# BOOK FIVE BOOK FIVE [1] I have shown you how one orders an army so as to do battle with another army that one sees placed against oneself, and have told you how one wins that [battle], and then the many circumstances for the various accidents that can happen in [the battle]. So now it seems to me to be time to show you how one orders an army against that enemy which others do not see,1but which, it is continually feared, may assault you. [2] This happens when one marches through enemy or suspect country. [3] And first you have to understand that ordinarily a Roman army always sent ahead some groups of cavalrymen as explorers2 of the road. [4] Then the right horn followed. [5] After this came all of the wagons that belonged to it. [6] After these came one legion; after it, its wagons; after these, another legion and, after that, its wagons; after these came the left horn with its wagons behind and, in the last part, the remainder of the cavalry followed. [7] This in effect was the mode in which it marched ordinarily. [8] And if on the march it turned out that the army was assaulted in front or in back, at a stroke they had all of the wagons withdraw either to the right or to the left, according to need or as best one could do with respect to the site. And all of the troops together, free from their impediments, made a front on the side where the enemy came. [9] If they were assaulted on the flank, the wagons were withdrawn toward the part that was secure, and [opposite] from the others made a front. [10] It seems to me it would be well to imitate this mode, since it is good and prudently governed, by sending the light cavalrymen ahead as explorers3 of the country, then, having four brigades, to have them march in a file, each with its own wagons behind. [11] And because there are two types of wagons, that pertaining to particular soldiers and that pertaining to public use by the whole camp, I would divide the public wagons into four parts, and to each brigade I would assign their own part of them by also dividing the artillery and all of the unarmed in four, so that each number of armed [men] had their own impediments equally. [12] But because it sometimes happens that one marches through a country not only suspect, but so hostile that you fear being assailed any hour, you are necessitated, so as to go more securely, to change the form of the march and to go in an ordered mode, so that neither the peasants nor the army can offend you, finding you unprepared.4 [13] In such a case the ancient captains usually went with the army squared (so they called this form, not because it was altogether square, but through its being able to fight on four sides)5and they said that they went prepared both for marching and for fighting. I do not want to distance myself from that mode, and to this effect6 I want to order my own two brigades, which I have taken as a general rule. [14] Therefore, wanting to march securely through enemy country and to be able to respond on any side when assaulted unexpectedly,7 and wanting, according to the ancients, to arrange it in a square whose opening is a 212-braccia space on each side, I would plan to make a square in this mode: I would first place the flanks 212 braccia distant from one another, and I would put five battalions on the flank lengthwise and three braccia distant from one another. Since each battalion occupies 40 braccia, these would occupy 212 braccia with their spaces. [15] Between the fronts and between the tails of these two flanks I would then put the other ten battalions, five on each side, so that four are close to the right flank along the front, and four[are close] to the left flank along the tail, leaving between each one an interval of three braccia. One, then, is near to the left flank along the front and to the right flank along the tail. [16] And because the opening from one flank to the other is 212 braccia, and these battalions, which are posted alongside one another by width and not by length, would occupy 134 braccia with their intervals, a space of 78 braccia would end up remaining between the four battalions placed on the front on the right flank and the one placed on[the front] on the left. And that same space would end up remaining in the battalions placed on the rear part. Nor would there be any other difference except that one space would end up on the back part and toward the right horn, the other would end up on the front part toward the left horn. [17] In the space of 78 braccia in front, I would place all of the ordinary velites; in that behind, the extraordinary [velites], which would end up being one thousand per space. [18] And wanting the space that is inside the army to be 212 braccia in every direction, it would be necessary for the five battalions that are placed at the front, and those that are placed at the tail, not to occupy any part of the space that the flanks take. It would therefore be necessary for the battalions behind to touch the tail of the flanks with their front, and for those in front to touch [the flanks’] front with their tail, so that in every corner of this