# BOOK FOUR

BOOK FOUR



LUIGI. [1] Since under my rule a battle has been won so honorably, I think it is well that I no longer tempt fortune, knowing how much it is variable and unstable. [2] Therefore, I desire to put down the dictatorship and for Zanobi now to carry on this office of questioning, wanting to follow the order that proceeds by the youngest. [3] And I know that he will not refuse this honor or, we mean to say, this trouble, both so as to please me and also through being naturally more spirited than I; nor will it bring him fear to have to enter into these travails, wherein he can just as well be conquered as conquer.

ZANOBI. [4] I’m going to stay wherever you put me, even though I would more gladly keep listening. For up to this point, your questions have satisfied me more than those have pleased me which have occurred to me while listening to your reasonings. [5] But I believe it is well, Lord, that you press on1 and have patience if we tire you with these ceremonies of ours.

FABRIZIO. [6] Indeed, you give me pleasure. For this variation of questioners allows me to know your various talents and various appetites. [7] But does anything remain that seems [well] to you to add to the material discussed?2

ZANOBI. [8] I desire two things before moving on to another part: one is that you show me whether another form of ordering armies occurs to you; the other, those considerations3 a captain ought to make before he goes to battle, and, if any accident arises in it, what remedies he can use.

FABRIZIO. [9] I will do my utmost4 to satisfy you. [10] I will not really respond distinctly to your questions, for while I respond to one, many times another will end up being responded to. [11] I have told you how I proposed one form of an army for you, so that according to it, he5 could give it all those forms that the enemy and the site require. For in this case one proceeds both according to the site and according to the enemy. [12] But note this: that there is no more dangerous form than to extend the front of your army greatly, if you do not already have a very hardy and very great army. Otherwise, you have to make it thick and not very wide rather than very wide and thin. [13] For when you have few men in comparison to the enemy, you must search for other remedies, such as ordering your army so that you are covered on one side either by a river or by a marsh, so that you cannot be surrounded;6 or covering yourself on the flanks with ditches, as Caesar did in France.7 [14] And in this case you have to take up this generality: to extend yourself or constrict yourself on the front according to your number and that of the enemy. And if the enemy has a smaller number, you must seek wide places, especially if you have disciplined your troops, so that you can not only surround the enemy, but extend your orders. For in harsh and difficult places you end up having no advantage since you cannot avail yourself of your orders. [15] Hence it arose that the Romans almost always sought open fields and fled difficult [ones]. [16] You must do the contrary, as I said,8 if you have few or badly disciplined men. For you have to seek places where the small number is saved or where the lack of experience does not hurt you. [17] You also ought to select a high place so as to be able to charge [the enemy] more easily.9 [18] Nonetheless, one ought to take this precaution: do not order your army on a sloping hill or a place near its bases, where the enemy army can come. For in this case the higher place brings you disadvantage on account of10 artillery. For you could always conveniently be hurt by the enemy artillery without being able to make any remedy, and you could not easily offend it, being impeded by your own [men]. [19] Whoever orders an army for battle also ought to take account of11 the sun and the wind, that the one and the other do not hit you in the front. For the one and the other obstruct your vision, the one with its rays, the other with dust. [20] And the more the wind is unfavorable to the arms that are shot at the enemy, the more it weakens their blows. [21] And as to the sun, it is not enough to take care that it not hit you in the face right then. Rather, one must see to it that as the day goes on it does not offend you. [22] And for this, in ordering the troops, it would have to be altogether at the back, so that much time would have to pass for it to arrive in front of you.12 [23] This mode was observed by Hannibal at Cannae13 and by Marius against the Cimbri.14 [24] If you are much inferior in cavalrymen, order your army amidst vines and trees and similar impediments, as the Spaniards did in our times, when they broke the French in the Kingdom at Cerignuola.15 [25] And it is seen many times how from losing one becomes victorious with the same soldiers by varying only the orders and the place. So it happened with the Carthaginians, who, having been conquered by Marcus Regulus many times, were then victorious through the counsel of the Lacedeamonian Xantippus. He had them descend into the plain where they were able to overcome the Romans by virtue of the cavalrymen and the elephants.16 [26] It seems to me that according to the ancient examples almost all the excellent captains did not oppose the strongest part but the weakest when they knew that the enemy had made one side of the battalion strong. And the