I believe, thinking that the army could easily remain deceived through the difficulty that there is in inspecting40 them, and through their being able to be either corrupted or oppressed by the enemy. So they judged trusting in them [to be] dangerous, either in part or entirely. [101] Therefore, the whole guard force was inside the ditches. They did this with diligence and with very great order, punishing capitally anyone who deviated from such an order. [102] How it was ordered by them I will not otherwise tell you, so as not to bore you, since you can see it yourselves if, up to now, you have not seen it.41 [103] I will only briefly tell you what would be done by me. [104] I would ordinarily have a third of the army stay armed every night, and of that, a fourth part always on foot. That [part] would be distributed along all of the embankments and through all the army, with double guards placed on every corner. Of these, part would stay put, part would continually go from on side of the encampment to the other. [105] And during the day, if I had the enemy near, I would also observe this order that I mention. [106] As to giving out the password42 and renewing it every evening, and doing other things that are used by similar guards, I will not otherwise speak of, as being things [that are] known.43 [107] I will recall only one thing as being very important and which produces much good when it is observed and much bad when not observed. It is that great diligence be used toward anyone who does not encamp inside the camp at night and toward anyone new who comes there. [108] And it is an easy thing to inspect44 anyone who encamps in the order that we have drawn. For since every encampment has the number of its men determined, it is an easy thing to see if there are men missing or if there is a surplus. And when some are missing without permission,45[it is easy] to punish them as fugitives and, if there is a surplus, to understand who they are, what they are doing, and their other conditions. [109] This diligence makes it so that the enemy cannot, except with difficulty, do business46 with your heads and be knowledgeable of your counsels. [110] If this thing had not been observed with diligence by the Romans, Claudius Nero, when he had Hannibal nearby, could not have departed from his own encampments that he had in Lucania, and gone to and returned from the Marches, without Hannibal having had presentiment of anything.47 [111] But it is not enough to make these orders good unless one makes them be observed with great severity. For in an army there is nothing that needs48 as much observance as is required [for this]. [112] Therefore, the laws for its fortification must be harsh and hard, and the executor very hard. [113] The Romans punished with capital punishment anyone who failed on guard, anyone who abandoned the place he had been given to fight, anyone who carried any concealed thing outside of the encampments, if anyone said he had done something outstanding in the fight and had not done it, if some had fought contrary to49 the commandment of the captain, and if anyone had thrown away his arms in fear.50 [114] And when it happened that a cohort or an entire legion had made a similar error, so as not to have all of them die, they put all [of their names] in a bag, drew out a tenth part, and killed them.51 [115] This punishment was used52 so that if each did not feel it, eachnonetheless feared it. [116] And because where there are great punishments, there should also be rewards. To have the men fear and hope at one stroke, they had rewards offered for every outstanding deed: to him who saved the life of one of his fellow53 citizens while fighting, to him who first jumped over the wall of the enemy town, to him who first entered the encampments of the enemies, to him who had wounded or killed the enemy while fighting, to him who had thrown [the enemy] from his horse.54 [117] And thus every virtuous act was recognized and rewarded by the consuls and publicly praised by each. And besides the glory and the fame they acquired among the soldiers, those who received gifts for any of these things showed them with solemn pomp and with great demonstrations among their friends and relatives when they had returned to their fatherland. [118] Thus, it is not marvelous if that people acquired so much empire, since it paid so much attention to the punishment and reward of55 those who merited either praise or blame, either through their good or through their evil doings. The greater part of these things would have to be observed. [119] Nor does it seem [well] to me to be silent about the mode of punishment observed by them. It was that when the wicked [man] was convicted56 before a tribune or consul, he was hit by him lightly with a rod. After that hit, the wicked [man] was allowed to flee and all the soldiers to kill him. So that at once each threw either stones or darts, or hit him with other arms, in such a manner57 that he went along barely alive, and very rarely did they escape. And such as did escape, were not allowed to return home, except with so many disadvantages and ignominies that it was much better to die.58 [120] One sees this mode is almost observed by the Swiss, who have the condemned killed popularly by the other soldiers. [121] This is well considered and optimally59 done. For to want one individual not to be a defender of someone wicked, the best remedy that is found is to make him the