army a space would be left for receiving another battalion. [19] And because there are four spaces, I would take four bands from the extraordinary pikes, and I would put one of them in every corner. In the middle of the vacancy of this army, I would put, as one battalion in a square, the two bands8 of the said pikes that remain to me. At their front would be the captain-general with his own men around him. [20] Because these battalions so ordered all march in one direction but do not all fight in one direction, in placing them together one has to order for fighting those sides that are not guarded by other battalions. [21] One must therefore consider that the five battalions that are in front guard all the other parts except those in front, and ordinarily these have to be put together there, with the pikes forward. [22] The five battalions that are behind are guarded on all their sides except the side behind. One must therefore put these together so that the pikes end up behind, as we showed in its place.9 [23] The five battalions that are on the right flank are guarded on all their sides except the right flank. [24] The five that are on the left are covered on all their sides except the left flank.Therefore, in ordering the battalions, one must make the pikes turn to the flank that remains uncovered. [25] Because the decurions end up along the front and along the tail, so that if they have to fight all of the arms and members are in their own places, the mode of doing this was mentioned when we reasoned about the modes of ordering the battalions.10 [26] I would divide the artillery. I would put one part of it outside on the right flank and the other [outside] on the left. [27] The light cavalrymen I would send ahead to scout the country. [28] I would place the men-at-arms behind, part on the right corner and part on the left, forty braccia distant from the battalions. [29] In any mode you order an army, you have to take this generality regarding cavalry: it always has to be placed either behind or on the flanks. [30] And whoever puts them ahead, directly in front of the army, must do one of two things. Either put them so far ahead that, if they are repulsed, they have enough space to give them time to be able to get out of the way of your infantrymen and not to charge them. Or order them with so many intervals that the cavalrymen can enter through them without disordering the [infantrymen]. [31] And do not let anyone fail to esteem this reminder. For many have been ruined by not having heeded it, and have been disordered and broken by their very own [cavalrymen]. [32] The wagons and the unarmed men are put in the piazza that is left inside the army, and are divided so that they easily give passage11 to anyone wanting to go either from one side of the army to the other or from one front to the other. [33] In every direction from the outer side, these battalions occupy two hundred and eighty-two braccia of space,12 without the artillery and the cavalrymen. [34] And because this square is composed of two brigades, one must divide that part which makes one brigade from that [which makes] the other. [35] And because the brigades are named by their number, and each of them, as you know, has ten battalions and one headgeneral, I would have the first brigade place its first five battalions on the front and the other five on the left flank, and the head stand on the left corner of the front. [36] [I would] then [have] the second brigade put its first five battalions on the right flank, and the other five on the tail, and the head would be on the right corner, which would end up doing the office of the tergiduttore. [37] Having ordered the army in this mode, one has to make it move and, while going, observe this order completely. And without doubt, it is secure against all the tumults of the peasants. [38] Nor need the captain make any other provision against tumultuous assaults than sometimes to give to some cavalryman or band of velites a commission to push them back. [39] Nor will it ever happen that these tumultuous troops end up finding you within range of sword or pike. For unordered troops fear ordered ones, and it will always be seen that they make a great assault with cries and with noises without otherwise getting near, just like snapping dogs around a mastiff. [40] When he came to harm the Romans in Italy, Hannibal passed through all of France and always took little account of the tumultuous French.13 [41] In wanting to march, one must have levelers and sappers ahead who make the road for you. They will be guarded by those cavalrymen who are sent ahead to scout. [42] In this order, an army will march ten miles a day, and enough of the sun will be left for it to encamp and eat, for ordinarily an army marches twenty miles. [43] If it ends up being assaulted by an ordered army, this assault cannot arise at once. For an ordered army comes at your pace, so that you know in time to reorder yourself for battle and arrange yourself quickly in the form, or similar to the form, of the army that was shown to you above.14 [44] For if you are assaulted on