other stronger part they opposed to the weakest. Then, in joining battle, they commanded their hardiest part only to withstand the enemy and not to extinguish him, and the weakest to allow itself to be conquered and to retire into the last line of the army. [27] This produces two great disorders for the enemy: the first, that he finds his strongest part surrounded; the second is that when it seems to him that he has an immediate victory, rare are the times that he is not disordered. His own immediate loss arises from this. [28] Cornelius Scipio, being in Spain against the Carthaginian Hasdrubal, knew Hasdrubal had noticed that in ordering his army he used to put his legions—the strongest part of his own army—in the middle, and through this [Scipio knew] that Hasdrubal had to proceed with similar orders when he later came to battle; [so Scipio] changed order and put his legions on the horns of the army, and in the middle he put all of his weakest men. [29] Then, coming to hands, he suddenly had the men posted in the middle walk slowly, and the horns of the army were made to advance with celerity, so that the horns of the one and the other army fought, and the lines in the middle, by being distant from one another, did not join one another. So the hardiest part of Scipio’s [army] ended up fighting with the weakest of Hasdrubal’s. And he conquered him.17 [30] That mode was useful then. But today, on account of18 artillery, it could not be used. For the space that would remain in the middle, between one army and the other, would give time for it to be able to fire, which is very pernicious, as we said above.19 [31] Therefore, one must leave this mode aside, and [instead of] it, use [the mode] of having the whole army join and the weakest part yield, as I said a little while ago.20 [32] When a captain finds he has a larger army than that of the enemy, and wants to surround it without it foreseeing this, he orders his army with a front equal to that of his adversary. Then, the battle having been joined, little by little he has the front withdraw and the flanks extend themselves. And, unless he notices it, it will always happen that the enemy will find himself surrounded. [33] When a captain wants to fight with near certainty21 that he cannot be beaten, he orders his army in a place where it has a nearby and secure refuge, either amidst marshes or amidst mountains or in a powerful city. For in this case he cannot be followed by the enemy and the enemy can be followed by him. [34] These means were22used by Hannibal, when fortune began to turn against him and he feared23 the valor of Marcus Marcellus.24 [35] So as to disturb the orders of the enemy, some have commanded those that were lightly armed to join the battle and, having joined it, to withdraw among the orders. And when the armies later came together head to head and the front of each was occupied with fighting, they had them go out along the flanks of the battalions, and disturb and beat him. [36] If someone finds himself inferior in cavalrymen, he can, besides the modes mentioned, put a battalion of pikes behind his cavalrymen and, in fighting, order that they give way to the pikes. And he will always remain superior. [37] Many were in the habit25 of accustoming some lightly armed infantrymen to fight among the cavalrymen, which was of very great help to the cavalry.26 [38] Of all those who have ordered armies for battle, the most lauded are Hannibal and Scipio when they fought in Africa. Because Hannibal had composed his army of Carthaginians and of auxiliaries of various kinds, he put eighty elephants in the first front; next he located the auxiliaries; after these he put his own Carthaginians. In the last place he put the Italians, in whom he had little confidence. [39] He so ordered these things because the auxiliaries could not flee, since they had the enemy in front and were blocked from behind by his own [men]. Since they were necessitated to fight, they conquered or tired out the Romans. He thought then [he could] easily overcome the already tired Romans with his own fresh and virtuous troop[s]. [40] Against this order, Scipio placed the hastati, the principes, and the triarii in the accustomed mode of one being able to receive the other and one being able to help the other. [41] He made the front of the army full of intervals. And so that it would not be transparent, but rather would seem united, he filled them with velites. He commanded, as soon as the elephants came, that the [velites] yield, and enter among the legions through the ordinary spaces and leave the way open for the elephants. Thus, he ended up rendering the impetus of the latter vain, so that, having come to hands, he was superior.27



1. Lit.: spare time.

2. Lit.: reasoned.

3. Lit.: respects.

4. Sforzarmi.





5. The subject of this clause seems to be the captain mentioned above in sentence 8; but there is support for the impersonal rendering “one could give.”

6. See Vegetius III 20.

7. See Caesar, Gallic War II 8, VII 72.

8. See AW IV 13–14.

9. See Vegetius III 13.

10. Lit.: with respect to.

11. Lit.: have respect for.





12. See Vegetius III 14.

13. The battle of Cannae (216 b.c.); see Livy XXII 43.

14. Gaius Marius (ca. 157–186 b.c.) at the battle of Vercellae (101 b.c.); see Plutarch, Marius 26; Frontinus II 2.7; cf. D II 8.1, III 37.4; Augustine, City of God V 26.