punisher of the latter. For he favors him with a different respect and he longs for his punishment with a different desire when he himself is the executioner than when the execution belongs to another. [122] Thus, to want one individual not to be favored in his errors by the people, a great remedy is to make the people have to judge him. [123] As fortification of this, one can adduce the example of Manlius Capitolinus, who, having been accused by the senate, was defended by the people up until it became the judge of him. But having become arbiter of his cause, it condemned him to death.60[124] Therefore, this is a mode of punishing that takes away tumults and makes justice be observed. [125] And because to check armed men neither the fear of the laws nor that of men is enough,61 the ancients added the authority of God. And therefore with very great ceremony they made their soldiers swear to the observance of military discipline, so that if they acted against it, they not only had to fear the laws and men, but God. [126] And they used every industry to rule them with religion. 34. Lit.: with respect to. 35. Lit.: half. 36. Perhaps a reference to the discussion beginning at AW VII 199 and promised at AWI 44. 37. Lit.: way. 38. Cf. Vegetius I 25, III 8; Xenophon, Education of Cyrus VIII 5.9. 39. Lit.: is used today; see Vegetius III 8, near the end, for the assertion that the cavalry was responsible for nighttime patrols outside the camp. 40. Lit.: seeing them again. 41. For the following discussion, see Polybius VI 35. 42. Lit.: name. 43. See Polybius VI 34. 44. Lit.: see again. 45. Lit.: license. 46. Lit.: practice. 47. In 207 b.c.; see Frontinus I 1.9; Livy XXVII 43–47. 48. Lit.: wants. 49. Lit.: outside of. 50. See Polybius VI 37. Not all proscribed acts mentioned in Polybius are named by Machiavelli, and Polybius mentions neither the offense of taking concealed things out of the camp nor that of fighting against the order of the commander (for the latter see Livy VIII 6–8; D II 16.1, III 1.3, 22.4, 34.2.). 51. See Polybius VI 38. 53. Lit.: own. 52. Lit.: done or made. 54. See Polybius VI 39, where entering the enemies’ encampments is not mentioned. 55. Lit.: having so much observance of punishment and of merit toward. 56. Convinto, usually translated as “conquered.” 57. Lit.: of a quality. 58. See Polybius VI 37. 59. Ottimamente is juxtaposed to popolarmente [popularly] above. In Florentine parlance and politics, the ottimati or grandi constituted the upper crust of the political class, while the popolari constituted its lower rungs (though the term could be applied to the political class as a whole). Machiavelli refers to the people and the great as the two most important “humors” (see P9; D I 4.1; FHII 12, III 1; cf. P 19.76–77). 60. See Livy VI 19–20; cf. DIII 8.1. BATISTA. [127] Did the Romans permit women to be in their armies, or the use of those idle games that are used today? FABRIZIO. [128] They prohibited the one and the other. [129] And this prohibition was not very difficult. For there were so many exercises in which they kept the soldiers, both individually62 and generally, occupied everyday, that no time was left to them for thinking or for Love63or for games, nor for other things that seditious and useless soldiers do. BATISTA. [130] That pleases me. [131] But tell me: when the army had to decamp,64 what order did they keep?65 FABRIZIO. [132] The captain’s trumpet was sounded three times. [133] At the first sound, the tents were taken away and the packs were made; at the second, the baggage was loaded; at the third, every armed part moved in the mode that I mentioned above,66 with the impediments [coming] after and the legions in the middle. [134] You67 would therefore have to have one auxiliary brigade move and, after that, their particular impediments, and with those, a fourth part of the public impediments, which would be all of those that had been lodged in one of the squares that we demonstrated a little while ago.68[135] It would therefore be necessary to have each one of these assigned to one brigade, so that when the army is moved, each one knows which place for marching is his. [136] And thus every brigade ought to move out69 with its own impediments, and with a fourth part of the public [impediments] at its back, in the mode in which we demonstrated the Roman army marched.70 BATISTA. [137] In placing the encampment did they consider71 other [things] than the ones you have mentioned? 61. Cf. AWI246. 62. Lit.: particularly. 63. Lit.: Venus. 64. Lit.: rise up. 65. See Polybius VI 40. 66. See AWV 2–11. 67. An unusual instance of the formal or plural second person in that this seems to be advice to a practicing or would-be prince (which advice is elsewhere given in the familiar tu form) rather than to those reasoning with Fabrizio. 68. See AWVI 69–71; cf. figure 7, page 175. 69. Lit.: go away. 70. See AWV 2–11. 