the part ahead, you have nothing to do but to make the artillery that is on the flanks and the cavalrymen that are behind come ahead, and place them in those places and at that distance spoken of above.15 [45] The thousand velites that are ahead go out of their places and divide themselves in five hundred per part, and enter into their places between the cavalrymen and the horns of the army. [46] In the opening that they leave, the two bands of extraordinary pikes, which I placed in the middle of the piazza of the army, will then enter. [47] The thousand velites that I placed behind leave that place and divide themselves along the flanks of the battalions as fortification for them, and through the opening that they leave, all of the wagons and the unarmed go out and are put at the back of the battalions. [48] Thus, the piazza being empty and each man having gone to his place, the five battalions that I placed behind come forward through the opening that is between one flank and the other, and march toward the front battalions. Three [of the five battalions that are coming forward] stop forty braccia from the [five battalions in front], with equal intervals between one [battalion and] another [from side to side]; and the [other] two [battalions] remain behind at a distance of forty braccia [from the three that have just moved ahead]. [49] That form can be ordered at once, and it ends up being almost the same as the first arrangement of the army that we showed.16 And if it ends up more narrow in front, it ends up more thick on the flanks; which does not give them less strength. [50] But because the five battalions that are at the tail have pikes on the rear part, for the causes that I mentioned before,17 it is necessary to have them come to the part ahead, wanting them to make the back into the front of the army. Therefore, one must either have it turn around battalion by battalion as a solid body, or have them enter at once between the orders of the shields, and go ahead. The latter mode is more rapid and less disorderly than making them turn around. [51] You must do this for all those that remain behind, in every quality of assault, as I will show you. [52] If one senses that the enemy will come on the rear part, one first has to make each one turn his face where he had his back, and immediately the army ends up having made its head into a tail and its tail into a head. [53] One must then keep all those modes of ordering the front that I speak of above. [54] If the enemy ends up attacking the right flank, one should make the whole army turn its face toward that side, then do all those things in the fortification of the front that are spoken of above, such that the cavalrymen, the velites, and the artillery are in places that conform to this front. [55] Here there is only this difference: that in varying the fronts of those that are switched, some have to go less [distance] and others more. [56] It is very true that in making a front from the right flank, the velites that had to enter into the intervals that are between the horns of the armies and the cavalrymen would be those that were nearer to the left flank. In their place, the two bands of extraordinary pikes would have to enter, posted in the middle. [57] But before they entered there, the wagons and the unarmed would clear out the piazza through the opening and withdraw behind the left flank; which would then end up being the tail of the army. [58] The other velites that had been posted on the tail according to the principal ordering would not change in this case, because that place, which from the tail would end up being the flank, would not remain open. [59] All of the other things must be done in the first front as spokenof. [60] Whatwassaid about making the right flank into afrontis [also] understood to have been said about making the left flank into [a front]. For one must observe the same order. [61] If the enemy comes thick and ordered so as to assault you on two sides, the two sides that he comes to assault must be made strong with the two that are not assaulted by doubling the orders in each one and by dividing the artillery, the velites and the cavalrymen for each part. [62] If he comes on three or four sides, it is necessary that either you or he lack prudence. For if you are wise, you will never put yourself in a place in which the enemy can assault you on three or four sides with thick and ordered troops. For in wanting to offend you securely he must be so thick that he assaults you on every side with almost as many troops as your whole army has. [63] And if you are so lacking prudence that you enter into the lands and forces of an enemy that has three times more ordered troops than you, you can complain only about yourself if you end badly. [64] If this happens not through your fault, but through some misfortune,18 it will be harm without shame, and will happen to you as to the Scipios in Spain and to Hasdrubal in Italy.19 [65] But if the enemy does not have many more troops than you, and wants to assault you from more sides so as to disorder you, it will be his foolishness and