# BOOK ONE OF THE ART OF WAR

BOOK ONE OF THE ART OF WAR



by Niccolò Machiavegli, Florentine Citizen and Secretary, to Lorenzo di Filippo Strozzi, Florentine Patrician1



[1] Because I believe that one can praise any man without reproach after his death, since every cause and suspicion of adulation have passed away, I will not hesitate to praise our Cosimo Rucellai,2whose name will never be recalled by me without tears, since I knew in him those things that can be desired by friends in a good friend and by his fatherland in a citizen. [2] For I do not know what was so much his (not even excepting his soul)3 that it would not have been willingly spent by him for his friends; I do not know of any undertaking that would have frightened him wherein he had recognized the good of his fatherland. [3] And I confess freely that I have not found among the many men I have known and dealt with, a man in whom there was a spirit more on fire for great and magnificent things. [4] Nor in his death did he complain to his friends of anything else but of being born to die young in his own houses and unhonored without having been able, as accorded with his spirit, to help anyone. For he knew that nothing else could be said of him except that a good friend had died. [5] It does not stand because of this, however, that we, and anyone else who knew him as we did, cannot vouch for his praiseworthy qualities because his works did not appear. [6] It is true that fortune was not, however, so much an enemy to him that he did not leave any brief record of the dexterity of his talent, as some of his writings and compositions of love verses show. In these, although he had not been in love, he used to train himself in his youthful age so as not to consume his time in vain, until fortune had conducted him to higher thoughts. Therein one can clearly understand with how much felicity he would have described his concepts and how much he would have been honored in poetry if it had been practiced by him as his ultimate purpose. [7] Since, therefore, fortune has deprived us of the use of one [who was] so much a friend, it appears to me that one cannot make other remedies—the best that are possible for us to seek—than to enjoy his memory and repeat anything that may have been subtly said or wisely disputed by him. [8] And because nothing regarding him is more fresh than the discussion that Lord Fabrizio Colonna4 had with him in his gardens5 in recent times (where the things of war were disputed at length by that lord, both subtly and prudently questioned in good part by Cosimo), and having been present with some other friends of ours, it seemed [well] to me to recall it to memory so that by reading it the friends of Cosimo who convened there may refresh the memory of his virtue in their spirit, and others may, on the one hand, complain about not having been there and, on the other hand, learn many things useful not only for military but also civil life, wisely disputed by a very knowledgeable man.



1. For explanations of names and titles used in the title of book I, see AWpr., notes 1–3.

2. Cosimo Rucellai (1494–1519), a dedicatee of the Discourses on Livy, hosted a circle of prominent Florentines with literary and political interests frequented by Machiavelli and the young interlocutors of the Art of War (see note 8). The circle met on the same site and had some of the same participants as that begun by his grandfather, Bernardo Rucellai (see note 5).

3. Machiavelli’s parentheses.





[9] I say, therefore, that while returning from Lombardy, where he had soldiered for a long time for the Catholic King6 to his own great glory, Fabrizio Colonna decided as he passed through Florence to stay in that city for some days so as to visit His Excellency the Duke7 and to see again some gentlemen with whom he had had some acquaintance in the past. [10] Hence it seemed [well] to Cosimo to invite him to a banquet in his gardens, not so much to use his liberality as to have cause to speak with him at length, and to understand and learn various things from him in accordance with what one can hope for from such a man, since it appeared to him to be an opportunity to spend a day discussing those matters that satisfied his spirit. [11] So according to his wish, Fabrizio came and was received by Cosimo together with some other of his trusted friends, among whom were Zanobi Buondelmonti, Batista della Palla, and Luigi Alamanni,8 all youths loved by him and very ardent for the same studies, whose good qualities we will omit because every day and every hour they are their own praise. [12] Therefore, according to the times and the place, Fabrizio was honored by all of them with the greatest honors possible. But convivial pleasures passed, the tables cleared, and every order of celebration concluded—which are concluded promptly in the presence of great men who have turned their minds to honorable thoughts—since the days were long9 and the heat great, Cosimo, so as better to satisfy his desire, judged that it would be well to go to the most secret and shady part of his garden, using the opportunity of fleeing the heat. [13] Having arrived there and taken seats, some on the grass, which is very fresh in that place, and some on the benches ordered in those parts under the shade of very tall trees, Fabrizio praised the place as delightful. And considering the trees individually10 and not recognizing some of them, he stopped, his spirit uncertain.11 [14] Having discerned this, Cosimo said: “You perhaps do not have knowledge of some of these trees. But do not marvel at this, for some of these are more celebrated by the ancients than by the common usage today.” [15] And [Cosimo] having told him their names and how his grandfather Bernardo had exerted himself so much in cultivating them, Fabrizio replied: “I was thinking that what you say might be so; and this place and this study12 were making me remember some princes of the Kingdom13 who delight in these ancient growths and shades.” [16] And at this, having stopped speaking and been for a while in reflection as if uncertain, he added: “If I did not believe I would offend, I would state my opinion; but I do not believe I would, since I am speaking with friends so as to dispute things and not to calumniate them.14[17] How much better they would have done, may it be said with everyone’s leave,15 to seek to be like the ancients in the strong and harsh things, not in the delicate and soft ones, and in those that they did under the sun, not in the shade, and to take up the modes of the true and perfect antiquity, not the false and corrupt one. For after these studies pleased my Romans, my fatherland went to ruin.” [18] To which Cosimo responded . . . But so as to avoid the trouble of having to repeat many times “this one said” and “the other one added,” only the names of the speakers will be noted, without recounting anything else. [19] Thus said



4. Fabrizio Colonna (1450–1520), a prominent mercenary captain, fought in the Italian Wars first for the French against Italian, papal, and Aragonese forces, and then for the papacy and the Spanish against the French. He had major roles in Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy (1494) and at such battles as Cerignola (1503) and Ravenna (1512), where as cavalry commander on the Spanish side he was subjected to the first decidedly successful deployment of field artillery. In 1515 he became constable of the kingdom of Naples, in the northern region of which he had his estate at Tagliacozza. Several times between 1504 and 1505, Piero Soderini (1452–1522), leader of the Florentine republic and Machiavelli’s political patron, championed hiring Fabrizio to lead Florence in its costly war to retake Pisa. Soderini’s efforts to hire Fabrizio were unsuccessful in part because Fabrizio was then in the hire of Spain, the chief adversary of Florence’s traditional ally, France.

5. The Orti Oricellari (the Rucellai family’s gardens) were the meeting place of a literary circle of prominent intellectuals and politicians founded by Cosimo Rucellai’s grandfather, Bernardo Rucellai (1448–1514), who was married to Nannina de’ Medici (cf. FH VII 5), granddaughter of the great Medici ruler of Florence, Cosimo de’ Medici (1389–1464). Bernardo was a proponent of an aristocratic or oligarchic republic and a bitter enemy of Piero Soderini and of what Bernardo took to be Soderini’s excessively democratic republic. Bernardo withdrew into his literary circle and then into exile during Florence’s republican years (1494–1512), returning to politics under the restored Medici only briefly before his death.

6. Ferdinand the Catholic (1452–1516), II king of Sicily, II of Aragon, III of Naples, and V of Castile. Ferdinand died some eight months before the supposed date of the setting of the dialogue (September 1516) and was succeeded by Charles I of Spain (1500–58), who in 1519 became Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire.