71. Lit.: have respects. FABRIZIO. [138] I tell you anew that in encamping the Romans wanted to be able to keep to the accustomed form in their own mode. So as to observe this, they did not have any respect. [139] But as to other considerations,72 they had two principal ones: one, to put themselves in a healthy place; the other, to put themselves where the enemy could not besiege [the encampment] and cut off the way to water and to food supplies. [140] So as to flee infirmity, they fled marshy places or those exposed to noxious winds. [141] They recognized this not so much from the quality of the site as from the faces of the inhabitants. When they looked badly colored or winded or full of another infection, they did not lodge there. [142] As to the other part [of your question] about not being besieged, one must consider the nature of the place, [as well as] where friends are posted and where enemies. From this, [you must] make your conjecture as to whether you can be besieged or not. [143] Therefore, the captain must be very expert about the sites of countries, and have around many who have the same expertise.73 [144] Sickness and hunger are also fled by not having the army disordered. For to want to maintain it healthy, it must be worked out that the soldiers sleep under the tents, that one encamps where there are trees that make shade, where there is wood to be able to cook the food, and that it not march in the heat. [145] Therefore, in the summer, one needs to take it from the encampment before day, and in the winter, to beware that it not march through the snow and through ice without the convenience of a fire, and [that it] not lack the necessary clothing and not drink bad water. [146] Have doctors cure those who get sick by chance. For a captain has no remedy when he has to fight with sickness and the enemy. [147] But nothing is so useful in maintaining the army healthy as is exercise. And therefore the ancients had them exercise each day. [148] From this it is seen how much this exercise is worth. For in encampments, it makes you healthy, and in fights, victorious. [149] As to hunger,74 not only is it necessary to see that the enemy not impede your food supplies, but to foresee from where you have to get them, and to see that what you have is not lost. [150] Therefore, you must always have a one-month supply [of provisions] with the army, and then tax your nearby friends to provide them to you daily. [You must] put supplies of them in some strong place and, above all, dispense them with care,75 giving to each a reasonable measure every day. And [you must] observe this part so that it does not disorder you. For in war, every other thing can in time be conquered, this alone in time conquers you. [151] Nor will any enemy of yours who can overcome you with hunger ever seek to conquer you with iron. For if the victory is not as honorable, it is more secure and more certain. [152] Thus, that army cannot flee hunger which does not observe justice and which licentiously consumes whatever it wishes.76 For the one disorder makes food supplies not come to it; the other [makes] what has come be consumed uselessly. [153] Therefore, the ancients ordered it that what they gave out be consumed, and at the time they wanted [it to be]. For no soldier ate except when the captain [did so]. [154] How much this is observed by modern armies each knows, and they cannot deservedly be called ordered and sober like the ancients, but licentious and drunk. 72. For the following discussion of the troops’ health and the nature of the site, see Vegetius III 2; cf. Xenophon, Education of Cyrus I 6.16–17. 73. Cf.DIII39;P14. 74. For the following discussion of supplying the army, see Vegetius III 3. 75. Lit.: diligence. BATISTA. [155] At the beginning of ordering the encampment, you said77 that you did not want to stay in two brigades only, but that you wanted to take four, so as to show how a complete78army is encamped. [156] Therefore, I would like you to tell me two things: one, when I have more or fewer men, how do I have to encamp them; [157] the other, what number of soldiers would be enough to fight against any enemy whatsoever? FABRIZIO. [158] As to the first question, I respond to you that if the army has more or less than four or six thousand79 soldiers, one takes away or adds as many orders of encampments as suffice. And with this mode, it can be increased or decreased infinitely. [159] Nonetheless, the Romans, when they joined two consular armies together, made two encampments and turned the unarmed parts toward one another.80 [160] As to the second question, I reply to you that the ordinary Roman army was around 24 thousand soldiers. But when a greater force pressed them, the most that they put together was fifty thousand. [161] With this number they opposed the French, who assaulted them after the first war that they had with the Carthaginians.81 [162] With the same they opposed Hannibal. And you have to note that the Romans and the Greeks made war with few, fortified by order and by art. The occidentals and orientals made it with a multitude. But one of these nations, the occidentals, used natural fury; the other [used] the great obedience that those men had for their king. [163] But in Greece and in Italy, since there is not natural fury or natural reverence toward their king, it has been necessary to turn to discipline, which is of so much force that it has made it that the few have been able to conquer the fury and the natural obstinacy of the many.82[164] Therefore, wanting to imitate the Romans and the Greeks, I say that the number of fifty thousand soldiers ought not to be passed, indeed even fewer of them [ought to be] taken. For more make confusion, nor do they let discipline and learned orders be observed. [165] And Pyrrhus used to say that with fifteen thousand men he wanted to assail the world.83 [166] But let us pass to another part. We have had this army of ours win a battle, and shown the travails that can occur in that fight. We