your fortune.20 For to do this he must thin himself out so that you can easily charge him on one side and sustain him on another, and in a brief time ruin him. [66] This mode of ordering an army is necessary against an enemy that one does not see but that one fears. It is a very useful thing to accustom your soldiers to put themselves together and march in such an order and, while marching, to order themselves so as to fight according to the first front, and then to return to the form in which they march, and from that, to make their tail and then their flank into a front, and from these to return to the first form. [67] These drills and accustomings are necessary when wanting to have a disciplined and practiced army. [68] In these things captains and princes have to exert themselves. Military discipline is nothing other than knowing how to command and execute them well; a disciplined army is nothing other than an army that is well practiced in these orders; and it would not be possible that whoever used similar discipline would ever, in these times, be beaten. [69] And if this squared form that I have shown you is somewhat difficult, such difficulty is necessary, and to be handled through training. For knowing well how to order and to maintain oneself in it, one will then know how to stay more easily in those that do not have so much difficulty. 1. Or: which no one sees. 2. Lit.: herds of horses as speculators; for the marching order of the Romans, see Polybius VI 40. 3. Lit.: speculators. 4. Lit.: unforeseen. 5. Parentheses in original; “squared” translates quadrato, “square” quadra, and “four” quattro. 6. See figure 5, page 173. 7. Lit.: unforeseen. 8. Lit.: flags. 9. See AWII 221–26. 10. See ibid. 11. Lit.: a way. 12. Here Fabrizio seems to contradict his earlier claim (see AWII 186) that a battalion will not be square but rectangular, such that five battalions put together front-to-back would be considerably longer than five put together from side-to-side. 13. See Polybius III 51. 14. The arrangement Fabrizio is about to show is represented in figure 6, page 174. The arrangement of the “army shown above” is represented in figure 4 and is described at AW III 48 ff. 15. For the placement of the artillery, see AWIII 64–65; for that of cavalry, see AWIII 19, 58–59. 16. Cf. figures 4 and 6, pages 172 and 174. 17. See AW V 22. 18. Sventura, not sfortuna. 19. For the two Scipios, see note to AWIV 77; for Hasdrubal, see Livy XXVII 39 ff. 20. Ventura, not fortuna. ZANOBI. [70] I believe, as you say, that these orders are very necessary, and for my part, I would not know what to add or take away. [71] It is true that I desire to know two things from you: one, when you want to make the tail or the flank into the front, and you want to have them turn, whether this is commanded with the voice or with music; the other, whether those whom you send ahead to level the roads so as to make a way for the army must be among the same soldiers from your own battalions, or other vile troops deputed for a like exercise. FABRIZIO. [72] Your first question is very important, for many times captains’ armies have been disordered by their commandments not being understood well or interpreted badly. Therefore, amidst dangers, the words21 with which one commands must be clear and sharp. [73] And if you command with music, one mode must bemadeso different from the other that they are not mistaken for each other. If you command with words, you must take the precaution of fleeing general words, and [must] use particular ones and flee those among the particular ones that can be interpreted sinisterly. [74] Many times the saying “Back! Back!” has made an army come to ruin.22 Therefore, one must flee this word and use “Withdraw!” in its place. [75] If you want to turn them so as to change a front into either a flank or a back, never use: “Turn!” but say, “To the left! To the right! To the rear! To the front!” [76] All the other words have to be simple and sharp as well, like, “Close ranks! Stand strong! Forward! Retreat!” [77] And all those things that can be done with the voice are done [with the voice]; the other things are done with music. [78] As to the levelers, which is your second question, I would have my very own soldiers do this office, both because in the ancient military it was so done, and also so that there may be fewer unarmed people and fewer impediments in the army. I would draw the needed number from every battalion, and I would have them take instruments fit for leveling and leave their arms with those files that were nearest to them, which would carry them for them. When the enemy came, they would not have to do anything but take them again and return to their orders. 21. Lit.: voice. In sentences 71–77, voce is translated as “word” and “voice.” Parola, also translated as “word” but never as “voice,” does not occur in these sentences. 