7. Lorenzo di Piero di Lorenzo de’ Medici (1492–1519), the dedicatee of The Prince, was made duke of Urbino in August 1516 by his uncle, Giovanni de’ Medici (1475–1521), who had become Pope Leo X in 1513. Only by dint of heavy taxation (which earned him the resentment of many Florentines) was Lorenzo able to hold the duchy of Urbino against the attempts of his predecessor, Francesco Maria della Rovere, to retake it by force. Lorenzo had succeeded his uncle, Giuliano de’ Medici, as the effective ruler of Florence in 1513 (while maintaining the pretense that Florence was still a republic) and had been named (contrary to the Florentine custom of naming only foreigners) captain general of Florence in 1515 and then captain general of the Church.

8. Zanobi Buondelmonti (1491–1527), a dedicatee of Machiavelli’s The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca and, along with Cosimo Rucellai, of his Discourses on Livy; Batista della Palla (d. 1530); Luigi (Ludovico di Piero) Alamanni (1495–1556), the other dedicatee of The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca. In 1522, a year after the publication of the Art of War, all three men went into exile because of their involvement in a conspiracy with members of the Soderini family to topple the rule of Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici.

9. Lit.: day was long, i.e., it was summertime.

10. Lit.: particularly. 11. Lit.: suspended, here and in AWI 16.





COSIMO. [20] You have opened the way to a discussion such as I was desiring, and I beg you to speak without respect, because I will question you without respect. If while questioning and replying I excuse or accuse someone, it will not be for the sake of excusing or accusing,16 but for understanding from you the truth.

FABRIZIO. [21] And I will be very content to tell you what I understand of all that you will ask me; whether it will be true or not, I will refer to your judgment. [22] And I will be grateful for your questioning of me, because I am going to learn as much from your questioning me as you from me in responding to you. For many times a wise questioner makes one consider many things and recognize many others that one would never have recognized without having been asked.

COSIMO. [23] I want to return to what you said before: that my grandfather and those [princes] of yours17 would have acted more wisely by being like the ancients in harsh rather than in delicate things. I want to excuse my family18 because the other I will leave to you to excuse. [24] I do not believe there was, in his times, a man who detested the soft life as much as he, and who was so much a lover of that harshness of life that you praise. Nonetheless, he recognized that he was not able to make use of it personally or with his own children,19 since he had been born in an era of so much corruption, wherein one who wanted to part from the common usage would be defamed and vilified by everyone. [25] Because if in the summer, under the highest sun, an individual were to roll around naked on the sand, or on the snow in the winter in the frostiest months, as Diogenes20 used to do, he would be held to be crazy. [26] If, like the Spartans, an individual were to raise his children in the country, make them sleep in the open, go with head and feet naked, and wash in cold water so as to harden them to be able to withstand evil and so as to make them love life less and fear death less, he would be jeered and held to be a beast rather than a man. [27] If one were also seen to eat vegetables and to despise gold, like Fabricius,21 he would be praised by few and followed by no one. [28] So, frightened by these present modes of living, he left behind the ancients, and in that which he could with less amazement imitate antiquity, he did so.



12. In addition to its academic sense (as in “humanist studies” [studio humanitatis] ), studio had the more general sense of prolonged attention, care, or cultivation.

13. “The Kingdom” customarily referred to that of Naples (cf. FHI 20).

14. “Them” refers to “things.”

15. Lit.: with peace to all.

16. See D I 7–8 on accusation and excuse.

17. “Those [princes] of yours” seems to refer to the “princes of the Kingdom” mentioned in sentence 15.





FABRIZIO. [29] You have vigorously excused him in this regard, and certainly you speak the truth. But I was not speaking so much of those hard modes of living, as of other more humane modes and those that have more conformity with life today, which I do not believe would have been difficult to introduce for one who is numbered among the princes of a city. [30] I will never depart from my Romans as the example for anything. [31] If one were to consider their life and the order of that republic, one would see in it many things not impossible to introduce into a city22 where there was still something good.

COSIMO. [32] What are these things, similar to the ancient ones, that you would like to introduce?

FABRIZIO. [33] To honor and reward the virtues, not to despise poverty, to esteem the modes and orders of military discipline, to constrain the citizens to love one another, to live without sects, to esteem the private less than the public, and other similar things that could easily accompany our times. [34] These modes are not difficult to persuade [men of] when one thinks about them much and they are entered into by due degrees. For in them truth appears so much that every common talent can be capable of it. Whoever orders that thing plants trees under the shade of which one resides more happy and more glad than under this.



18. Lit.: my part.

19. Lit.: in his own person or in those of his children.

20. Diogenes the Cynic (ca. 400–325 b.c.). See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VI 2 23.

21. Gaius Luscinus Fabricius (“Fabrizio” in Italian), twice consul of the Roman republic (282, 278 b.c.) and famous for incorruptible moral rectitude. See D III 1.3, 20.

22. Lit.: civilization.





COSIMO. [35] I do not want to make any reply to what you have said; rather, I wish to allow the judgment of it to be given to these,23 who can easily judge it. And thinking by this path to be more easily satisfied in my intention, I will turn24 my speech to you, the accuser of those who are not imitators of the ancients in grave and great actions. [36] I would therefore like to know from you whence it arises that, on the one hand, you condemn those who are not like the ancients in their actions, and on the other, in war, which is your art and in which you are judged [to be] excellent, one does not see that you have used any ancient means or [ones] that bear any likeness to them.

FABRIZIO. [37] You have turned up exactly where I was expecting you, for my speech merited no other question, nor did I desire another. [38] And although I might save myself with an easy excuse, nonetheless, since the season allows it, I want to enter into a longer discussion for my and your greater satisfaction. [39] Men who want to do something must first prepare themselves with every industriousness to be set to satisfy that which they have set themselves to do when the opportunity comes. [40] And because when the preparations are made cautiously they are not recognized, one cannot accuse anyone of any negligence if it is not discovered before the opportunity. But after that, by his not taking action, one sees either that he did not prepare well enough or that he has not thought in any way of this. [41] And because no opportunity has come to me to make it possible to show the preparations made by me so as to be able to bring back the military to its ancient orders, if I have not brought it back, I cannot be blamed for it by you or others. [42] I believe that this excuse should be enough as a response to your accusation.

COSIMO. [43] It would be enough if I were certain that the opportunity had not come.

FABRIZIO. [44] But because I know that you can doubt whether or not this opportunity has come, I want to discourse at length, if you want to listen to me with patience, on what preparations are necessary to make before, what opportunity must arise, what difficulty impedes so that preparations do not help and so that the opportunity does not come, and how this thing is, though the terms seem contrary, at once25 very difficult and very easy to do.



23. It is no clearer in Italian to whom “these” refers.

24. Or: vulgarize, i.e., speak in a common manner or speak in Italian rather than Latin.

25. Lit.: at a stroke.





COSIMO. [45] You cannot, both for me and for these others, do anything more welcome than this. And if speaking will not be tiresome to you, listening will never be tiresome to us. [46] And because this discussion must be long, with your permission I want help from these friends of mine. And they and I beg one thing of you, that you not be annoyed if sometimes we interrupt you with some importunate question.