have had it march, and narrated those impediments by which it can be surrounded while marching. And in the end we have encamped it where it must not only take a little rest84 from its passed troubles, but also think of how it must finish the war. For in the encampments many things are managed, especially when enemies in the country and suspect towns still remain for you, against which it is well to be secure, and to storm those that are enemies. [167] Therefore, it is necessary to come to these demonstrations and to cross these difficulties with that glory with which we have served in the military till now. [168] Therefore, descending to particulars, I say that if you should need many men or many people to do a thing that would be useful to you and of great harm to them (for instance, either undoing the walls of their city or sending many of them into exile),85it is necessary for you either to deceive them so that each believes only what touches him, so that by not assisting one another, they all later find themselves oppressed without remedy; or, on one and the same day, command to all what they must do, so that since each one believes himself to be the only one to whom the commandment was made, [each] thinks of obeying and not of remedies. And so it is that without tumult your commandment is executed by each. [169] If you had suspected the faith of a certain people and wanted to secure yourself against it and occupy it unforeseen, so as to be able to color your plan more easily, you cannot do better than to communicate to it some plan of yours, requesting help from it and showing that you want to do another enterprise and have a spirit alien to any thought of [the suspected people]. This will make them not think of its defense, not believing that you think of harming it, and it will give you the convenience of easily being able to satisfy your desire. [170] When you sense86that there is in your army someone who keeps your enemy advised as to your plans, so as to make use of his wicked spirit, you cannot do better than to communicate to him those things that you do not want to do and to keep quiet those that you want to do, and say you fear87 the things that you do not fear and hide those that you do fear. Since he believes he knows your plans, it will make him make some enterprise wherein you would easily be able to deceive and oppress him. [171] If you should plan, as did Claudius Nero, to diminish your army by sending help to some friend and that the enemy not be aware of it, it is necessary not to diminish the encampments, but to maintain the signs and orders entirely, everywhere making the same fires and the same guards.88 [172] Thus, if new troops are conjoined with your army and you want the enemy not to know that you have been fattened, it is necessary not to increase the encampments. For to keep your actions and plans secret [would] always be very useful. [173] Hence, while with his army in Spain, Metellus responded to one individual who asked him what he would do the next day, that if his own shirt knew, he would burn it.89 [174] Marcus Crassius, said to one individual who asked him when he would move the army, “Do you believe you may be the only one not to hear the trumpet?”90 [175] If you should desire to understand the secrets of your enemy and to know his orders, some were used to sending ambassadors and, with them, men very expert in war in the clothes of attendants. The latter, having taken the opportunity to see the enemy army and to consider its strengths and its weaknesses, gave them the opportunity to overcome him.91 [176] Some have sent into exile one individual intimate with them, and by means of that one, known the plans of his adversary.92[177] One also understands similar secrets from enemies, when one takes prisoners from them to this effect.93 [178] In the war Marius made with the Cimbri, so as to know the faith of those Frenchmen who inhabited Lombardy and were confederated with the Roman people, he sent them opened and sealed letters. In the open ones, he wrote that they not open the sealed ones except at such and such a time. Before that time, by asking for them back and finding them opened, he knew their faith not to be entire.94 [179] Having been assaulted, some captains have not wanted to go to find the enemy, but have gone to assail his country and constrained him to return to defend his own house.95 [180] That has gone well many times. For your own soldiers begin to conquer, to fill themselves with spoils and confidence; those of the enemy are afraid, since it seems to them that from [being] victors they have become losers. [181] So for him who has made this diversion, many times it has gone well. [182] But it can be done only by him whose country is stronger than is that of the enemy. For if it were otherwise, he would end up losing. [183] It has often been something useful to a captain that finds himself besieged in his encampments by the enemy, to start a negotiation for an accord and make a truce with him for some day[s]. This only makes the enemies more negligent in every action, such that by making use of their negligence, you can easily have the opportunity to get out of their hands. [184] In this way Sulla freed himself two times from his enemies. With this same deception Hasdrubal in Spain got away from the forces of Claudius Nero that had besieged him.96[185] In freeing oneself from the forces of the enemy, it is also well, beside what