22. Cf.D III 14.1. ZANOBI. [79] Who would carry the instruments for leveling? FABRIZIO. [80] The wagons deputed for carrying such23 instruments. ZANOBI. [81] I doubt that you would ever get these soldiers of yours to dig. FABRIZIO. [82] Everything will be reasoned about in its place;24 now I want to let this part be and to reason about the army’s mode of living. For having so exhausted it, it seems to me to be time to refresh it and restore it with food. [83] You have to understand that a prince should order his army to be as unencumbered as possible and take away from it all those things that add a burden to it and make enterprises more difficult for it. [84] Among those that increase the difficulty more is having to keep the army provided with wine and with cooked bread. [85] The ancients did not think of wine. For, lacking it, they drank water tinged with a little vinegar to give it taste. So among the army’s food supplies there was vinegar and not wine. [86] They did not cook their bread in ovens, as is done in the cities,25 but they did provide flour, and with it every soldier satisfied himself in his own mode, having lard and fat as condiments that gave taste to the bread they made and maintained their strength. So the food provisions for the army were flour, vinegar, lard and fat, and for the horses, orzo. [87] Ordinarily, they had big and small herds of animals that followed the army and did not give much impediment since they did not need to be carried. [88] From this order it arose that an ancient army sometimes marched many days through isolated and difficult places without suffering the hardships of foraging, because they lived on things that could be pulled behind them easily. [89] The contrary happens in modern armies. Not wanting to do without wine and eating bread cooked in those modes in which [it is cooked] when they are at home, and not being able to make provision for this for long, they are often starved, or if they are indeed provided for, it is done with hardship and at very great expense. [90] Therefore, I would withdraw my army from this form of living, nor would I want them to eat bread other than that which they have cooked themselves. [91] As to wine, I would not prohibit drinking it or some of it coming along with the army, but I would not use either industry or any trouble so as to have it. And in other provisions I would govern myself altogether like the ancients. [92] If you would consider these things well, you would see how much difficulty is taken out of the way, and how many worries and hardships an army and a captain are deprived of, and how much convenience will be given to whatever enterprise one wants to make. 23. A simile. 24. See AWVII 214. 25. Cittadi, coined in antiquity for a free city with its own name and emblem, can mean a “real city” or “principal city” as well as simply “city.” ZANOBI. [93] We have conquered the enemy in the field and marched upon his country. It is reasonable26 that spoils be had, towns made to pay tribute, and prisoners taken. I would therefore want to know how the ancients governed themselves in these things. FABRIZIO. [94] Here I will satisfy you. [95] Because I have reasoned about this with some of you another time,27 I believe28 that you have considered how present wars impoverish the lords that win as much as those that lose. For if the one loses his state, the other loses his money and his belongings. This was not so anciently, for the winner of wars got rich. [96] This arises from not taking account of spoils in these times, as was done anciently, but leaving everything to the discretion of the soldiers. [97] This mode makes two very great disorders: one, I have stated;29 the other, that the soldiery becomes more greedy for spoils and less observant of orders. Many times it has been seen that greed for spoils has made the one who had been victorious lose. [98] Therefore, the Romans, who were the princes of this exercise,30 provided for one and the other of these inconveniences by ordering it that all the spoils belong to the public, and that the public then dispense it as seemed [best] to it. [99] Therefore, they had questors in the armies, who were bursars, as we said.31 All the tribute and spoils were located next to them. The consul used this to give the ordinary pay to the soldiers, to help the wounded and the sick, and for the other needs of the army. [100] The consul was very able, and often did, use it to yield spoils to the soldiers. But this concession did not make disorder. For having beaten the army, all the spoils were put in the middle and distributed by head, according to the qualities of each. [101] This mode made the soldiers attend to winning and not to robbing. And the Roman legions used to conquer the enemy and not follow him, because they never departed from their orders. Only the cavalry followed him with those lightly armed and, if there were [any heavily armed soldiers, they were] soldiers other than legionaries. [102] For if the spoils had belonged to him who gained them, it would not have been possible or reasonable to keep the legions firm; and many dangers would have been borne. [103] Therefore, from this it arose that the public got rich, and at their own triumphs every consul carried into the treasury much treasure, all of which was from tributes and spoils. [104] The ancients considered another thing well:32 they wanted each soldier to deposit a third of the money that they gave him next to the one who carried the flag of his battalion, who never reconsigned it to him unless the war was finished. [105] They did this for two reasons. First, because the soldiery made capital from its money; for since the greater part were young and negligent, they spent as much as they had without necessity. Second, because they knew that their belongings were next to the flag, they were forced to take more care of it and defend it with more obstinacy. Thus, this mode made them savers and hardy. [106] It is necessary to observe all of these things in wanting to return the military to its limits. 