15. The battle of Cerignuola (1503) between French and Spanish forces in the kingdom of Naples. Fabrizio is reported to have said of this battle (in which he participated on the Spain side) that the Spanish victory was due neither to the valor of their captain Gonzalo (see AWII 62, note 25) nor to the courage of Spanish troops, but to the small dirt wall behind which the Spanish arquebuses hid as they fired on their enemies. Cf. D II 17.4.

16. In 255 b.c.; see Polybius I 32–35; cf. D II 18.4.





17. In 206 b.c.; see Livy XXVIII 14, Polybius XI 22.

18. Lit.: with respect to.

19. Cf. AWIII 101 ff.

20. SeeAWIV26.

21. Lit.: secure.

22. Lit.: This end was.

23. Lit.: doubted.

24. At the battle of Nola (215 b.c.); see Livy XXIII 16, XXVII 12, 14.

25. Consueto, usually translated as “accustomed.”

26. See Vegetius III 16.





ZANOBI. [42] You have made me remember, in alleging this battle to me, how in fighting Scipio did not have the hastati withdraw into the order of the principes, but divided them and had them withdraw to the horns of the army, so that they gave place to the principes, when he wanted them to push them ahead. Therefore, I would like you to tell me what cause moved him not to use the accustomed order.

FABRIZIO. [43] I will tell you. [44] Hannibal had posted all of the virtue of his army in the second line. Hence, so as to oppose similar virtue to the latter, Scipio collected the principes and the triarii together, such that since the intervals of the principes were occupied by the triarii, there was no room where the hastati could be received. [45] And therefore he had the hastati divide and go to the horns of the army, and not withdraw among the principes.[46] But note that one cannot use this mode of opening the first line so as to give place to the second except when one is otherwise superior.28 For then one has the convenience of being able to do it, as Scipio was able to. [47] But being inferior and having been repulsed, you cannot do it except with your own manifest ruin. Therefore, there must be orders behind that receive you. [48] But let us return to our reasoning. [49] Among other things thought up to offend their enemies, the ancient Asiatics used chariots that had several scythes on the sides, such that they not only served to open the lines with their thrust, but also killed their adversaries with the scythes.29 [50] These thrusts were provided against in three modes: either they were withstood with the density of the orders, or they were received into the lines like the elephants, or some hardy resistance was made with art, as the Roman Sulla did against Archelaus. The latter had many of these chariots which they called scythed, so that he drove many pikes into the ground after the first lines so as to withstand them. Having been withstood by them, the chariots lost their impetus. [51] And the new mode that Sulla took against them in ordering his army is to be noted. For he put the velites and the cavalrymen behind and all of the heavily armed ahead, leaving many intervals so as to be able to send ahead those from behind when the necessity required it. Hence, the fight having been joined, he had the victory with the help of the cavalrymen to whom he had given a way.30[52] To want to disturb the enemy army in a fight, one must make something that frightens him arise, either by announcing new supports that are coming, or by showing things that represent them, in such a way that the enemies, deceived by that appearance, are frightened and being afraid, can easily be conquered.31 [53] The Roman consuls Minucius Rufus32 and Acilius Glabrio33 held to these modes. [54] Gaius Sulpitius also put many bags on mules and other animals useless in war, but ordered [them] so that they represented men-at-arms. He commanded that they appear on a hill while they were at hands with the French. His victory arose from this.34 [55] Marius did the same when he fought against the Germans.35 [56] As feigned assaults are thus very valuable while the battle goes on, it must be that true ones are much more helpful, especially if by improvising in the middle of the fight one can assault the enemy from behind or on the side. [57] This can be done [only] with difficulty if the country does not help you. For when it is open, part of your troops cannot be concealed, as they must be in such enterprises. But in places wooded and mountainous, and thus fit for ambushes, part of your troops can be hidden well, so as to be able to assault the enemy at once contrary to his expectation.36 This thing will always be cause for giving you the victory. [58] Sometimes it has been of great moment, while the fight is going on, to disseminate words that pronounce the enemies’ captain to be dead, or to have been conquered by another part of the army. Many times this has given victory to him who used it. [59] One easily disturbs the enemy cavalry by unusual forms or noises. Croesus, who opposed camels to the cavalrymen of his adversaries, did so.37 And to the Roman cavalry Pyrrhus opposed elephants, whose aspect disturbed it and disordered it.38 [60] In our times, the Turk beat the Sophy in Persia and the Sultan in Syria with nothing but the noise of their arquebuses, which confused the cavalry with their unusual noises, so that the Turk could easily conquer it.39[61] The Spanish, so as to beat the army of Hamilcar, put in the first front wagons full of brushwood pulled by oxen and, coming to hands, set fire to them. From this the oxen, wanting to flee the fire, charged into the army of Hamilcar and opened it up.40 [62] It is customary, as we said,41 to deceive enemies while fighting, drawing them into ambushes, where the country is convenient. But when it is open and wide, many were used to making ditches, and