FABRIZIO. [47] I am very content, Cosimo, that you with these other youths here should question me. For I believe that youth makes you more friendly to military things and more ready to believe what will be said by me. [48] By already having white heads and ice in their veins,26 some of these others27 are accustomed to being enemies of war; some [are] incorrigible, like those who believe that the times and not wicked modes constrain men to live thus. [49] So all of you, question me securely and without respect. I desire this both because it would be a little rest for me and because I will be pleased not to leave any doubt in your minds. [50] I want to begin from your words, where you said that in war, which is my art, I had not used any ancient means.28 [51] About this I say that as this is an art by means of which men cannot live honestly in every time, it cannot be used as an art except by a republic or a kingdom. And the one and the other of these, when it was well ordered, never consented to anyof its citizens or subjects using it as an art, nor did any good man ever practice it as his particular art. [52] Because he will never be judged good who engages in a career in which, by wanting to draw utility from it in every time, he must be rapacious, fraudulent, violent, and have many qualities that of necessity make him not good. Nor can the men who use it as an art, the great as well as the small, be made otherwise, because this art does not nourish them in peace. Hence they are necessitated either to plan that there not be peace or to succeed so much in times of war that they can nourish themselves in peace. [53] And neither one of these two thoughts dwells in a good man. For from wanting to be able to nourish oneself in every time arise the robberies, the acts of violence, and the assassinations that such soldiers do to friends as well as to enemies. And from not wanting peace come the deceptions that the captains use on those who hire them so that war may last. If peace does indeed come, often it happens that the heads, being deprived of their stipends and living, set up a flag of fortune29 without restraint30 and pillage a province without any mercy. [54] And do you not have in the memory of your things how, when many soldiers found themselves in Italy without pay because the wars were finished, several groups, which were called Companies, gathered together and went about levying tribute on the towns and pillaging the country without one being able to make any remedy for it?31 [55] Have you not read that the Carthaginian soldiers, having finished the first war with the Romans, made (under Matho and Spendius, the two they made their heads in a mutiny)32 a war against the Carthaginians [that was] more dangerous than the one they had finished with the Romans?33[56] In the times of our fathers, Francesco Sforza, so as to be able to live honorably in times of peace, not only deceived the Milanese, whose soldier he was, but took away their liberty and became their prince.34 [57] Similar to these have been all the other soldiers of Italy who have used the military as their particular art; and if they have not become dukes of Milan by means of their malefactions, so much more do they merit being blamed, because, if one were to see their lives, they all have the same faults35 without so much utility. [58] Sforza, father of Francesco, having abandoned Queen Giovanna all of a sudden and left her unarmed in the middle of her enemies, constrained her to jump into the arms of the king of Aragon, only so as to vent his ambition either to levy a tribute against her or to take her kingdom.36 [59] With the same devices Braccio sought to occupy the kingdom of Naples and, if he had not been routed and killed at Aquila,37 would have succeeded. [60] Similar disorders arise from nothing other than there having been men who used the career of the soldier as their own art. [61] Do you not have a proverb that fortifies my reasons: “War makes thieves, and peace hangs them”? [62] For those who do not know how to live from another career and do not find someone to support them and do not have so much virtue that they know how to gather together to make an honorable wickedness,38 are forced by necessity to take to the road,39 and justice is forced to snuff them out.



26. Lit.: being filled with frozen blood.

27. Referent unclear.

28. See AW I 36.

29. Ventura, not fortuna.

30. Lit.: licentiously.





31. The Great Company, composed of nearly ten thousand men of many nationalities who had fought in the crusades or for the German emperor, marauded throughout Italy from 1338 to 1354. The White Company was formed in 1361 from soldiers of many nationalities who had been fighting in the Hundred Years War (1337–1453) by John Hawkwood (d. 1394), the English mercenary captain who was in the service of Florence from 1377 to 1393. The first Italian mercenary band was the “Company of St. George,” formed by Alberigo da Barbiano, count of Conio (d. 1409). From Alberigo stem the condottieri who predominated in Italian warfare throughout the fifteenth century. See P 12.52–53; FH I 34; see also FH I 39, IV 6, V 2.

32. Lit.: their heads in a tumult. Regarding “tumults,” see D I 4–5.

33. The First Punic War, between Rome and Carthage, ended in 241 b.c.; the subsequent mutiny or “tumult,” led by the Lybians Matho and Spendius, and the ensuing Mercenary War (241–237 b.c.) are recounted in Polybius I 65–88. See also P 12.50; D III 32.

34. Francesco Sforza (1401–1466) seized Milan in 1450. See FHVI 18–22; P7.26, 12.50; see also P 14.58, 20.87;DII24.2.

35. Or: burdens.

36. Muzio Attendolo Sforza (1369–1424); Giovanna II, queen of Naples (1414–35); Alfonso V, king of Aragon (1416–58). See P 12.50; FHI 33, 38, 39, IV 7.

37. Andrea Fortebracci (1368–1424), known as Braccio da Montone, was killed by Francesco Sforza in 1424 at the town of Aquila in the Abruzzo region of Italy. See FHI 38.





COSIMO. [63] To me, you have made this soldier’s art be worth almost nothing, and I had presupposed it the most excellent and most honorable that one could do; so if you do not explain it to me better, I remain dissatisfied. For if it is as you say, I do not know from where arises the glory of Caesar, Pompey, Scipio, Marcellus,40 and so many Roman captains who are by fame celebrated as gods.

FABRIZIO. [64] I have not yet finished disputing all that I proposed, which was two things: the one, that a good man could not exercise this career41 as his art; the other, that a well-ordered republic or kingdom never allowed its subjects or its citizens to use it as an art. [65] About the first I have spoken as much as has occurred to me; it remains for me to speak of the second, where I will come to responding to this last question of yours. And I say that Pompey and Caesar, and almost all those captains who were in Rome after the last Carthaginian war,42 acquired fame as able, not as good, men; those who had lived before them acquired glory as able and good. [66] This arose because these men did not take the practice of war as their art, and those that I named first used it as their art. [67] And while that republic lived immaculately, never did any great citizen presume by means of such a practice to take advantage of the peace by breaking the laws, despoiling the provinces, usurping and tyrannizing the fatherland and taking advantage in every mode. Nor did anyone of obscure fortune think of violating the oath,43 adhering to private men, not fearing the Senate, or pursuing any tyrannical insult so as to be able to live by the art of war in every time. [68] But those who were captains, contented with their triumph, used to return to private life with desire; and those who were members used to lay down their arms with a greater will than they picked them up. And everyone used to return to the art by means of which he had ordered his life;44 nor was there ever anyone who hoped to be able to nourish himself with spoils and with this art.45 [69] About this one can make an evident conjecture regarding the great citizens by means of Regulus Attilius, who, being captain of the Roman armies in Africa and having almost conquered the Carthaginians, asked the Senate for permission to return to his house to take care of his farms, which were being spoilt by his workers.46 [70] From which it is clearer than the sun that if he had used war as his art and by means of it had thought to make use of it [for profit], he, having so many provinces as prey, would not have asked permission to return to care for his fields, for each day he would have acquired much more than the price of all of them. [71] But because these good men who do not use war as their art do not want to draw from it anything but toil, dangers, and glory, when they are sufficiently glorious they desire to return home and live from their art. [72] How much it is true of the base men and the common soldiers that they kept the same orders appears [from the facts] that each willingly withdrew from such a practice, and when he was not in the military he wanted not to be in the military,47 and when he was in the military he would have wanted to be discharged.48 [73] This agrees with many modes, especially seeing how among the first privileges that the Roman people gave to one of its citizens was that he would not be constrained to soldier against his will. [74] Therefore while Rome was well ordered (which was until the Gracchi),49 it did not have any soldier who took this practice as an art; yet it had a few wicked ones and these were severely punished. [75] So a well-ordered city ought to want this study of war to be used in times of peace for training and in times of war for necessity and for glory, and the public alone left to use it as an art, as Rome did. [76] And any citizen who has another end in such a practice is not good; and any city governed otherwise is not well ordered.