26. Lit.: Reason wants. 27. See D II 6; cf. FH VI 1. 28. In Italian, “I believe” begins the sentence. 29. Presumably immediately above in AWV 95. 30. For the Romans’ management of spoils, see Polybius X 16, 17; Livy IV 53, V 20, X 46, XXXVII 57. 31. There seems to be no such previous discussion. ZANOBI. [107] I believe that it is not possible that dangerous accidents not befall an army while it marches from place to place, wherein the industry of the captain and the virtue of the soldiers are needed if it wants to evade them. Therefore, I would value it33 were you to relate any that occur to you. FABRIZIO.[108] I will gladly34content you, it being especially necessary, and since I want to provide perfect knowledge35 of this exercise. [109] While they are with the army, captains must guard themselves against ambushes above every other thing. One runs into these in two modes: either you enter them while marching, or by the art of the enemy you are drawn in, without your anticipating it. [110] Wanting to avoid the first case, it is necessary to send ahead double guards that scout the country. You should use more diligence the more the country is fit for ambushes, as are wooded and mountainous countries, because they are always put in a forest or behind a hill. [111] And just as an ambush ruins you when you don’t foresee it, so you are not harmed36 when you do foresee it. [112] Birds and dust have uncovered the enemy many times. For when the enemy comes to find you, he will always make a great deal of dust that will signal to you his approach. [113] A captain, by seeing doves and other birds that fly in formation37take offand circle around and not land in places where he should pass, has many times recognized an ambush of the enemy to be there, and has sent his troops ahead. Having recognized it, he has saved himself and harmed his enemy. [114] As to the second case of being drawn in, which we call being drawn in by a tug, you must be shrewd about easily believing those things that lack the reasonableness they have.38 For instance, if the enemy puts spoils in front of you, you must believe that in them is a hook, and that a deception is hidden within. [115] If many enemies are chased by few of your [men], if few enemies assault many of your [men], if the enemies make a sudden and unreasonable retreat, you must always fear a deception in such cases. [116] And you must never believe that the enemy does not know how to conduct his own affairs. Indeed, if you want to be deceived less and want to bear less danger, the more the enemy is weak [or] the less the enemy is cautious, so much more must you esteem him. [117] And in this you have to use two diverse means, for you have to fear him in thought and in order, but with words and with other extrinsic demonstrations, show that you despise him. For this last mode makes your soldiers hope more to have victory; the other one makes you more cautious and less apt to be deceived. [118] And you have to understand that when one marches through enemy country, one bears more and greater dangers than in doing battle. Therefore, while marching, the captain must redouble his diligence.39 The first thing he must do is to have the whole country through which he is marching described and depicted,40 so that he knows the places, the number, the distances, the roads, the rivers, the marshes, and all of their qualities. To get to know this, he must have with him, diversely and in diverse modes, those who know the places, and question them with diligence, and compare what they say and, according to the comparisons, take note. [119] He ought to send cavalrymen ahead, and with them prudent heads, not so much to discover the enemy as to contemplate41the country, to see whether it compares with the design and with the notes that he has made of it. [120] He also ought to send guides guarded by the hope of reward and fear of penalty. Above all, he should have the army not know to what action he guides it. For there is nothing more useful in war than keeping silent the things that have to be done. [121] And you ought to warn your own soldiers to be prepared with their arms so that42 a sudden assault does not disturb them. For things foreseen offend less. [122] To flee the confusions of the march, many have put the wagons and the unarmed under flags, and commanded them to follow them, so that if they have to stop or