then covering them lightly with brush and earth and leaving some solid spaces between them to enable them to withdraw. Then, the fight having been joined, they have retired through them. When the enemy follows, he is ruined in them. [63] If in the fight it happens to you that some accident frightens your soldiers, knowing how to dissimulate it and pervert it for good is a very prudent thing, as did Tullus Hostilius and Lucius Sulla. The former, seeing how, while fighting, one part of his troops had gone over to the side of the enemy, and how that thing had frightened his own [men] very much, he had the whole army understand immediately that everything happened by his order. This not only did not disturb the army, but it increased its spirit so much that it remained victorious.42 [64] It also happened to Sulla that since certain soldiers whom he sent to do some business had been killed, he said, so that his army would not be frightened, that he had them sent into the hands of their enemies by art becausehe had found out that they lacked faith.43 [65] Sertorius, doing battle in Spain, killed one who indicated to him the death of one of his own officers44 for fear that he would frighten them if he said the same to others.45 [66] It is a very difficult thing to stop an army and return it to battle once it has already moved to flee. [67] And you have to make this distinction: either the whole has moved, and then it is impossible to return it; or a part of it has moved, and then there is some remedy. [68] Many Roman captains, by getting in front of those who were fleeing, have stopped them, making them ashamed of their flight, as did Lucius Sulla. As part of his legions were already turning around having been chased by the troops of Mithridates, he put himself in front with a sword in hand, crying: “If anyone asks where you left your captain, say: We left him in Boeotia, fighting.”46 [69] The consul Attilius opposed those who were fleeing with those who were not fleeing, and made them understand that if they did not turn around they would be killed by their friends and by their enemies.47 [70] Philip of Macedon, understanding that his own [men] feared the Scythian soldiers, put some of his most faithful cavalrymen behind his army, and commissioned them to kill anyone who fled. Hence his own [men] won, wanting to die fighting rather than fleeing.48 [71] Not so much to stop a flight as to give opportunity to their own [men] for making a greater force, many Romans have taken a flag from the hands of their own [men] while they were fighting and thrown it amidst the enemies and proposed rewards to whoever regained it. [72] I do not believe that it is outside of the purpose to add to this reasoning those things that happen after the fight, especially since these things are brief and not to be left behind and conform well to this reasoning. [73] I say, therefore, that battles are lost or won. [74] When one wins, one must follow up the victory with utmost speed and in this case imitate Caesar and not Hannibal, who, by staying put after he had beaten the Romans at Cannae,49 lost the empire of Rome. [75] The former never paused after a victory, but followed the beaten enemy with greater impetus and fury than [when] he had assaulted it in its entirety. [76] But when one loses, a captain must see if from his loss anything can arise for his own utility, especially if any residue of this army has remained with him. [77] The convenience can arise from the lack of caution of the enemy, who most of the time after a victory has become careless and gives you the opportunity to oppress him, as the Roman Martius oppressed the Carthaginian armies. The latter, having killed the two Scipios and beaten their armies [and] not esteeming that remnant of the troops that had remained alive with Martius, were assaulted and beaten by him.50[78] By this one sees that there is nothing as likely to succeed as what the enemy believes you cannot attempt, because most of the time men are hurt more where they fear51 less. [79] Therefore, when he cannot do this, a captain should at least contrive with industry that the loss be less harmful. [80] To do this it is necessary for you to hold modes that do not enable the enemy to follow you with ease, or give him causes that have to delay him. [81] In the first case, after they recognize that they have lost, some ordered their heads to flee to diverse parts and by diverse ways, having given orders [as to] where they had to assemble later. That made it so that the enemy, fearing to divide his army, let all or the greater part of them go safely. [82] In the second case, many have thrown their dearest things in front of the enemy, so that having been delayed by the prey, he affords them more space for their flight. [83] Titus Dimius used no lack of astuteness so as to hide the harm that he had received in the fight; for, having fought until night with much loss of his own, at night he had most of them buried. Hence, seeing in the morning so many of their own dead and so few of the Romans, [and] believing they were at a disadvantage, the enemies fled.52 [84] I believe I have thus haphazardly, as I said,53 satisfied your question in good part. [85] Concerning the form of the armies, it’s true that it remains for me to tell you how at times it was customary for some captain to make them with the front in the shape54of a wedge, judging that in such a way he could more easily open the enemy army. [86] Against this form, they used to make a form in the shape of a scissors so as to be able to receive the wedge between the opening55 and to surround and fight it from every part.56 [87] In regard to this I want you to take this general rule: the greatest remedy that is used against a plan of the en