38. Cf. the discussion of “honorably wicked men” in D I 27.

39. That is, become bandits.

40. Julius Caesar (100–44 b.c.); Pompey (106–48 b.c.); Scipio Africanus (236–182 b.c.); Marcus Claudius Marcellus (270–208 b.c.).

41. Lit.: exercise this exercise.

42. Third Punic War (149–146 b.c.).

43. See AW II 134–35 on the military oath.

44. That is, to his civilian occupation.

45. The art of war.





COSIMO. [77] I remain very content and satisfied by what you have said up to now, and this conclusion you have made is very pleasing to me. And as far as a republic is concerned, I believe that it is true. But as to kings, I do not yet know. For I would believe that a king would want to have around him whoever particularly takes such a practice for his art.

FABRIZIO. [78] So much more ought a well-ordered kingdom to flee similar artifices, for these alone are the corruption of its king and are altogether the ministers of tyranny. [79] And do not allege to me any present kingdom to the contrary, because I will deny that these are well-ordered kingdoms. [80] For the kingdoms that have good orders do not give absolute rule to their kings except in the armies; for in this place alone is a sudden decision necessary, and because of this there is only one power. [81] In other things he cannot do anything without counsel; and those who give him counsel have to fear that he may have someone near who in times of peace desires war because he cannot live without it. [82] But I want to stay a little longer on this, not to seek out a kingdom altogether good, but one similar to those that exist today, where those who take war for their art must be feared even by the king because the sinew of armies without any doubt is the infantry. [83] So if a king does not order himself so that his infantrymen may be content in time of peace to return home and to live from their arts, of necessity he must come to ruin, for a more dangerous infantry is not found than that which is composed of those who make war as their art. For you50 are forced either to make war always or to pay them always or to bear the danger that they may take the kingdom from you. [84] To make war always is not possible and to pay them always one cannot do; thus of necessity one incurs the danger of losing one’s state. [85] As I have said,51 while my Romans were wise and good they never permitted their citizens to take this practice as their art, notwithstanding that they were able to nourish them in every time because they made war in every time. [86] But to flee the harm that this continual practice could do them, since the time did not vary, they varied the men, and they went on temporizing with their legions so that [every] fifteen years they had always renewed them. And thus they availed themselves of the men in the flower of their age, which is from 18 to 35 years, at which time the legs, the hands and the eyes respond to one another. Nor did they wait until strength decreased in them and malice increased, as it did later in corrupt times. [87] For first Octavius, and then Tiberius,52 thinking more of their own power than of the public utility, began to disarm the Roman people so as to be able to command it more easily, and to keep those same armies continually at the frontiers of the Empire. [88] And because they still did not judge that this was enough to keep the Roman people and Senate in check, they ordered an army called Praetorian that stayed near the walls of Rome and was like a castle close by that city. [89] And because they then began freely to allow the men deputed in those armies to use the military for their art, their insolence suddenly arose from it, and they became formidable to the Senate and harmful to the emperor. Hence it resulted that many of them53 died from their insolence because they gave the empire to, and took it from, whomever they wished;54 and sometimes it happened that at one and the same time there were many emperors created by various armies. [90] From which proceeded first the division of the Empire and ultimately its ruin. [91] If they want to live securely, kings must therefore have their infantries composed of men who, when it is time to make war, go to it willingly because of their love, and then when peace comes return home more willingly. [92] This always is [the case], when he chooses men who know how to live from another art than this. [93] And thus, peace having come, he ought to want his princes to return to govern their peoples, the gentlemen to the cultivation of their possessions, and the infantrymen to their particular arts; and [he ought to want] each of them to make war willingly so as to have peace, and not to seek to disturb the peace so as to have war.



46. See Valerius Maximus IV 4 6; Livy, Summaries XVIII; D III 25; see also Vegetius III pr.; Frontinus IV 3 3; D II 18.4, III 1.3.

47. Following the reading of Marchand et al.; but there is some support for the rendering: “when he was not in the military he would have wanted to be in the military.”

48. Lit.: licensed.

49. Late-second-century b.c. reformers. See Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus 9–21, Caius Gracchus 4–6, 9–17; cf. D I 37.2; see also D I 4, I 6.1.





50. The first instance of the singular or informal “you;” see glossary for all later instances.

51. See AWI 64–74; cf. AWI 17.

52. Octavius (Augustus) (63 b.c.–a.d. 14), first Roman emperor (27 b.c.–a.d. 14); Tiberius (42 b.c.–a.d. 37), second Roman emperor (14 b.c.–a.d. 37).

53. “Them” appears to refer to the Roman emperors.





COSIMO. [94] Truly this reasoning of yours appears to me well considered; nonetheless, this being almost the opposite of what I have thought about this until now, my spirit does not remain purged of every doubt, for I see many lords and gentlemen nourish themselves in time of peace by means of the studies of war, as do your peers who have provisions from princes and communities. [95] I also see almost all the men-of-arms remain with their provisions, and I see many infantrymen stay in the guard of cities and fortresses; so that it seems to me that there is a place for each in time of peace.

FABRIZIO. [96] I do not believe that you believe this, that in time of peace each and every one has a place. For supposing that no other reason can be adduced regarding this, the small number made up by all those, alleged by you, who remain in the places would respond to you: what proportion do the infantries that are needed in war have to those that are employed in peace? [97] For the fortresses and cities that are guarded in time of peace are guarded much more in war; to that are added the soldiers that are kept in the country, a large number who are all abandoned in peace. [98] And as to guards of states, which are a small number, Pope Julius55 and you have shown to everyone how much are to be feared those who do not know how to do any art other than war. And for their insolence you have deprived them of [being] your guards and posted Swiss there, as [men] born and raised under the laws and selected by the community according to a true selection. So say no longer that in peace there is a place for every man. [99] As to the men-of-arms, since they all remain with their pay in peace, this solution seems more difficult; nonetheless, whoever considers everything well finds the response easy, for this mode of keeping men-of-arms is a corrupt mode and not good. [100] The cause is that they are men who make it an art, and from them would arise a thousand inconveniences each day in the states where they were if they were accompanied by a sufficient company; but since they are few and cannot by themselves make an army, they cannot so often do grave harm. [101] Nonetheless, they have done it many times, as I said to you of Francesco and of Sforza, his father, and of Braccio of Perugia.56 [102] So I do not approve this usage of keeping men-of-arms; it is corrupt and can make great inconveniences.



54. Lit.: whomever it seemed to them.

55. Julius II (Giuliano della Rovere) (1443–1513), pope (1503–13).





COSIMO. [103] Would you like to do without them?—or, keeping them, how would you keep them?