was said, to do something that makes him delay. [186] One does this in two modes. Either assault him with part of your forces, so that he, intent on that fight, makes it convenient for the rest of your troops to be able to save themselves. Or, make some new accident arise that, by the novelty of the thing, makes him marvel and, through this cause, remain in doubt and stalled, as you know Hannibal did. Being closed in by Fabius Maximus, he put small, lighted lamps between the horns of many oxen so that Fabius, made uncertain97 by this novelty, did not think to impede his passage otherwise.98 [187] Among all his other actions, a captain ought with every art to contrive to divide the forces of his enemy, either by making him suspect his own men in whom he confides, or by giving him a cause that has him separate his own troops and, through this, become weaker. [188] The first mode is done by taking care of the things of someone of those whom [the enemy] has near him, such as preserving his troops and his possessions during the war, [or] giving him his children or his other necessities of his without ransom. [189] You know that Hannibal, having burned all the fields around Rome, allowed only those of Fabius Maximus to be saved.99 [190] You know that Coriolanus, coming with the army to Rome, conserved the possessions of the nobles, and those of the plebs he burned and sacked.100 [191] All the ambassadors that Jugurtha had sent to Metellus while he had the army against Jugurtha were asked by him to give Jugurtha to him [as] a prisoner. And by later writing letters to these same men about the same matter, he worked it out so that in a small time Jugurtha was suspicious of all of his own counselors and eliminated them by diverse modes.101 [192] When he was taking refuge with Antiochus, the Roman ambassadors dealt so familiarly with Hannibal that Antiochus, having become suspicious of him, soon after no longer trusted his counsels.102 [193] As to dividing the enemy troops, there is no more certain mode than to have the country of part of them assaulted, so that having been constrained to defend it, they abandon the war. [194] Fabius kept this mode while encountering the forces of the French and of the Tuscans, Umbrians, and Samnites with his army.103 [195] Titus Didius, had few troops compared to104 those of his enemies and was awaiting a legion from Rome that the enemies wanted to go and oppose. So that they would not go there, he let it be known105 throughout all his army that he wanted to do battle with the enemies on the next day. He then saw to it106 that some of the prisoners that he had, had the opportunity to flee. By reporting the consul’s order to fight the next day, they made the enemies not go to encounter that legion so as not to diminish their own forces. And by this way it conducted itself to safety.107 This mode did not serve to divide the forces of the enemies, but to double his own. [196] So as to divide [the enemy’s] own forces, some used to allow him to enter into their own country and, as proof, allowed him to take many towns, so that by putting guards in them he might diminish his own forces. Having made him weak in this way, [they have] assaulted him and won. [197] Wanting to go into a province, some others have feigned wanting to assault another and used so much industry that, having suddenly entered [the province] where it was not feared they would enter, they have conquered it before the enemy has had time to succor it. [198] For your enemy, not being certain whether you are going to go back to the place first threatened by you, is constrained not to abandon one place and help the other. Thus, he often defends neither the one nor the other.108 [199] Besides the things said, if sedition or discord arises among his soldiers, it is important for a captain to know how to extinguish them with art. [200] The best mode is to punish the heads of the errors. But do it so that you oppress them before they have been able to notice it. [201] The mode is: if they are distant from you, do not call only the guilty, but all the others together with them, so that, not believing that it is for the cause of punishing them, they do not become contumacious but make it convenient to punishment [them]. [202] When they are present, one must make oneself strong with those who are not culpable and, by means of their help, punish them. [203] When there is discord among them, the best mode is to put them in danger; this fear alone always makes them be united.109[204] But that which above every other thing keeps the army united is the reputation of the captain, which arises through his virtue alone. For neither blood nor authority ever gave it without virtue.110 [205] And the first thing that a captain is expected to do is to keep his soldiers punished and paid. For whenever he lacks payment, he must lack punishment. For you cannot punish a soldier who robs if you do not pay him or who, wanting to live, cannot abstain from robbing. [206] But if you pay him and do not punish him, he becomes insolent in every mode. For you become of small esteem. Whoever arrives there cannot maintain the dignity of his rank, and by not maintaining it, tumult and discord, which are the ruin of an army, follow of necessity. [207] The ancient captains had a vexation111from which present ones are almost free. It was that of interpreting sinister auguries to their purpose. For if a bolt [of lighting] fell upon an army, if