27. At the battle of Zama (202 b.c.); see Frontinus II 3.16; Livy XXX 33, 35; Polybius XV 9, 11; cf. D II 27.4.

28. Or: is superior to others.

29. See Vegetius III 24, Livy XXXVII 41; cf. Xenophon, Education of Cyrus VI 1.29.





30. At the battle of Cheronea (86 b.c.), Lucius Sulla (ca. 138–178 b.c.) fought Archelaus, a general of Mithridates VI (132–163), king of Pontus; see Frontinus II 3.17; Plutarch, Sulla 15–19.

31. Cf. DIII 14.

32. Marcus Minucius Rufus against the Sordiscans and Dacians in 109 b.c.; see Frontinus II 4.3.

33. In 191 b.c., at the Pass of Thermopylae, Marcus Porcius Cato, the Elder (234–149 b.c.), surprised and defeated Antiochus III of Syria while fighting for Manius Acilius Glabrio. There is no record of the ruse reported by Fabrizio; see Frontinus II 4.4; Livy XXXVI 18; Plutarch, Marcus Cato 12.

34. In 358 b.c., Gaius Sulpicius Peticus as dictator; see Frontinus II 4.5; cf. Livy VII 12–15; D III 14.3; cf. also D III 10.

35. Gaius Marius (157–186 b.c.) against the Teutons at Aquae Sextiae in 102 b.c.; see Frontinus II 4.6; cf. D II 8.1.

36. Lit.: outside of his opinion.





37. See Frontinus II 4.12–13. Near Sardis in 546 b.c., Croesus, king of Lydia (560–546 b.c.), fought Cyrus the Great, king of Persia (559–529 b.c.). See Frontinus II 4.12; but cf. Herodotus I 80 and Xenophon, Cyropaedia VII 1.27, 48–49, where it is Cyrus who uses this stratagem against Croesus.

38. At the battle of Heraclea (280 b.c.) between Pyrrhus, king of Epirus (297–272 b.c.), and Rome; see Frontinus II 4.13; Plutarch, Pyrrhus 17.

39. Selim I, sultan of Turkey (1512–20), the “Grand Turk,” defeated Ismail I, the shah of Persia, in 1514 and the Mameluke dynasty in 1517. Cf. D II 17.5; cf. also D I 1.4, 19.2, 30.1, III 35.1.

40. In 229 b.c., Hamilcar Barca, father of Hannibal, conquered much of Spain for the Carthaginians from 238–229 b.c.; see Frontinus II 4.17; Polybius II 1.

41. SeeAWIV57.

42. In 658 b.c. near Rome, Tullus Hostilius, Rome’s third king (672–640 b.c.), was deserted by the Albans while preparing to fight the Veii and Fidenae. See Frontinus II 7.1 and Livy I 27, where the Albans do not go over to the enemy, but withdraw to nearby hills; cf. D I 22.





43. See Frontinus II 7.2–3.

44. Lit.: heads.

45. In 75 b.c., upon hearing of the death of Hirtuleius who had been killed by Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius; see Frontinus II 7.5.

46. At the battle of Orchomenus (85 b.c.); see Frontinus II 8.12; Plutarch, Sulla 21.

47. In 294 b.c., during the Samnite Wars, Marcus Atilius Regulus; see Frontinus II 8.11, IV 1.29; cf. Livy X 36.

48. In 339 b.c. against the Scythians, Philip II, king of Macedon (359–336 b.c.), father of Alexander the Great; see Frontinus II 8.14.

49. At the battle of Cannae (216 b.c.).





50. In 211 or 212 b.c.; cf. Frontinus II 10.2 on Titus Martius and Livy XXV 37 on Lucius Martius. The two Scipios, the father and the uncle of the Scipio who defeated Hannibal, are Publius Cornelius Scipio and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipo Calvus, respectively.

51. Lit.: doubt.

52. See Frontinus II 10.1 for a nearly identical strategem used by Titus Didius (not Dimius, as Fabrizio calls him), consul (98 b.c.), who fought in Spain 98–93 b.c. See AWVI 195 for evidence that Machiavelli was aware of the correct spelling.