withdraw while marching, they can do it more easily. I much approve of this as something useful. [123] In marching one should also beware that one part of the army does not come unstuck from the other, or that by one going quickly and the other slowly, the army does not thin itself out. These things are cause for disorder. [124] Therefore, he needs to locate the heads in a place in which they maintain a uniform pace, holding back those who have sped up too much and speeding up the late ones. This pace cannot be better regulated than by music. [125] One ought also to widen the roads, so that a battalion can almost always go in order.43 [126] One ought to consider the custom and the qualities of the enemy, and whether he usually assaults you in the morning or at midday or in the evening, and whether he is more powerful with his infantrymen or with his cavalrymen; and to order yourself and to prepare yourself according to your understanding. [127] But let us come to some particular accidents. [128] Removing yourself from before the enemy because you judge yourself inferior and, through this, not wanting to do battle with him, it sometimes happens as he comes behind you that you arrive at the bank of a river which takes you time to cross, so that the enemy is about to overtake and fight you. [129] Some who have found themselves in such a danger have enclosed their army on the rear part with a ditch, and filled it with brushwood and set it on fire, then crossed with the army without being able to be impeded by the enemy, as he was held back by the fire that was in the middle. 32. For this discussion, see Vegetius II 20, who says, “It was a divinely inspired institution of the ancients to deposit `with the standards’ half the donative that the soldiers received” (Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, trans. N. P. Milner [Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993], 53). The donative, which far exceeded the soldiers’ regular pay, consisted of bounty distributed on imperial birthdays and accession days (ibid., 53 n. 6). 33. Lit.: hold it dear. 34. Lit.: voluntarily. 35. Lit.: science. 36. Lit.: offended. 37. Or: line. 38. “They” refers to “things.” 39. For the following discussion (AWV118–26), see Vegetius III 6. 40. That is, he should have maps made. 41. Lit.: speculate; cf. AWV 3, 10. 42. Lit.: because. ZANOBI. [130] It is hard for me to believe that this fire could hold them back, especially because I recall having heard how Hanno the Carthaginian, as he was being besieged by the enemy, enclosed himself with timber on the part through which he wanted to break, and set it on fire. From this, since his enemy didn’t know on which part to guard him, he had his army pass over those flames, by having each one keep his shield over his face so as to defend himself from the fire and from the smoke.44 FABRIZIO. [131] You speak well. But consider what I have said and what Hanno did. For I said that they made a ditch and filled it with brushwood, so that whoever wanted to pass through had to contend with the ditch and the fire. [132] Hanno made the fire without the ditch. And because he wanted to pass through it, he must not have made it hardy. For even without the ditch it would have hindered him. [133] Don’t you know that Nabis the Spartan, besieged in Sparta by the Romans, set fire to a part of his town so as to impede the pace of the Romans, who had already entered inside? [134] And by means of the flames, he not only impeded their pace, but pushed them back outside.45 [135] But let us return to our material. [136] Quintus Latatius, the Roman, having the Cimbri at his back and having arrived at a river, showed that he was giving time to the enemy to fight him so that46 the enemy would give him time to cross. He therefore feigned wanting to camp there, had ditches made and some tents pitched, and sent some cavalrymen through the field foraging so that the Cimbri, believing that he was encamping, encamped as well and divided themselves in several parts to provide for food. By being crafty about this, he crossed the river without their being able to impede [him].47 [137] To cross a river with no bridge, some have diverted it and drawn off part of it behind their back; and the other, having then become lower, was crossed with ease. [138] When wanting infantrymen more securely to cross rivers that are rapid, one puts part of the heaviest cavalrymen up [stream] to withstand the water, and the other part, down [stream] to help the infantrymen if some of them are conquered by the river while crossing.48[139] Rivers that one does not ford are also crossed with bridges, boats, and [floating] bags. It is therefore well for your armies to have the aptitude for being able to do all of these things. [140] Sometimes it happens that the enemy, opposed on the other bank, impedes you from crossing a river. [141] In wanting to conquer this difficulty there is no example better for imitating than that of Caesar. Having his army on the bank of a river in France, and his crossing impeded by Vercingetorix, the Frenchman, who had his troops on the other part of the river, he marched for several days along the river, and the enemy did likewise. [142] Having made an encampment in a wooded place fit for hiding troops, Caesar drew off three cohorts from each legion and had them stop in that place, commanding that once he had departed, they throw a bridge up and fortify it. With his other troops he continued the march. [143] Hence, upon seeing the number of legions and believing that no part had remained behind, Vercingetorix also followed him on the march. But Caesar, when he believed that the bridge was done, turned back around and, having found everything in order, crossed the river without difficulty.49 43. Ordinanza, usually translated “militia.” 