FABRIZIO. [104] By way of a militia; not similar to that of the king of France57because it is dangerous and insolent like ours, but similar to those of the ancients who used to create the cavalry from their subjects and, in times of peace, used to send them to their homes to live off their arts, as I will contend58 at greater length before this discussion finishes. [105] So that now if this part of the army is able to live by such a practice even when there is peace, it arises from a corrupt order. [106] As to the provisions that are reserved for me and for other heads, I say to you that this likewise is a very corrupt order, for a wise republic ought not to give them to anyone; rather, it ought to use its citizens as heads in war, and in time of peace it ought to want them to return to their art. [107] Thus a wise king also ought not to give them, or, if he gives them the causes ought to be: either as a reward for some outstanding deed or because he wants to avail himself of one man in peace as well as in war. [108] And because you alleged me,59 I want to use myself as an example. And I say I have never used war as an art, because my art is to govern my subjects and to defend them, and, so as to be able to defend them, to love peace and know how to make war. [109] And my king rewards and esteems me not so much because I understand war as because I also know how to counsel him in peace. [110] Hence any king, if he is wise and wants to govern prudently, ought not to want to have near him anyone who is so made. For if he has around him either too great lovers of peace or too great lovers of war they will make him err. [111] I cannot say anything else in this my first discussion and according to my proposals; and if this is not enough for you, you must seek out someone who may better satisfy you. [112] You can well have begun to understand how much difficulty there is in bringing back ancient modes in the present wars, and what preparations a wise man must make, and what opportunities one can hope for so as to be able to execute them. But little by little60 you will understand these things better if the discussion, conferring some part of ancient orders on present modes, does not tire you out.



56. See AW I 56–59.

57. Francis I (1494–1547) had succeeded Louis XII as king in 1515; cf. note 82.

58. Lit.: dispute.

59. See AW I 94; cf. AWI 77.





COSIMO. [113] If before we were desiring to hear you discuss these things, truly what you have said up till now has redoubled the desire. Therefore, we thank you for what we have had and we ask for the rest.

FABRIZIO. [114] Since this pleases you, I want to begin to treat this material from the beginning so that it may be better understood, being enabled by that mode to demonstrate at greater length. [115] The purpose of whoever wants to make war is to be able to fight with any enemy in the field and to be able to win a battle. [116] To want to do this, one must order an army. [117] To order the army, one needs to find the men, arm them, order them, and train them in small and in large orders, quarter them, and then present61them, either standing or marching, to the enemy. [118] In these things consist all the industry of open-field warfare, which is the most necessary and the most honored. [119] The other errors that he may make in the handling of the war could be withstood by whoever knows well how to present battle to the enemy. But whoever lacks this discipline, though he be very worthy in other particulars, will never conduct a war with honor because a battle that you win cancels any other bad action of yours. In the same way, by losing one, all the good things worked by you before become vain. [120] Therefore, since it is necessary first to find the men, one must come to the levying62 of them, for so the ancients called it. We would call it a “draft;”63 but so as to call it by a more honored name, I want us to use the name of levy. [121] Those who have given rules for war want men to be selected from the temperate countries, so that they have spirit and prudence. For a warm country generates prudent and not spirited [men], a cold one spirited and not prudent ones.64 [122] This rule is well given to one individual who is prince of all the world and, through this, is allowed to draw men from those places that look good to him. [123] But wanting to give a rule about this that each can use, one must say that every republic and every kingdom should choose its soldiers from its own countries, be they warm or cold or temperate. [124] Through this one sees, by ancient examples, how with training good soldiers are made in every country. For where nature is lacking, industry, which in this case65 avails more than nature, provides. [125] And selecting them from other places cannot [truly] be called a levy, because a levy means to draw the best from a province and to have the power to select those who do not want to serve in the military as well asthose who do want to. [126] Therefore, this levy cannot be made except in places subject to you. For from countries that are not yours you cannot draw whomever you want; rather, you need to take those who want [to serve in the military].



60. Lit.: from hand to hand.

61. Lit.: represent.

62. “Levy” and “levying” translate deletto, from the Latin delectus.

63. Scelta, related to words translated elsewhere as “choose.”

64. Vegetius I 2; cf. Aristotle, Politics 1327b.





COSIMO. [127] But from among those who want to come, one can, of course, take some and leave some, and through this it can be called a levy.

FABRIZIO. [128] You speak the truth in a certain mode. But consider the defects that such a levy has in itself, for many times it still happens that it is not a levy. [129] First: those who are not your subjects and who are in the military voluntarily are not the best; rather, they are among the most wicked of a province. For if any are scandalous, idle, without restraint, without religion, fugitives from their fathers’ rule,66 blasphemers, gamblers, in every part badly raised, they are those who want to be in the military. These customs cannot be more contrary to a true and good military. [130] When so many of such men are offered to you that you exceed the number that you have planned, you can select them; but, since the matter is wicked, it is not possible that the levy be good. [131] But many times it happens that they are not enough to reach the number you need; such that, being forced to take them all, it arises that it can no longer be called a levy but a hiring67 of infantrymen. [132] Today the armies of Italy and elsewhere, except Germany, are made with these disorders. For no one is hired at the prince’s command, but according to the will of whoever wants to soldier. [133] So consider now which modes of those ancient armies can be introduced in an army of men put together in a similar way.

COSIMO. [134] What way would one have to take, then?

FABRIZIO. [135] The one I said:68 pick them from one’s own subjects and by the authority of the prince.

COSIMO. [136] In those thus chosen, would any ancient form be introduced?

FABRIZIO. [137] You know well that this is so, when whoever commands them is their prince or ordinary lord, when it is a principality; or, if it is a republic, as a citizen and, for that time, a captain. Otherwise, it is difficult to do anything good.

COSIMO. [138] Why?



65. Or: chance.

66. Lit.: empire.

67. Soldare.

68. See AW I 123–30.





FABRIZIO. [139] I will tell you in time;69for now I want this to be enough for you: that one cannot operate well by another way.

COSIMO. [140] Then, since one has to make this levy in one’s own countries, from where do you judge it better to draw them, from the city or from the country?

FABRIZIO. [141] Those who have written about this are all in accord that it is better to select them from the country, since they are men used to hardship, raised amidst toils, accustomed to being in the sun, fleeing the shade, knowing how to work a tool, digging a hole, carrying a load, and being without astuteness or malice.70 [142] But since there are two kinds of soldiers, on foot and on horse, in this part my opinion would be that those on foot should be selected from the country and those on horse from the cities.

COSIMO. [143] At what age would you take them?

FABRIZIO. [144] If I had to make a new military, I would take them from 17 to 40 years; if it were made and I had to restore it, always at 17.

COSIMO. [145] I don’t understand this distinction well.

FABRIZIO. [146] I’ll tell you. [147] If I had to order a military where there was none, it would be necessary to select all those men who were more fit and were also of military age so as to be able to instruct them, as will be said by me.71 But if I had to make the levy in places where this military was [already] ordered, I would take them from 17 years so as to supplement it, because others with more time would [already] be chosen and enrolled.

COSIMO. [148] So you would want to make a militia similar to that which is in our countries.72

FABRIZIO. [149] You speak well. [150] It is true that I do not know whether you have ordered them in the mode in which I would arm, captain, train, and order them.

COSIMO. [151] Then you praise the militia?

FABRIZIO. [152] Why, do you want me to condemn it?

COSIMO. [153] Because many wise men have always blamed it.

FABRIZIO. [154] You say a contradictory thing, in saying that someone wise blames the militia, that he can be held wise and be shown to be wrong.

COSIMO. [155] The poor73 showing that it has made will always make us have such an opinion.



69. See AWVII 208 ff.

70. Vegetius I 3.

71. See AWI 199 ff.

72. A reference to Machiavelli’s own militia, the ordinanza of 1506, which was reconstituted by Lorenzo de’ Medici in 1514.