the sun or the moon was eclipsed, if an earthquake came, if the captain, either mounting or dismounting his horse, fell, it was interpreted by the soldiers in a sinister way, and generated in them so much fear that if they came to battle, they would easily lose it. [208] Therefore, as soon as a similar accident arose, the ancient captains either showed the cause of it and reduced it to a natural cause, or interpreted it to their purpose. [209] Caesar, falling in Africa while leaving a ship, said: “Africa I have taken you.”112 [210] And many have given the cause of an eclipse of the moon, and of earthquakes. These things in our times cannot happen, both through there not being so much superstition in our men, and because our religion completely removes such opinions from itself. [211] However, when they should occur, one must imitate the orders of the ancients. [212] When either hunger or other natural necessity or human passion has led your enemy to ultimate desperation and, chased by that, he comes to fight with you, you must stay inside your encampments and as much as is in your power flee the fight. [213] The Lacedaemonians did so against the Messenians; Caesar did so against Afranius and Petreius.113 [214] While he was consul against the Cimbri, for many continuous days Fulvius had his cavalry assault the enemies. And he considered how they left their encampments so as to follow them. Thus, he put an ambush behind the encampments of the Cimbri and, having had the cavalry assault them, and the Cimbri leaving their encampments so as to follow them, Fulvius occupied them and sacked them.114 [215] It has been of great utility to a certain115 captain, while near the enemy army, to send his own troops with the enemy insignia to rob and burn their very own country. Hence the enemies have believed that they were troops coming to help them, and they too have run to help them get spoils. By this they have disordered themselves and given their adversary ease in beating them. [216] Alexander of Epirus used this means while fighting against the Illyrians, and Leptine the Syracusan [did so] against the Carthaginians.116 For both the one and the other, the plan easily succeeded. [217] By simulating being afraid and leaving their own encampments full of wine and herds, many have beaten the enemy by making it easy for him to eat and drink to excess.117 As he was filled with these beyond any natural use, they have assaulted him and, to his own harm, beaten him. [218] Tamirus did so against Cyrus,118 and Tiberius Gracchus against the Spaniards.119 [219] Some have poisoned the wine and the other things for eating so as to be able to beat him more easily.120 [220] I said a little while ago121 that I did not find that the ancients kept night sentinels outside, and I reckoned that they did this so as to shun the evils that could arise from it. For one finds that even the lookouts122that they post in the day to be on the look out for the enemy, have been the causes of the ruin of those who post them. For having been taken, many times it happens that by force they have been made to make the signal with which they had to call their own troops. Upon coming to the call,123they have been killed or taken.124[221] To deceive the enemy, sometimes it is well to vary one of your habits. By founding himself upon it, he is ruined. One captain once did this. At the coming of the enemy, he customarily had his own [troops] make a sign with fire at night, with smoke by day. He commanded that without any intermission smoke and fire be made, and then that it be stopped as the enemy came up. Believing he was coming without being seen, since he did not see signs made of [his] being discovered, he made victory easier for his adversary by going forth disordered.125 [222] Memnon of Rhodes, wanting to draw the enemy army out of his strongholds, sent out one individual under the color of a fugitive who asserted that his own army was in discord and that the greater part of it was departing. So as to lend faith to this thing, he had certain tumults among the encampments made as proof. Hence, the enemy, thinking himself able to break him, was broken when he assaulted him.126 [223] One ought, besides the things said, to have regard for not leading the enemy to ultimate desperation. Caesar had regard for this while fighting with the Germans. He opened the way for them, seeing that since they were not able to flee, necessity made them hardy. He wanted the trouble of following them when they were fleeing rather than the danger of conquering them when they were defending themselves.127 [224] Seeing some cavalrymen from Macedonia that were with him going to the side of the enemy, Lucullus immediately made the signal128 for battle and commanded that the other men follow him. Hence, the enemies, believing that Lucullus wanted to join battle, went to charge the Macedonians with such impetus that they were constrained to defend themselves.129 And thus from fugitives they became combatants against their will. [225] It is also important to know how to make sure of a town when you doubt its faith, once you have conquered it in battle, or before. Some ancient examples will teach you this. [226] Doubting the Catinensians, Pompey begged them to be content to accept some of the sick that he had in his army. Having sent very robust men disguised as130 sick [men], he occupied the town.131 [227] Fearing the faith of the Epidaunians, Publius Valerius