44. See Frontinus I 5.27. ZANOBI. [144] Do you have any rule for recognizing fords? 45. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta (207–192 b.c.), in 195 b.c.; see Livy XXXIV 39, who says that it was due solely to Pythagoras, a Spartan commander, that the city was saved by this strategem while Nabis looked about in fear for a way to escape. 46. Lit.: because. 47. In 102 b.c., Quintus Lutatius Catulus. 48. See Vegetius III 7. 49. See Caesar, Gallic War VII 34–35. FABRIZIO. [145] Yes, we have. [146] Between the stagnant and the running water, in the part which seems50like a ridge to him who looks at it, the river is always less deep. It is a place more fit to be forded than elsewhere. For the river has always deposited more in that place, and has collected more of that material that the deep [part of the river] takes with it. [147] Because it has been tested51 many times, this is something very true. ZANOBI. [148] If it ends up that the river has deepened the ford, such that the cavalrymen sink there, what remedy do you give for that? FABRIZIO. [149] To make grates of timber and put them on the bottom of theriver andcross on them. [150] But let’s continue our reasoning. [151] Ifithappens that a captain goes52 with his army between two mountains that have only two roads, the one ahead or the one behind, for saving oneself, and these are occupied by his enemies, as a remedy he has to do that what someone has done before him. This is to make a great and difficult-to-cross ditch on his rear part, and show the enemy that he wants to hold him back with it, so as to be able to force all of his forces through the road that remains open ahead without having any fear from behind. [152] Once the enemies believe this, they make themselves strong toward the open part and abandon the closed. He then throws a bridge of timber ordered to such an effect over the ditch, and on that part without any impediment he crosses and frees himself from the hands of the enemy. [153] Lucius Minucius, the Roman consul, was in Liguria with his armies, and had been closed up by his enemies between certain mountains from which he could not get out. [154] Therefore, on horseback he sent some Numidian soldiers he had in his army, who were badly armed and on little skinny horses, toward the places that had been guarded by the enemies. On first appearance, they made the enemies get together to defend the pass. But when they saw these badly ordered and, according to them, badly horsed troops, they widened the orders of their guard, esteeming them little. [155] When the Numidians perceived this, having spurred their horses and made a thrust upon them, they passed through without their being able to make any remedy. By wasting and plundering the country, those that passed through constrained the enemy to leave the pass free to the army of Lucius.53[156] Any captain who has found himself assaulted by a great multitude of enemies, has drawn himself together and given the enemy the ability to surround him entirely. Then, he has forced the part that he has recognized [to be] the weakest, and through that way has had room made, and saved himself. [157] Marc Antony, retreating before the army of the Parthians, noticed how everyday when he moved at daybreak, the enemy assaulted him and harassed him for the whole march. So he took the policy of not leaving before midday. [158] So the Parthians, believing that he did not want to decamp for that day, returned totheir quarters. And Marc Antony was then able to march the whole rest of the day without any molestation.54 [159] This same[man], to flee the arrows of the Parthians, commanded his troops to go down on their knees when the Parthians came toward them, and the second file of the battalion to place its shields on the head of the first, the third on the second, the forth on the third, and so on successively. So that the whole army ended up being as if under a roof and defended from the enemy arrows.55[160] This is as much as occurs to me to tell you about what can happen to an army while marching. Therefore, if nothing else occurs to you, I will pass to another part. 50. Lit.: makes. 51. Or: experienced; lit.: experimented. 52. Condursi. 53. In 193 b.c.; cf. Frontinus I 5.16, who incorrectly names Lucius Manucius, with Livy XXXV 11, who correctly names Quintus Minucius Thermus. 54. In 36 b.c.; see Frontinus II 13.7. 55. See Frontinus II 3.15.