73. The word can also mean wicked or naughty.





FABRIZIO. [156] Beware that the defect is not yours, rather than its; you will recognize this before this discussion is finished.

COSIMO. [157] You will do a very agreeable thing; however, I want to state that for which they accuse it, so that you can better justify it. [158] They say this: either it is useless, and entrusting ourselves to it will make us lose our state; or it is virtuous, and by its means whoever governs it will easily be able to take [our state]. [159] They allege the Romans, who by means of these very arms lost their liberty; they allege the Venetians and the king of France. The former of whom use the arms of others so as not to have to obey one of their own citizens; the king has disarmed his own people so as to command them more easily. [160] But they fear its uselessness even more than this. [161] They allege two principal reasons for this uselessness: one, through being inexperienced, the other, through having to serve in the military by force. For they say that things are not learned thoroughly, and that by force nothing is ever done well.

FABRIZIO. [162] All these reasons that you state are from men who recognize things nearby,74as I will openly show you.75 [163] First, as to the uselessness, I say to you that one does not use a more useful military than one’s very own, nor can one’s very own military be ordered except in this mode. [164] And because this was not disputed, I do not want to lose time on it, for all the examples of ancient history are for us. [165] And because they allege inexperience and force, I tell them that it is true that inexperience makes for lack of spirit and force makes for discontent. But one makes them gain spirit and experience by the mode of arming them, training them, and ordering them, as you will see as this reasoning progresses. [166] But as to force, you have to understand that the men who are inducted into the military by commandment of the prince have to come to it neither altogether forced nor altogether willingly. For complete willingness would make for the inconveniences that I stated above: that it would not be a levy, and those that went would be few; and complete force would also carry wicked effects. [167] Therefore, one should take a middle way where there is neither complete force nor complete willingness; rather, they must be drawn through the respect that they have for the prince, where they fear his disdain more than present pain. And it will always happen that it is a force mixed with willingness, so that such discontent as to have bad effects will not be able to arise from it. [168] I do not at all say by this that it cannot be conquered. For the Roman armies were conquered many times, and the army of Hannibal was conquered, such that it can be seen that one cannot order an army that someone may promise cannot be beaten. [169] Therefore, these wise men of yours must not gauge this uselessness from its having lost one time;76rather, [they must] believe that just as one loses, so can one win and remedy the cause of the loss. [170] And if they were to seek this, they would find that it was not through a defect of the mode but of the order that it did not attain its own perfection. And as I have said,77 they should have provided for it not by blaming the militia, but by correcting it. How that should be done you will understand little by little.78 [171] As to the fear79 that such an order may take away your state by means of the individual who is made its head, I respond that arms, given by the laws and by order, on the back of one’s own citizens or subjects never do harm; rather, they are always useful, and cities more often maintain themselves immaculate by means of these arms than without them. [172] Rome remained free for 400 years and was armed; Sparta for 800; many other cities have been unarmed and they have been free less than forty. [173] For cities need arms; and when they do not have their own arms they hire foreigners. And foreign arms can do damage to the public good more quickly than one’s own, because they become corrupt more easily and can be used more quickly by a citizen who has become powerful. And, in part, he has material that is easier to manage, since he has to oppress unarmed men. [174] Besides this, a city ought to fear two enemies more than one. [175] That which avails itself of foreign arms fears at a stroke the foreigner it hires and its citizen. [For evidence] that it should fear this, remember what I said about Francesco Sforza a little while ago.80 [176] That [city] which uses its very own arms is not afraid except of its own citizen. [177] But of all the reasons one could give, I want to use this: never did anyone order any republic or kingdom who did not think that the same men who inhabited it had to defend it with their arms. [178] And if the Venetians had been wise in this as in all their other orders, they would have made a new monarchy in the world. [179] So much more do they merit blame, since they had been armed by their first lawgivers. [180] But not having dominion on land, they had been armed on the sea, where they waged their own wars virtuously and, with arms in hand, increased their fatherland. [181] But as the time came when they had to wage war on land to defend Vincenza, where they should have sent one of their citizens to fight on land, they hired the marquis of Mantua as their captain.81 [182] This was the sinister policy that cut off their legs for leaping to heaven and expanding. [183] And if they made [that policy] in the belief that they lacked confidence for waging war on land, although they knew how to wage it at sea, then it was an unwise lack of confidence. For a sea captain, who is used to fighting with the wind, water, and men, will more easily become a captain on land, where he fights with men alone, than [a captain] on land will become one at sea. [184] Knowing how to fight on land and not at sea, and coming to war with the Carthaginians who were powerful at sea, my Romans did not hire Greeks or Spaniards accustomed to the sea, but imposed that task on their own citizens whom they used to send out on land; and they won. [185] If they did it so that one of their citizens would not become tyrant, it was a fear lacking consideration. For besides those reasons which I stated to this purpose a little while ago, if one citizen with sea arms had never made a tyranny in a city placed on the sea, so much less would he have been able to do this with land arms. [186] And by this means, they should have seen that arms in their citizens’ hands could not make them tyrants, but that evil orders of government make a city tyrannize. Since they had a good government, they did not have to fear their own arms. [187] However, they adopted an imprudent policy, which has been the cause of the loss of much glory and much happiness for them. [188] As to the error which the king of France makes in not keeping his peoples disciplined for war82 (which those [men] of yours allege83 as an example),84there is no one, having set aside any particular passion of his, who does not judge this defect to be in that kingdom and this negligence alone to make it weak. [189] But I have made too large a digression, and perhaps I have gone outside of my purpose; however, I did this so as to respond to you and to demonstrate to you that one cannot make a foundation on other arms than one’s own and one cannot order one’s own arms otherwise than by way of a militia, nor by other ways introduce forms of armies in any place, nor by another mode order a disciplined military. [190] If you read the orders that the first kings made in Rome, and especially Servius Tullius, you will find that the order of the classes is nothing other than a militia for the sake of being able immediately to put together an army for the defense of that city.85 [191] But let us return to our levy. [192] I say anew that having to restore an old order, I would take them at 17 years; having to create a new one, I would take them from every age between 17 and 40, so as to enable me to use them immediately.



74. Lit.: little distant.

75. In the discussion immediately following.





76. The Florentine militia, organized by Machiavelli himself, lost to the Spanish at Prato in 1512. This loss led directly to the end of the republican government in which Machiavelli had served and to the return of the Medici as rulers of Florence (see D II 27.3).

77. See AWI156.

78. Lit.: from hand to hand.

79. Lit.: doubt.

80. See AW I 56 ff., I 101.

81. Gianfrancesco Gonzaga I (1366–1407) conquered Vincenza for Venice in 1404.





82. By the mid-fifteenth century, Charles VII of France had organized a military that consisted of French subjects, a large portion of whom were civilians drawn from communities throughout the kingdom to serve as “free archers” (so called because they were exempted from taxation in recompense for weekly training and occasional combat service). Charles’s successor, Louis XI, disbanded the free archers in 1474, hiring in their stead Swiss and German mercenaries; he was in turn succeeded by Louis XII. For the Venetians, see the following discussion.

83. See AWI159.

84. Parentheses in the original.

85. Servius Tullius, the sixth king of Rome (578–535 b.c.). See Livy I 42–44; see also D II 3.





COSIMO. [193] Would you make a distinction in the arts from which you pick them?