had, as we would say, an indulgence come to a church outside of the town. When all the people had gone for the indulgence, he closed the gate and then received inside none except those whom he trusted.132 [228] Wanting to go to Asia and to make sure of Thrace, Alexander the Great brought with him all the princes of that province and gave them provisions. Over the people of Thrace he put vile men. Thus, he made the princes content by paying them, and the people quiet by not having heads that would disquiet them.133 [229] But among all the things with which captains gain peoples to themselves, are examples of chastity and of justice, like that of Scipio in Spain when he gave that young girl of very beautiful body to her father and her husband. This did more for him than arms to gain Spain.134 [230] By having payment made for the wood he had used to make the palisade around his army in France, Caesar gained for himself such a name for justice that he made the acquisition of that province easy.135 [231] I don’t know what else remains for me to say about these accidents. Nor does there remain any part about this material that has not been disputed by us. [232] There is only the need136 to speak of the mode of besieging and defending towns. I will gladly do so, if you really don’t mind. 76. Lit.: that which seems [good] to it. 77. See AWVI 23–25. 78. Lit.: just. 79. That is, less than four thousand or more than six thousand. 80. Cf. Polybius VI 32. 81. The attacks of the “French” on Rome culminated in their defeat at Telamon in 225 b.c. They were entirely repelled by 222 b.c.; see Polybius II 22 ff. 82. See Aristotle, Politics 1327b20–38; cf. AWI 121–23, II 81. 83. Source unknown. 84. Lit.: requiem. 85. Parentheses in original. 86. Lit.: [have a] presentiment. 87. Lit.: doubt, throughout this sentence. 88. See AWVI 110 and note 47. 89. In 79 b.c., Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius was made proconsul in Spain, where he fought Sertorius from 79–72 b.c.; see Frontinus I 1.12. 90. Marcus Lucinius Crassus (115–53 b.c.); see Frontinus I 1.13; cf. Plutarch, Demetrius 28. 91. See Frontinus I 2.1, where Scipio Africanus is said to have used this means in 203 b.c. against Syphax, king of the Maesulii; cf. Livy XXX 4. 92. See Frontinus I 2.3, where it is said that the Carthaginians, afraid that Alexander the Great would invade Africa, pretended to send Hamilcar Rhodinus into exile in 331 b.c. so as to learn Alexander’s plans; cf. Xenophon, Education of CyrusVI 1. 93. See Frontinus I 2.5, where Marcus Cato (the Elder) is said to have staged an attack while in Spain in order to seize a prisoner who was then tortured for secret information. 94. In 104 b.c.; see Frontinus I 2.6, where the war is said also to have been against the Teutons and the faith of the Ligurians also to have been tested. 95. See Frontinus I 3.8, where Scipio is said to have sent troops to Africa so as to force Hannibal to leave Italy (204 b.c.); cf. Livy XXVIII 40 ff. 96. Sulla in 90 b.c. during the civil wars and two years earlier in Cappadoccia against Archelaus, a general of Mithridates; Hasdrubal in 211 b.c. in Spain against Claudius Nero; see Frontinus I 5.17–19. 97. Lit.: suspended. 98. In 217 b.c.; see Frontinus I 5.28; cf. Livy XXII 16, 17; Polybius III 93, 94; D III 40.1. 99. In 217 b.c.; see Frontinus I 8.2; cf. Livy XXII 23. 100. In 491 b.c.; see Frontinus I 8.1; cf. Livy II 39; D I 7.1. 101. In 108 b.c.; see Frontinus I 8.8; cf. Sallust, Jugurthine War 61, 62, 70–72. 102. In 191 b.c., Antiochus III of Syria; see Frontinus I 8.7; cf. Livy XXXV 13. 103. During the fifth consulship of Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus (295 b.c.), these peoples allied against Rome; Frontinus I 8.3; cf. Livy X 27. 104. Lit.: respect to. 105. Lit.: gave voice. 106. Lit.: kept the mode. 107. While Titus was in Spain (98–93 b.c.). 108. Cf.AWVII97. 109. See Frontinus I 9. 110. Cf. DI58.1,58.4,60;AWIV137. 111. Molestia, translated as “molestation” at AW V 158. 112. See Suetonius, Julius Caesar 59, where Caesar is also said to have mocked the prophesy that the Scipios would always be successful in Africa; cf. Frontinus I 12.1, where the same story is told of Scipio Africanus, who says, “Congratulate me, soldiers! I have hit Africa hard;” see also Frontinus I 12.2, where Caesar, who slips while embarking, says, “I seize you, Mother Earth.” 113. The Spartans fought the Messenians sometime after 650 b.c.; see Frontinus II 1.10. In 49 b.c., during the civil wars, Caesar starved into submission forces led by Marcus Petreius and Lucius Afranius, Pompey’s lieutenants in Spain from 55–49 b.c.; see Frontinus II 1.11; cf. Caesar, Civil WarI 81–82. 114. In 181 b.c., Quintus Fulvius Flaccus fought in Spain against the Celtiberi rather than the Cimbri; see Frontinus II 5.8; Livy XL 30–32. 115. Lit.: some. 116. Alexander II, king of Epirus (336–326 b.c.); Leptine, brother of Dionysius I (405–367 b.c.), tyrant of Syracuse; see Frontinus II 5.10–11. 117. Lit.: outside of mode. 118. Herodotus I 211 and Justin I 8 assert that Cyrus used this stratagem against forces lead by Spargapises, son of Tomyris, queen of the Massagetae; cf. Polyaenus VIII 28. 119. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus in Spain in 179 b.c.; see Frontinus II 5.14. 120. See Frontinus II 5.12. 121. See AWVI 99–101. 122. Or: veils. 123. Lit.: sign. 124. Cf. Frontinus II 5.15. 125. See Frontinus II 5.16, where this stratagem is attributed to the Arabs. 