53. See AWIV 10.

54. Uso here and in the next sentence.

55. Lit.: vacuum.

56. See Vegetius III 19.





emy is to do voluntarily what he plans that you do by force. For, by doing it voluntarily, you do it with order and to your advantage and his disadvantage. If you did it having been forced, it would be your ruin. [88] As fortification of this, I will not mind replying to you with something already said. [89] Does your adversary make a wedge so as to open your lines? [90] If you go with these opened, you disorder him and he does not disorder you. [91] Hannibal put elephants in the front of his army so as to open the army of Scipio with them. Scipio went with it opened and it was the cause both of his victory and of the ruin of the former.57 [92] Hasdrubal put his hardiest troops in the middle of the front of his army, so as to push back the troops of Scipio. Scipio commanded that they themselves be withdrawn, and he beat him.58[93] Similar designs, when they are foreseen,59 are the cause of the victory of those against whom they are ordered. [94] It also remains for me, if I remember well, to tell you what respects a captain ought to have before he goes to the fight. [95] Of this I have to tell you, first, that a captain is never to do battle unless he has the advantage, or unless he is necessitated. [96] The advantage arises from the site, from order, or from having either more or better troops. [97] Necessity arises when you see that by not fighting you must lose in any mode; as when you are lacking money and because of this your army has to be dissolved in any mode; through hunger assaulting you; when the enemy waits to be enlarged by new troops. [98] In these cases, you must always fight, even atyour own disadvantage. For it is much better to tempt fortune where it can favor you than to see your certain ruin by not tempting it. [99] And in this case, not fighting is as grave a sin in a captain as having had the opportunity to win and either not to have recognized it through ignorance or to have let it go through vileness.60 [100] Sometimes the enemy gives you advantages, and sometimes your own prudence [does so]. [101] In crossing rivers many have been beaten by a shrewd enemy of theirs who has waited until they were half on each side, and then he has assaulted him,61 as Caesar did to the Swiss. He consumed a quarter part of them, through their having been divided by a river.62 [102] Sometimes your enemy finds himself tired through having followed you too thoughtlessly. Finding yourself fresh and rested, you must not let such an opportunity pass. [103] Besides this, if the enemy presents battle to you at an early63hour of the morning, you can defer going out of your encampments for many hours. When he has been under arms enough and he has lost that first ardor with which he came, you can then fight with him. [104] Scipio and Metellus kept this mode in Spain, the one against Hasdrubal, the other against Sertorius.64 [105] If the enemy is diminished in forces, either through having divided his armies like the Scipios in Spain, or through some other cause, you must tempt chance. [106] The greater part of prudent captains receive the thrust of their enemies rather than go to assault them with a thrust. For fury is easily withstood by firm and solid men; and fury easily withstood is converted into vileness.65[107] Fabius did so against the Samnites and against the Gauls, and he was victorious, and his colleague Decius remained there dead.66 [108] Some who have feared the virtue of their enemy have begun the fight at an hour near night, so that when they were beaten, their own [men], defended by its darkness, were able to save themselves.67 [109] Having recognized that the enemy army is overcome by a certain superstition of not fighting at some time, some have selected that time for the fight, and won. [110] Caesar obeyed68 this in France against Ariovistus,69 and Vespasian in Syria against the Jews.70 [111] The greatest and most important precaution that a captain ought to take71 is to have nearby him faithful men, very expert in war and prudent, with whom he continually takes counsel.72 With them he reasons about his troops and about those of the enemy: which is the greater number; which is better armed or better on horseback or better trained; which are more fit to endure necessity; in which may he have more confidence, in the infantrymen or the cavalrymen. [112] Then they might consider the place where they are, and whether it is more to the purpose for the enemy or for him;73who may get provisions for themselves more easily; whether it is well to defer battle or make it; what good can time give to or take away from him; for many times soldiers, having seen the war drag on, become annoyed and, worn out by fatigue and tedium, they abandon you. [113] Above all it is important to know the enemies’ captain and who he has around him; whether he is temerarious or cautious, whether timid or audacious. [114] [It is important] to see whether you can trust the auxiliary soldiers. [115] And above all you ought to guard against leading an army to fight that is afraid or that is not confident74 of victory. For the greatest sign of [an impending] loss is when one does not believe one can win. [116] In this case you ought therefore to flee battle, either by acting like Fabius Maximus who by encamping in strong places did not give Hannibal the spirit to go to find him, or—when you believe that the enemy may come to find you even in strong places—leaving the country and dividing your troops throughout your own towns, so that the tedium of storming them tires [out the enemy].