FABRIZIO. [194] These writers do so86 because they do not want fowlers, fishermen, cooks, pimps, and anyone who makes an art of amusement to be taken; but besides those who work the land, they want smiths, ferriers, carpenters, butchers, hunters, and the like, to be taken. [195] But with respect to conjecturing the goodness of the man from his art, I would make little distinction among them; yet I would definitely do so, so as to be able to use him with more utility. [196] And for this cause the peasants who are used to working the land are more useful than anyone. For of all the arts, this is used in armies more than the others. [197] After this are the smiths, carpenters, ferriers, and stone cutters. It is useful to have many of these because their art is quite worthwhile for many things, since it is a good thing to have one soldier from whom you take a double service.

COSIMO. [198] By what does one recognize those who are or are not fit to serve in the military?

FABRIZIO. [199] I want to speak of the mode of selecting a new militia so as to make an army of it later. For in part one also ends up reasoning about the selection that is made in the restoration of an old militia. [200] Therefore, I say that the goodness of one whom you have to select as a soldier is known either by experience through some outstanding deed of his or by conjecture. [201] Proof of virtue cannot be found in men who are being selected anew and who have never been selected before; and few or none [who have been chosen before] are found in a militia that is ordered anew. [202] Therefore, lacking this experience, it is necessary to recur to conjecture, which is made from his years, his art, and his bearing. [203] These first two have been reasoned about. It remains to speak of the third. Therefore, I say that some, among whom was Pyrrhus, have wanted the soldiers to be large; some others have selected them only from bodily vigor, as Caesar did. This vigor of body and spirit is conjectured from the composition of the members and from the grace of aspect.87 [204] And therefore those who write of this say that he needs to have lively and bright eyes, a sinewy neck, a large chest, muscular arms, long fingers, a small belly, round flanks, and lean legs and feet.88 These parts usually render the man agile and strong, which are the two things above all others that one seeks in a soldier. [205] One should above all look to his customs, and what in them is honest and shame-filled, otherwise one selects an instrument of scandal and a beginning of corruption. For there is no one who believes that any virtue that is in any part laudable can be known in a dishonest education and base spirit. [206] It does not seem superfluous to me; indeed, so that you may better understand the importance of this levy, I believe it is necessary to tell you the mode that the Roman consuls observed in selecting the Roman legions at the beginning of their magistracies. In that levy, because those whom they had to select were, thanks to continual wars, a mixture of veterans and new men, they were able to proceed by experience with the old and by conjecture with the new. [207] And this should be noted: that these levies were made either so as to use them right then or so as to train them right then and use them in time. [208] I have spoken and will speak of all that is ordered for using them in time, because my intention is to show you how one can order an army in countries where there was no military. In those countries one cannot have levies so as to use them right then; but in those where it is a custom to draw up armies, and [to do so] by the prince’s way, one can well have them right then, as used to be observed in Rome and as is observed today among the Swiss. [209] For in these levies, if there are some new [men], there are also so many others accustomed to remain in the military orders, that the new and the old mixed together make a united and good body. Notwithstanding, when they began to keep the stations of the soldiers fixed, the emperors had a teacher put in charge of the new soldiers, whom they called Tironi, to train them, as is seen in the life of Emperor Maximinus.89 [210] While Rome was free, this was ordered not in the armies but within the city. Since military drills in which the young were trained were customary there, it arose that when they were later chosen to go to war, they had been accustomed to the mock military, so that they could easily be used for the true one. [211] But since these emperors later eliminated these drills, they were necessitated to use the means I have demonstrated here. [212] Therefore, coming to the mode of the Roman levy,90 I say that the Roman consuls, upon whom the care of war was placed, created 24 military tribunes, who did the office done today by those whom we call constables, and put six of them in each legion. [They did so] after they had taken over the magistracy [and] when they wanted to order their armies (for it was a custom that each of them had two Roman legions, which were the sinew of their armies).91 [213] They then had all the Roman men fit to bear arms convene, and placed the tribunes of each legion separate from one another. [214] Then by lot they drew the tribes from which theselection first had to be made, and from the tribe [chosen first] they chose four of the best, and from [among] these [four] one was selected by the tribunes of the first legion; from the other three, one was selected by the tribunes of the second legion; from the other two, one was selected by the tribunes of the third; and the last one fell to the fourth legion. [215] After these, another four were chosen; from these, first, one of them was selected by the tribunes of the second legion; the second of these by the third; the third of these by the fourth; the fourth remained for the first. [216] Then another four were chosen: the third chose the first, the fourth the second, the first the third, and the fourth remained for the second; and thus this mode of selecting varied successively, so much so that the selection came out to be equal and the legions balanced one another. [217] And as we said above,92this levy could be made so as to use it right then, because it was made from men a good part of whom were experienced in the true military and all of whom were trained in the mock military; and this selection could be made by conjecture and experience. [218] But where one has to order a military anew, and therefore has to choose for a time [in the future], this levy cannot be done except by conjecture, which is made from their years and bearing.



86. Vegetius I 7, with changes; cf. Cicero, De Officiis I 150.

87. The sources are unknown for Pyrrhus’s and Caesar’s preferences asserted here; cf. Vegetius I 5.

88. See Vegetius I 6.





89. Julius Verus Maximinus, Roman emperor (235–38). See Herodian VI 8.2; cf. L. Arthur Burd, “Le fonti letterarie di Machavelli nell’Arte della guerra,” Atti della Reale Academia dei Lincei, 5th ser., Cl. di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche 4 (1896): 191 n. 1.

90. See Polybius VI 19–20.

91. Parentheses in original.





COSIMO. [219] As much as has been said by you, I believe to be altogether true. [220] But before you pass to another reasoning, I want to ask you about one thing that you made me remember by saying that the levy which had to be made where there were no men used to soldiering would have to be made by conjecture. For I have heard our militia blamed in many parts, and especially as to the number, because many say that a smaller number should be taken. From this, one would take this fruit: that they would be better, and chosen better; one would not give so much hardship to the men; one would be able to give them some reward by means of which they would remain more content, and they could be better commanded. [221] Hence, I would like to understand your opinion in this part, and whether you would like a larger or a smaller number, and what mode you would take to select them for one and the other number.