126. See Frontinus II 5.18; cf. Polyaenus V 44.2. 127. Caesar invaded Germany in 55 b.c.; see Frontinus II 6.3, cf. IV 7.16; see also Vegetius III 21. 128. Lit.: sound. 129. Lucius Lucullus between 74–66 b.c.; see Frontinus II 7.8. BATISTA. [233] Your humanity is so much that it has us follow our desires without being afraid of being held presumptuous, since you freely offer us what we would be ashamed to ask of you. [234] Therefore, we say only this to you: you cannot do us a greater or more pleasant benefit, than to finish this reasoning. [235] But before you pass to that other matter, resolve one doubt for us: whether it is better to continue a war even in winter, as is done today, or to make it only in summer, and to go to quarters in the winter, like the ancients. 130. Lit.: under the dress. 131. Between 76 and 72 b.c.; see Frontinus II 11.2. 132. Cf. Frontinus II 11.1, where Publius Valerius is said to have closed the gates behind the Epidaurians—not the Epidaunians (Epidauni) as Fabrizio would have it—as they went to see an athletic contest he had prepared outside the city, refusing to allow their return until he had taken hostages from among their most important men. 133. In 334 b.c.; see Frontinus II 11.3. 134. See Frontinus II 11.5, where Scipio is said to have returned the girl to her betrothed, Alicius, along with the gold that her parents had given as a ransom; cf. Livy XXVI 49–50; see also D III 20, 34.3. 135. Frontinus II 11.7, where Caesar Augustus Germanicus (i.e., the Emperor Domitian [81– 96] ) is said to have won the faith of all through the fame of his justice gained by his compensation of the Cubii for the crops he had included within his fortifications during the conquest of the Germans (83 a.d.). 136. Lit.: lack. FABRIZIO. [236] Behold; if it were not for the prudence of the questioner, a part that merits consideration would have remained behind. [237] I tell you anew that the ancients did everything better and with greater prudence than we. And if in other things some errors are made, in the things of war all are made. [238] There is nothing more imprudent or more dangerous to a captain than to make war in winter, and he who makes it bears much more danger than he who waits for it.137[239] The reason is this: all the industry that is used in military discipline is used so as to be ordered to do battle with your enemy. For this is the end to which a captain must proceed, because the battle gives you the war, won and lost. [240] Thus, whoever knows how to order it better, whoever has the better disciplined army, has more advantage in [battle] and can hope more to win it. [241] On the other side, nothing is more inimical to orders than are harsh sites or cold and wet weather. For a harsh site does not allow you to extend yourself fully according to discipline, cold and wet weather do not let you keep the troops together, nor can you present yourself to the enemy united. Rather, you must of necessity lodge disunited and without order since you have to obey the castles, neighborhoods, and villages that receive you, so that138 all the trouble used by you so as to discipline your army is in vain. [242] And do not marvel if today they make war in the winter. For since the armies are without discipline, they do not recognize the harm that not lodging united does them. For it does not bother them not to be able to keep those orders and observe that discipline they do not have. [243] Therefore, they ought to see how campaigning in the winter has been the cause of many harms, and to remember how the French, in the year 1503, were beaten at Garigliano by the winter and not by the Spanish.139 [244] For as I have told you,140 whoever assaults has even more disadvantage. For the bad weather hurts him more, since the others are at home and he wants to make war. Hence he is necessitated either to sustain the inconvenience of the wet141 and the cold so as to stay together, or to divide his troops so as to flee it. [245] But he who waits can select the place in his own mode and await him with his own fresh troops. These can at once unite and go to find a band of the enemy troops, which cannot resist their thrust. [246] The French were beaten thus, and so those will always be beaten who in winter assault an enemy who has prudence in him. [247] So whoever does not in any part want to make use of forces, orders, discipline, and virtue, makes war on campaign in the winter. [248] And because the Romans wanted to make use of all those things into which they put so much industry, they fled the winter no less than harsh alps and difficult places and any other thing that impeded them from being able to show their art and virtue. [249] So this is enough for your question, and we come to treating the defense and attack of towns, and sites and their construction. 137. Cf. P 12.53, where the unwillingness of condottieri to campaign in winter is listed as one of their many faults. 138. Lit.: in the manner. 139. On December 28, 1503, Gonzalo de Cordoba surprised and beat the French who had dispersed their numerically superior forces throughout the surrounding towns and castles to seek shelter from the winter weather. This victory was quickly followed by the capitulation of the French at Gaeta and Spanish control of southern Italy; cf. Ritratto di cose di Francia, in Tutte le opera, ed. Mario Martelli (Firenze: Sansoni, 1992), 57. 140. Presumably at AW VI 238. 141. Lit.: water.