57. At Zama in 202 b.c.; see Livy XXX 32 ff.

58. At Becula in 208 b.c.

59. Presentire.

60. Cf. DIII 10.2.

61. Change from plural to singular.

62. In 58 b.c.; see Caesar, Gallic WarI 12.

63. Lit.: good.





64. In 206 b.c., Scipio Africanus defeated Hasdrubal, son of Gisco; see Frontinus II 1.1.; cf. Livy XXVIII 15. The other incident occurred in 75 b.c., when Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius fought against Hirtuleius rather then Sertorius; see Frontinus II 1.2. Sertorius is mentioned in the succeeding paragraph of Frontinus (II 1.3).

65. Cf. DIII 11.

66. The battle of Sentinum (295 b.c.). Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus (dictator in 315 b.c.) and Publius Decius Mus, the Younger; see Frontinus II 1.8; cf. Livy X 28; D III 11, 45.

67. See Frontinus II 1.13.

68. Lit.: observed.

69. In 58 b.c.; see Frontinus II 1.16; cf. Caesar, Gallic WarI 50.

70. In 70 a.d., the emperor Vespasian (69–79); see Frontinus II 1.17; cf. D I 29.2.

71. For the following, see Vegetius III 19.

72. Cf. P 14.59–60.

73. Change from plural to singular.





ZANOBI. [117] Can one not flee battle otherwise than by dividing into more parts and entering into one’s towns?

FABRIZIO. [118] I believe I have reasoned with some of you another time75 that he who stays in the country cannot flee the battle when he has an enemy who wishes to fight in any mode. He has only one remedy: placing himself with his army at least fifty miles distant from his adversary, so as to have time to get out of his way before he goes to find it. [119] And Fabius Maximus never fled from battle with Hannibal, but wanted to make it to his own advantage; and Hannibal did not presume that he was able to conquer him by going to find him in the places where he was encamped. For if he had presupposed himself capable of conquering him, Fabius would have had to do battle with him in any mode, or flee. [120] In coming to war with the Romans, Philip, king of Macedon, the one who was father of Perseus, put his own encampments on a very high mountain so as not to do battle with them. But the Romans went to find him upon that mountain and beat him.76 [121] So as not to have to do battle with Caesar, who contrary to77 his own opinion had crossed a river, Cingetorix, captain of the French, went with his own men to a distance of many miles.78[122] In our times, if the Venetians did not want to come to battle with the king of France, they should not have waited for the French army to cross the Adda,79but [should have instead] distanced themselves from it, like Cingetorix. [123] Hence it is that having waited, they did not know how to seize the opportunity of the crossing of the troops to do battle, nor to flee it. For the French, since they were nearby, assaulted and beat the Venetians as they were decamping.80 [124] So it is that one cannot flee battle when the enemy wishes to do [battle] in any mode. [125] Nor can anyone allege Fabius, because in that case he wanted to flee battle as much as Hannibal did. [126] It happens many times that your soldiers are eager81 to fight; yet because you know you are at a disadvantage because of the numbers and the site or for some other cause, you desire to remove this desire from them. [127] It also happens that necessity or the opportunity constrains you to the battle, and that your soldiers lack confidence and are little disposed to fight. Hence it is necessary for you in the one case to frighten them and in the other to enflame them. [128] In the first case, when persuasions are not enough, there is no better mode than giving a part of them as prey to the enemy, so that those who have fought and those who have not believe you. [129] And you can very well do with art what happened to Fabius Maximus by chance. [130] As you know, the army of Fabius desired to fight with the army of Hannibal. His own master of horse had the same desire, but it did not seem [well] to Fabius to attempt a fight; so much so, that because of such disparity he had to divide the army. [131] Fabius kept his own [portion of the troops] in the encampments; the [master of horse] fought, and having ended up in great danger, would have been beaten if Fabius had not helped him. [132] Through this example, the master of horse, together with the whole army, knew that it was a wise policy to obey Fabius.82 [133] As to inflaming them to fight, it is well to make them indignant toward their enemies, showing that they speak ignominious words about them; to show that you have communication83 with them and have corrupted a part of them; to lodge in a place so that they see their enemies and make some light fight[s] with them, for the things that are seen daily are despised with more ease;84 to show oneself to be indignant and, with an oration to that purpose, to reprimand them for their sloth and, so as to make them ashamed, to speak of wanting to fight alone if they do not want to remain in your company. [134] And you must, above everything, take this precaution in wanting to make your soldiery obstinate in the fight: do not permit them to send any of their property85 home or to put it in some place until the war has ended, so that they understand that if in fleeing they save their lives, they do not save their possessions, the love of which is no less a ground for rendering men obstinate in defense.