FABRIZIO. [222] Without a doubt a large number is better and more necessary than a small one; indeed, it is better to say, where one cannot order a large quantity, one cannot order a perfect militia; and I will easily invalidate all the reasons allotted93 by those [who blame the militia]. [223] Therefore, I say first that where there are many people, as there are in Tuscany, for example, the smaller number does not make you have better [men] or a better chosen levy. [224] For in selecting men, [although] wanting to judge by experience, one would find very few in that country whom experience made probable [choices], both because few have been in war and because among these few very few have given proof by means of which they merit being chosen before the others. So whoever has to select them in similar places must lay aside experience and take them by conjecture. [225] Hence, since others are reduced to such a necessity, I would like to understand by what rule I should take or leave anyone, if twenty youths of good bearing come before me. So without doubt, I believe that every man will confess that it is less an error to take them all so as to arm them and train them, since one cannot know which of them is better, and to reserve for later making a more certain levy once one recognizes, by testing them in training, those of more spirit and of more life. [226] So everything considered, in this case to choose few so as to make them better is altogether false. [227] As to giving less hardship to the country and to the men, I say that the militia, whether it be large or small, will not give any hardship. For this order does not take the men from any of their affairs, nor does it keep them from being able to go to do any of their business. For it obliges them to convene together for training only on holidays.94 This does harm neither to the country nor to the men. Indeed, it would give a delight to the youths because on festival days when they stay idly in their retreats, they would go with pleasure to these drills. For, since the handling95 of arms is a beautiful spectacle, it is delightful to young men. [228] As to being able to pay the smaller number and, because of this, to keep them more obedient and more content, I respond that one cannot make a militia of so few that they can be paid continuously such that the pay satisfies them. [229] For example, if one ordered a military of five thousand infantrymen, to want to pay them so that one would believe they would be contented one would have to give them at least ten thousand ducats a month. [230] First, this number of infantry is not enough to make an army; this payment is not supportable by one state and, on the other hand, it is not sufficient for keeping the men contented and obligated to enable one to use them in their post. [231] So that in doing this, one would spend more and have few forces, and they would not be sufficient either to defend you or to engage in any enterprise of yours. [232] If you gave them more, or took more of them, by so much more would it be impossible for you to pay them. [233] If you gave them less, or took less of them, by so much less would they be content, or by so much less would they bring utility to you. [234] Thus those who reason about making a militia and paying them while they remain at home, reason of things either impossible or useless. [235] But it is very necessary to pay them when they are raised to remain at war. [236] Yet if such an order were to give some hardship (what [hardship], I do not see) to those enrolled in it in time of peace, as recompense for this there are all those goods which an ordered military brings to a country, because without that nothing is secure there. [237] I conclude that this is not understood by whoever wants a small number so as to be able to pay them, or for some other of the causes alleged by you. For my opinion is also supported [by the fact] that any number will always diminish in your hands because of the infinite impediments that men have, so that a small number would turn into nothing. [238] Besides, when you have a large militia, [through] your selection [of men] you can avail yourself of few or of many. [239] Beyond this, it has to serve you in fact and in reputation, and a large number will always give you more reputation. [240] Add to this that since the militia is made so as to keep the men trained, if you enlist96 a small number in a large country, those enlisted are so distant from one another that you cannot, without very grave harm to them, collect them so as to train them; and without this training the militia is useless, as will be said in its place.



92. See I 202 ff.

93. The metaphor is economic: the checks (i.e., reasons) written by the critics of the militia will be canceled by Fabrizio.





94. Lit.: idle days.

95. Or: treatment.





COSIMO. [241] You have said enough about this question of mine; but now I desire that you resolve another doubt for me. [242] These [men] say that such a multitude of armed [men] makes for confusion, scandal, and disorder in the country.

FABRIZIO. [243] I will tell you the cause why this is another vain opinion. [244] These [men] ordered for arms can cause disorder in two modes: either among themselves or against others. [245] One can easily avoid these things where the order by itself does not avoid them. For, as to the scandals among them, this order takes them away rather than nourishes them, because in ordering them you give them arms97 and heads. [246] If the country where you order them is so unwarlike that there are not arms among its men, and so united that there are not heads there, this order makes them more ferocious against foreigners but does not make them in any mode more disunited. For well-ordered men, armed as well as unarmed, fear the laws. Nor can they rebel if the heads that you give them do not cause the rebellion. The mode to do this will now be told. [247] But if the country where you order them is armed and disunited, this order alone is the cause of uniting them. For they have arms and heads for themselves, but the arms are useless for war, and the heads are nurturers of scandals. [248] This order gives them arms useful for war and heads [that are] extinguishers of scandals. For in that country as soon as anyone is offended, he recurs to the head of his party who, to keep up reputation, encourages him to vengeance, not to peace. [249] The public head acts to the contrary so that by this way the cause of scandals is taken away and that of union is prepared. The united and effeminate provinces lose their vileness and maintain their union; the disunited and scandalous ones unite, and that ferocity of theirs which usually works in a disordered manner is turned to the public utility. [250] As to wanting them not to do harm to others, one should consider that they cannot do this except by means of the heads that govern them. [251] To want the heads not to make disorder, it is necessary to make sure that they not acquire too much authority for themselves. [252] And you have to consider that this authority is acquired either by nature or by accident. [253] And as to nature, one must provide that whoever is born in a place not be assigned to the men enrolled there, but be made head in those places where he does not have any natural connection. [254] As to accident, one should order the thing in a mode that each year the heads are changed from government to government; because the continued authority over the same men generates among them so much union that it can easily be converted to the prejudice of the prince. [255] How useful these changes are to those who have used them and harmful to whoever has not observed them can be recognized by the example of the kingdom of the Assyrians and of the empire of the Romans. There one sees that that kingdom lasted a thousand years without tumult and without any civil war, which did not proceed from anything other than the changes that these captains, who had been assigned to the care of the armies, made from place to place every year. [256] In the Roman Empire, once the blood of Caesar was spent, so many civil wars among the captains of the armies, and so many conspiracies of the aforementioned captains against the emperors, arose from no other cause than from continually keeping those captains fixed in the same government. [257] And if in some of those first emperors and those who then kept the empire with reputation, such as Hadrian, Marcus, Severus,98 and the like, it had been seen that they had introduced this custom of changing the captains in that empire, without doubt they would have made it more quiet and more durable. For the captains would have had less opportunity to tumult, the emperors less cause for fear, and the Senate, in the absence of successors, would have had more authority in the election of the emperor, and as a consequence it would have been better. [258] But wicked customs, either because of the ignorance or little diligence of men, can be taken away neither by evil nor by good examples.



96. Lit.: write.

97. Weapons (arme), not upper limbs (braccia), here and in the following discussion.





COSIMO. [259] I do not know whether with my questioning I have somewhat taken you out of your order, because from the levy we have entered into another reasoning; and if I had not excused myself a little while ago,99 I would believe that I merit some reprehension for it.



98. Hadrian (emperor 117–38); Marcus Aurelius (emperor 161–80); Septimius Severus (emperor 193–211). See P19 (esp. 81–82).





FABRIZIO. [260] Do not let this worry you. For all this reasoning was necessary [since we] wanted to reason about the militia, which, since many have blamed it, needed to be excused, [since we] wanted this first part of the levy to have a place here. [261] And before I descend to the other parts, I want to reason about the levy of the men for the cavalry. [262] According to the ancients, this was made from the wealthiest, having a regard for both years and the quality of the man. And they selected three hundred of them per legion, so that the Roman cavalry in every consular army did not pass the sum of six hundred.

COSIMO. [263] Would you make a cavalry militia to train them at home, and avail oneself of them in time?

FABRIZIO. [264] Indeed, it is necessary; and one cannot do otherwise, wanting to have arms that are one’s own, and not wanting to have to draw from among those who make it an art.

COSIMO. [265] How would you select them?

FABRIZIO. [266] I would imitate the Romans. I would draw from the wealthiest, I would give them heads in the mode in which they are given to the others today, and I would arm and train them.

COSIMO. [267] Would it be well to give some provision to these?

FABRIZIO. [268] Indeed, but only as much as is necessary to feed their horses. For bringing expense to your subjects would enable them to complain of you. [269] But it would be necessary to pay for the horse and its expenses.

COSIMO. [270] What number would you make them, and how would you arm them?

FABRIZIO. [271] You are passing on to another reasoning. [272] I will tell you in its place,100 which is when I will have told you how infantrymen should be armed, or how they are prepared to do battle.



99. See AWI 20, 45.

100. SeeAWII67ff.