74. Lit.: is diffident.

75. See D III 10.

76. At the battle of Cynocephalae (197 b.c.); see Polybius XVIII 7; Livy XXXIII 7–10.

77. Lit.: outside of.

78. See Caesar, Gallic WarVII 35, where Caesar uses the name Vercingetorix rather than Cingetorix for the leader of the Gauls and king of the Averni.

79. In 1509, at the battle of Agnadello between Venice and France. The latter was fighting as part of the Holy League, an alliance of the major Italian powers against Venice.





80. At the battle of Agnadello (1509), also called Vailà; see P 12.52, 20.84, 26.102; D I 6, 53, II 10, III 31.3; Florentine Histories I 29; Second Decannale lines 175–93.

81. Or: willing.

82. In 217 b.c.; see Livy XXII 24 ff.; cf. D I 53.2.

83. Lit.: intelligence.

84. See Vegetius III 12; Plutarch, Marius 16.

85. Facultà.





ZANOBI. [135] You have said86 how one can make fleeing soldiers87 fight by speaking to them. [136] Do you mean by this that one has to speak to the army, or to its heads?

FABRIZIO. [137] To persuade or dissuade a few of a thing is very easy. For if words are not enough, you can then use authority or force. But the difficulty is in removing from the multitude a sinister opinion that is also contrary either to the common good or to your opinion. There one can use only words that are heard by all, wishing to persuade all of them together. [138] For this, excellent captains needed to be orators, because without knowing how to speak to the whole army, [only] with difficulty can one do anything good. This is cast off altogether in these times of ours. [139] Read the life of Alexander the Great, and see how many times it was necessary for him to harangue and to speak publicly to the army. Otherwise, since it had become rich and full of prey, he would never have led it through the deserts of Arabia and into India to its own hardship and annoyance. For infinite times things arise by means of which an army falls to ruin, when the captain either does not know how or is not used to speaking to it. For this speaking takes away fear, inflames spirits, increases obstinacy, uncovers deceptions, promises rewards, shows dangers and the way to flee them, fills with hope, praises, vituperates, and does all of those things by which the human passions are extinguished or inflamed. [140] Hence that prince or republic which designs to make a new military and give reputation to this training ought to accustom its own soldiers to hear the captain speaking and the captain to know how to speak to them. [141] Religion, and the oath that was given to them when they went to serve in the military, was very valuable in keeping the ancient soldiers [well] disposed. For in each of their errors they were menaced not only by those evils that they could fear from men, but by those that they could expect from God. [142] Mixed with other religious modes, that thing many times made every enterprise easy for ancient captains, and it would always do so where religion is feared and observed. [143] Sertorius availed himself of this, by showing he spoke with a deer that, on behalf of God, promised him victory. [144] Sulla said he spoke with an image that he had taken from the temple of Apollo.88 [145] Many have said that God, who admonished them to fight, appeared to them in a dream. [146] In the times of our fathers, Charles VII, king of France, in the war that he made against the English, said he held counsel with a young girl sent by God, who was called by all the Virgin of France.89 That was the cause of his victory. [147] You can also keep modes that make your own [men] prize the enemy little, like those kept by the Spartan Agesilaus, who showed to his soldiers some naked Persians, so that having seen their delicate members, they would have no cause to fear them.90[148] Some have constrained them to fight by necessity, taking away from them every hope of saving themselves, outside of winning. That is the most hardy and the best provision that one, wanting to make his own soldiery obstinate, can make. [149] That obstinacy is increased by confidence and by the love of the captain or of the country. [150] Confidence is caused by arms, and by order, fresh victories, and the reputation91 of the captain. [151] Love of country is caused by nature; that of the captain, by virtue more than by any other benefit. [152] Necessities can be many, but the one that is stronger is that which constrains you to win or to die.



86. See AWIV 66–70; see also AWIII 230.

87. Soldati volti, soldiers who have turned away from the enemy in order to flee.

88. See Frontinus I 11.13, 11.12; cf. Plutarch, Sertorius 11, 20; Sulla 29.





89. St. Joan of Arc (1412–31).

90. At Sardis (395 b.c.), Agesilaus II, king of Sparta (398–360 b.c.), defeated the Persians; see Frontinus I 11.17; Plutarch, Agesilaus 9; Xenophon, Hellenica III 4.19.

91. Lit.: opinion.